This case is a bankruptcy proceeding in which the liquidating trustee for Bruno's Supermarkets sued its former corporate parents (including Lone Star entities), affiliates, and individual officers and directors to recover alleged fraudulent transfers and preferences under the Bankruptcy Code and Alabama's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, as well as to assert breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims under Delaware law. The district court addressed multiple motions to dismiss, objections to exhibits, and a request for a more definite statement. It denied the motions filed by the Lone Star and BI-LO–Bruno's defendants, granted in part and denied in part the Bruno's Officer Defendants' motion (dismissing some claims for insufficient pleading while granting leave to amend), and granted in part the trustee's motion to strike exhibits. The core reasoning focused on whether the amended complaint's allegations of insolvency, lack of reasonably equivalent value, and intercompany payments satisfied Rule 8's notice-pleading standard and the substantive elements of the UFTA and Bankruptcy Code claims.
This case is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act and analogous state laws brought by a former social worker against hospice providers alleging they improperly enrolled ineligible patients for hospice care, failed to deliver required services, billed Medicare and Medicaid for unnecessary equipment, offered illegal kickbacks, and retaliated against the relator by demoting and firing her. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) after taking judicial notice of certain materials. The court determined that allegations concerning locations other than the relator's specific office lacked the particularity required by Rule 9(b), some state claims were barred because the states declined to intervene or due to statutes of limitations, and certain retaliation and specific false claims allegations could proceed.
The case concerned LifeCare's efforts to recover payment from two employer-sponsored health benefit plans administered by IMA for services provided to participants Wall and Evans after they were transferred to LifeCare facilities following acute medical events. IMA denied coverage, concluding that LifeCare operated skilled nursing facilities rather than hospitals under the plans' definitions, leading LifeCare to assert ERISA claims for benefits as well as state-law claims for breach of contract and deceptive practices. The court granted LifeCare summary judgment on its ERISA claims while granting the defendants summary judgment on the non-ERISA claims. The decision rested on review of the plan terms, the administrative record, and application of the abuse-of-discretion standard to the claims administrator's coverage determinations.
In this case, homeowners Curtis and Jamie Marsh sued Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, a law firm, and substitute trustees in Texas state court, alleging breach of contract and fraud related to a denied loan modification agreement and an attempted foreclosure on their home. The bank defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the Texas-resident law firm and trustees were improperly joined. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the non-diverse defendants were properly named. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that there was no reasonable basis to predict liability against the law firm or trustees under Texas law, including the Texas Property Code provisions shielding trustees from certain claims when acting in that capacity. As a result, the case remains in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
This case involves a homeowner's dispute with the servicer and owner of his mortgage note and deed of trust over force-placed insurance charges, attempts to cure a payment default following a violent incident at the property, and communications regarding loan modification and foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff asserted claims including breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act, and unreasonable collection efforts after defendants returned partial payments, declined to accept cure amounts, and pursued acceleration and foreclosure notices that were later rescinded. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, finding no genuine issues of material fact on certain claims while allowing others to proceed based on evidence of disputed charges, contract terms in the deed of trust, and debt collection practices.
In Cox v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, the plaintiff alleged that defendants Hilco and Central violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Texas Debt Collection Act by attempting to collect a vehicle loan deficiency balance that Hilco had purchased, because Hilco lacked the license required under Chapter 348 of the Texas Finance Code to hold or act as a holder of such motor vehicle retail installment contracts. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that no license was required, that the lack of a license alone did not violate the federal or state statutes, and that Hilco had no direct contact with the plaintiff. The court denied the motions in part and granted them in part. It reasoned that the statute and related administrative rules bar acquiring such debts without a license, making the debt unowed to Hilco, and that a 2009 statutory amendment clarifying the definition of "holder" does not apply retroactively absent explicit language.
