In Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff, a former Wal-Mart employee in Michigan, sued after the company terminated him for not returning from an approved leave of absence and later refused to rehire him following a 90-day waiting period. Berrington claimed the refusal to rehire violated Michigan public policy, alleging it stemmed from his pursuit of unemployment benefits, which Wal-Mart had opposed. Wal-Mart moved to dismiss the single count for failure to state a claim. The federal district court, applying Michigan substantive law under diversity jurisdiction, granted the motion to dismiss. It held that neither the Michigan Supreme Court nor Court of Appeals has recognized a public policy exception to at-will employment in the context of hiring or rehiring decisions, and federal courts will not expand state common law to create such a cause of action.
This case arose from a 2001 car accident in which debtor Matthew Henney, then under 21, rear-ended another vehicle after purchasing beer, killing one Rumfield brother and injuring the other; the Rumfields obtained state-court judgments against both Henney and the store that sold him alcohol. Henney filed for bankruptcy and sought to discharge the resulting debt, while the Rumfields argued it was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) because it stemmed from operation of a vehicle while intoxicated. The bankruptcy court granted the Rumfields summary judgment, finding preclusive effect from the dram-shop verdict and from Michigan’s zero-tolerance statute for minors. On appeal, the district court held that neither the dram-shop judgment (to which Henney was not a party) nor the zero-tolerance violation established intoxication as defined by Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.625(1), and therefore vacated the bankruptcy rulings and remanded for a factual determination of whether Henney was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
This case is a dispute over whether two insurance policies provided coverage for an incident involving Jim A. Fish's yacht during its lay-up period. The court granted summary judgment to Fish on the Mid-Century Yacht Secure policy, finding that the policy's failure to define terms such as "safe berth afloat" meant coverage was not excluded. The court denied without prejudice the cross-motions for summary judgment on the Farmers Insurance Exchange umbrella policy because the record was incomplete and genuine issues of material fact appeared to exist. The decision applied standard rules for interpreting insurance contracts and evaluating summary judgment motions in a diversity jurisdiction case.
The case involved a dispute over a 2004 contract between a condominium developer and Traverse City Light & Power (TCLP) for the financing and installation of street lighting on a Michigan property, with provisions allowing TCLP to impose superior tax liens on individual condo units in case of default. Brown Bark I, L.P. (BBI), the subsequent owner of the property through a mortgage foreclosure, sued TCLP seeking to avoid the payment obligations and liens. The court held that the Tax Injunction Act did not deprive it of jurisdiction over the state-law contract and lien claims. It denied BBI's motion for summary judgment and granted TCLP's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, directing the parties to file a joint statement on damages and interest. The core reasoning focused on contract interpretation regarding ownership of the lighting equipment, the validity of the recorded tax lien consents, and federal procedural rules for post-judgment interest.
This case is a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a member corporation, and its PAC challenged the Michigan Secretary of State's interpretation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 169.254 as applied to corporate and union contributions to a PAC that makes only independent expenditures. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the provision, arguing it violated their First Amendment rights to political speech and association by prohibiting such contributions for non-coordinated expenditures. The court rejected the Secretary's arguments on ripeness, exhaustion, abstention, and laches, applied strict scrutiny, and granted preliminary injunctive relief in part: it enjoined enforcement against contributions for expenditures not coordinated with candidates or candidate entities, while permitting enforcement against coordinated expenditures. The decision rested on the principle from Citizens United that the government lacks a legitimate anti-corruption interest in restricting independent corporate political speech, while coordinated activity could still be regulated.
