Sam A. Lindsay

This case involves plaintiff Jerry Chapman suing defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company over an alleged unearned fee of $260.50 charged for a lender title insurance policy during the refinancing of his home mortgage in 2007, claiming he was entitled to a discount under Texas law for a reissue policy issued within five years of a prior loan. The complaint asserted claims for money had and received, unjust enrichment, violation of RESPA (12 U.S.C. § 2607(b)), and breach of implied contract. On summary judgment, the court held it had subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed the unjust enrichment claim with prejudice, reasoning that under Texas law unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but merely a theory of recovery that duplicates the money had and received claim. The claims for money had and received and breach of implied contract were allowed to proceed.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In United States v. Wali, the defendant moved to suppress a firearm seized during a warrantless stop and frisk by police responding to a 911 call reporting a person carrying a handgun in a residential area. The court granted the motion, ruling that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The 911 call was treated as an anonymous tip lacking sufficient indicia of reliability, and merely carrying a firearm does not establish illegality, with the tip's description also not perfectly matching the defendant. The court relied on precedents like Florida v. J.L. to conclude that the tip did not justify the stop and frisk.

criminal lawgunscivil rights

The case involved healthcare providers suing Aetna for unpaid services provided to enrollees in an Aetna Medicare HMO plan after the third-party administrator Heritage went bankrupt. The bankruptcy court had administratively closed the case to require exhaustion of Medicare remedies but later reopened and remanded it to state court after Fifth Circuit and Texas Supreme Court decisions eliminated the exhaustion requirement for such claims. Aetna appealed the reopening, arguing the claims were time-barred due to lack of diligence in exhausting remedies. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, reasoning that administrative closure does not trigger statutes of limitations and that the bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion to remand based on equitable factors.

healthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a former DynCorp employee who sued under the False Claims Act's whistleblower retaliation provision after being fired for raising concerns about improper government payments. The court had previously dismissed the claim as time-barred under the 90-day limitations period of the Texas Whistleblower Act rather than a longer residual personal injury statute. In this opinion, the court denied the plaintiff's post-judgment motions to reconsider and alter the dismissal, holding that the limitations period in effect when the suit was filed applied, the Dodd-Frank Act's three-year period enacted afterward did not change the result, and the plaintiff had not shown manifest error, new evidence, or an intervening change in law under Rule 59(e).

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Chatelaine, Inc. v. Twin Modal, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant after a shipment of wine was delayed and damaged by heat during interstate transport from California to Texas, bringing claims for breach of contract, negligence, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligent hiring, and liability under the federal Carmack Amendment. The court granted in part the defendant's motion to dismiss and dismissed the negligence, TDTPA, and negligent hiring claims with prejudice. The court reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Act broadly preempts state law claims regulating the interstate transportation of goods except for routine breach-of-contract claims between private parties, drawing on the Supreme Court's analysis of analogous preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a former DynCorp employee who sued the company and two supervisors under the False Claims Act's anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), alleging he was marginalized and fired after reporting that the company was receiving unearned government payments under a contract. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was filed 178 days after the termination and was therefore untimely. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claim with prejudice, holding that the applicable statute of limitations was the ninety-day period borrowed from the Texas Whistleblower Act rather than the two-year personal-injury period or the three-year period added by the later-enacted Dodd-Frank Act, which the court found did not apply retroactively. The court also denied leave to amend because any amendment would be futile given the time bar.

labor & employmentcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Wells Fargo Bank, which had purchased real property at a foreclosure sale and then sued defendant Byron Jones in Texas state court for forcible entry and detainer to obtain possession after Jones remained on the property. Jones, proceeding pro se, removed the case to federal district court, asserting federal question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction, and claiming the removal was timely. The court granted Wells Fargo's motion to remand the case to the County Court at Law in Dallas County, Texas. It found that Jones failed to establish federal question jurisdiction because the claim arose solely under Texas property law, did not properly allege diversity of citizenship or that the amount in controversy (the value of the right to occupy the property) exceeded $75,000, and filed the removal more than thirty days after receiving notice of the suit.

propertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Anthony Belmonte's claim against his former employer, Examination Management Services, Inc. (EMSI), for ERISA estoppel. Belmonte alleged that EMSI's president promised him $1,000 monthly retirement benefits for 15 years, but he only received payments for five years under a Top Hat plan after retiring in 1997; he sought to prevent EMSI from denying the remaining benefits based on the oral assurances. The court granted EMSI's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). It reasoned that Belmonte failed to allege facts showing reasonable reliance on the representations or the extraordinary circumstances needed to support an ERISA estoppel claim, as the assurances were not repeated after diligent inquiries and did not involve especially vulnerable circumstances.

labor & employmentprocedure

Heather Appel sued her former employer, Inspire Pharmaceuticals, alleging gender and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and disability discrimination under the ADA after her termination shortly after disclosing her high-risk pregnancy that required house confinement from September 2008 through delivery. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, denied the plaintiff's motion to strike portions of a declaration, and denied her motion for leave to file a sur-reply. The court reasoned that there was no evidence of disparate treatment or pretext to support the Title VII claims and that Appel was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because she could not perform essential job functions such as driving and in-person visits even with requested accommodations.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves a wrongful death and survival action brought by the family of Christopher M. Lofton against McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals and Johnson & Johnson, alleging that the decedent died from Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis after taking Motrin (ibuprofen) for pain. The claims included defective design, marketing defect/failure to warn, breach of warranties, negligence, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. After reopening the case following the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the failure-to-warn, marketing defect, breach of express warranty, negligence, and DTPA claims, primarily due to federal preemption of state failure-to-warn claims and insufficient evidence or legal bars on the others. The court denied summary judgment on the defective design and breach of implied warranty claims, allowing the surviving family members' wrongful death and survival actions on those grounds to proceed to trial. The decision also addressed objections to expert testimony and procedural matters under federal rules.

torts & liabilityhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an insurance company's declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that two commercial lines policies did not provide uninsured/underinsured motorist, medical payments, or personal injury protection coverage for the death of Meredith Hatch, who was struck while riding a bicycle. The policies had been issued to business entities owned by Hatch and her husband. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, declaring that no coverage applied because Mrs. Hatch was not an insured under the policy terms for the accident, and it dismissed the defendants' contingent counterclaims for breach of contract and negligence. The reasoning rested on the plain language of the policies, which limited coverage to specified insureds and vehicles, along with Texas law holding that policyholders are bound by the terms they purchased and that no negligence duty was breached absent misrepresentation. The court also dismissed the insurer's claim for attorney's fees and denied a joint motion to abate as moot.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a prisoner convicted in Texas state court of burglary of a habitation. The district court granted the petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misunderstanding the elements of the Texas burglary statute under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3), conceding key facts during closing argument that satisfied the elements of subsection (a)(3), failing to cross-examine the complainant about her prior felony conviction, and not challenging her credibility or possible bias. The court held that these deficiencies prejudiced the petitioner under Strickland v. Washington because a competent attorney would likely have pursued different strategies, such as objecting to bolstering or exploring impeachment, and that the state court's denial of relief was an unreasonable application of federal law. The court directed the state to release the petitioner unless it grants him a new trial within 90 days.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Robin R. Scroggins's appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, based on claimed physical and mental impairments such as spinal issues, anxiety, and depression. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner's motion, reversed the administrative decision, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The core reasoning was that the administrative law judge committed legal error at step two of the sequential evaluation by failing to apply the severity standard established in Stone v. Heckler when assessing the plaintiff's mental impairments, and that a psychological consultative examination was needed to develop the record adequately. The court did not reach other issues raised in the appeal.

healthcareprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Oblio Telecom sued multiple defendants including Zuber Patel, Touch Tell, Hawaii Global Exchange, Asia Telecom, and others, alleging violations of the federal RICO statute along with state-law claims of fraud and conspiracy arising from an alleged scheme in which Patel, an Oblio employee, sold phone cards to the other defendants at unauthorized discounts and inflated values, causing Oblio millions in losses. The court addressed several motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. It denied Asia Telecom’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction after finding that Oblio had established a prima facie case of minimum contacts. It denied the remaining motions without prejudice, concluding that the complaint lacked the specificity required under Rule 9(b) and RICO pleading standards for predicate acts of fraud, but granted Oblio leave to file an amended complaint by December 3, 2008.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved challenges by apartment owners and residents to Ordinance 2903 adopted by the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, which required verification of legal immigration status for occupants of rental housing and was approved by voters. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the ordinance was preempted by federal immigration law and violated constitutional protections including due process. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on preemption and due process grounds and issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. In the current order, the court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied the Vasquez plaintiffs' request under Rule 54(b) to certify a partial final judgment, reasoning that the remaining claims (such as equal protection and Fair Housing Act violations) were distinct from the adjudicated issues and that separate litigation would be needed for a related new ordinance. The court emphasized that only legal issues remained and that entering partial judgment would not serve judicial efficiency given the differences in legal analysis required.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal power

This case involves a pro se plaintiff who filed a new 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against Dallas County Jail officials after his prior similar action (3:05-CV-1048-R) was dismissed without prejudice in September 2007 for failure to update his address, causing him to miss the 30-day window to reopen it. The magistrate judge recommended administratively closing the new case and reopening the old one to avoid an unintended dismissal with prejudice given the two-year statute of limitations and lack of plaintiff delay or contumacious conduct. The district court accepted the findings in part but rejected reopening the prior closed case on another judge's docket, instead directing that the current action proceed in the same posture as the dismissed case, allowing the parties to raise any remaining claims or defenses. The core reasoning was that the court lacked authority to reopen a non-pending case and that the interests of justice favored avoiding a harsh effective dismissal with prejudice under the circumstances.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerns a challenge by apartment owners and residents to Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903, which required landlords to verify tenants' citizenship or eligible immigration status as a condition of any lease or renewal, modeled on federal HUD regulations. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on claims that the ordinance was preempted by federal immigration law and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted the motion after reviewing the record and applicable law, resulting in a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. The ordinance had been adopted by the city council and approved by voters in 2007 following an earlier version enjoined by a state court.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal power

In this bankruptcy appeal, former Dallas Cowboys player James Hughes challenged two rulings by the bankruptcy court denying him a Chapter 7 discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3). The underlying facts showed that Hughes had operated on a cash basis after prior business failures, received $5,000 monthly from his wife's company without keeping records of how most of those funds were spent, and provided only limited documentation in response to inquiries by the trustee and creditor. The district court affirmed both rulings after reviewing the record for clear error and legal questions de novo, holding that the bankruptcy court correctly found Hughes had failed to keep or maintain adequate records from which his financial condition could be ascertained and that he had not offered sufficient justification for the failure. The court also rejected arguments that an incorrect legal standard had been applied or that an explicit finding regarding a specific creditor was required.

procedure

The case involved a dispute between SR International Business Insurance Company Ltd. and Energy Future Holdings Corp. over coverage under an excess liability insurance policy for shareholder litigation defense and settlement costs, specifically whether arbitration of the coverage dispute could begin before Energy Future Holdings provided documentation showing exhaustion of underlying policies. The court found that the policy incorporated an arbitration agreement covering controversies arising out of or relating to the policy, and that the separate dispute over the information request as a potential condition precedent fell within the scope of that agreement. The court therefore denied SRI's motion to dismiss the petition to compel arbitration, granted Energy Future Holdings' motion to dismiss SRI's complaint seeking to block arbitration, and ordered the parties to arbitrate the issue of whether arbitration could proceed without the requested information.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Greene v. Knight, plaintiff Jordan Greene sued four Hunt County law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their early-morning entry into his apartment and brief detention of him while attempting to serve arrest warrants violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The warrants were for a different individual named Jordan Patrick Greene, and the officers had been directed to the plaintiff's address by defendant Knight without further verification of identity or residence. The court granted summary judgment to defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce, finding their conduct objectively reasonable under the circumstances, but denied summary judgment to defendant Knight, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the reasonableness of his decision to send the officers to the incorrect location. The claims against the three officers were dismissed with prejudice, while the claims against Knight were allowed to proceed to trial.

civil rightscriminal law