In Garmon v. Vilsack, plaintiff Vera Garmon sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging she was not selected for a permanent Program Support Clerk position because of her age (57 at the time); her race discrimination claim under Title VII was withdrawn. The defendant moved for summary judgment, showing that applicants were ranked by objective scores from an electronic questionnaire processed by Human Resources, with selections made by the Miami office director based on the top three scores plus veteran preferences and qualifications. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing the employer's stated reasons were pretext for age discrimination, as the selected candidates had higher rankings and no evidence supported an inference of discriminatory motive.
This case involves a plaintiff's motion to remand a lawsuit to state court after all federal claims had been dismissed, leaving only state-law claims pending. The court denied the motions to remand and decided to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the case had been pending in federal court since November 2010, the court was already familiar with it after issuing rulings and overseeing discovery, trial was imminent, and remand at this late stage would waste judicial resources, inconvenience the parties, and be unfair to the defendant who was prepared for trial.
The case involved a plaintiff suing the City of Miami Beach and a police officer for actions during her 2007 arrest, including claims that the officer used excessive force and committed sexual battery after driving her to a dark alley; the suit asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officer and state tort claims for battery and false imprisonment, seeking to hold the City vicariously liable. The court granted the City's motion to dismiss the vicarious liability portions of the tort claims to the extent they rested on the alleged sexual battery. The core reasoning was that Florida Statute section 768.28(9)(a) bars municipal liability for employee acts committed outside the course and scope of employment, and the sexual battery served no employer purpose and was therefore outside that scope.
This case involves claims by plaintiffs, who are undocumented immigrants, alleging retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against their former employers and counsel. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants retaliated in prior FLSA lawsuits by publicly disclosing their immigration status in court, questioning them during depositions about their illegal entry into the country, and filing a motion seeking criminal investigation referrals for harboring or concealing illegal aliens. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on these retaliation claims. It found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the defendants' actions were motivated by retaliation or had a legitimate basis, such as compliance with ethical or legal duties, leading to the denial of summary judgment.
In Salinas v. Carnival Corp., a Nicaraguan seaman sued his employer for negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act after suffering injuries on two Carnival vessels. Carnival moved to dismiss and compel arbitration under a clause in the Seafarer’s Agreement that required arbitration in Panama or the Bahamas and applied the law of the vessel’s flag state. The court found the arbitration agreement enforceable under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards but held that the choice-of-law provision was void as against public policy because it could prospectively waive U.S. statutory remedies. The court severed the choice-of-law clause, granted the motion to compel arbitration, and retained jurisdiction to enforce any award. The ruling followed Eleventh Circuit precedent allowing arbitration while preserving the possibility of later review of statutory claims.
This case involves an FLSA retaliation claim in which the plaintiffs allege that the defendants, including attorney Chris Kleppin and his firm, engaged in unlawful retaliation in prior FLSA lawsuits by making statements and asking deposition questions about the plaintiffs' immigration status. The plaintiffs moved to disqualify Kleppin and the Glasser firm from representing the co-defendants under Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.7 (conflicts of interest) and 4-3.7 (lawyer as witness). The court denied disqualification under Rule 4-1.7, finding no direct adversity between clients, valid waivers, and no material limitation on professional judgment. Under Rule 4-3.7, the court granted the motion in part, ruling that Kleppin may not serve as trial advocate for his co-defendants because his testimony would likely be required on contested matters, though another attorney from the firm could represent them and Kleppin could proceed pro se on his own behalf.