Timothy K. Lewis

The case involves credit card holders suing national banks, including PNC, for charging late fees, overdraft charges, annual fees, and similar fees that allegedly violate Pennsylvania state laws such as the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act and Unfair Trade Practices law. Plaintiffs filed class actions in state court seeking damages and injunctions, after which defendants removed the cases to federal court on grounds including federal question jurisdiction. The court denied motions to remand, ruling that federal question jurisdiction existed because the National Bank Act exclusively governs such fees charged by national banks and preempts state regulation in this area, allowing removal despite the complaints relying only on state-law claims.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involves the estate of pilot Michael Hamas seeking a $50,000 death benefit under an employer-provided life insurance policy after his death in 1988. Due to corporate changes and confusion over the identity of the employer, the plaintiffs brought ERISA claims and a state breach of contract claim against multiple defendants. The court denied most motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding key issues like the employer identity and plan administration. However, it granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for punitive damages under ERISA and in favor of CSX on its crossclaim against Aero Services, as those presented no factual disputes or were legally unavailable.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing a borough constable (Deer), another individual, and the Borough of Bellevue under federal civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983) and related state-law tort claims, alleging that Deer and the other defendant used official authority to forcibly repossess the plaintiffs' vehicle. After Deer received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge, the court addressed whether that discharge barred continuation of the suit against him in his official capacity as constable. The court ruled that the discharge did not release Deer from potential official-capacity liability or enjoin the suit from proceeding against him in that capacity. The core reasoning was that section 1983 official-capacity claims seek recovery from the governmental entity rather than imposing personal liability on the officer, bankruptcy discharges only personal debts, and an officer in an official capacity is a distinct legal entity from the individual.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court order requiring the Chapter 7 trustee for the Visiting Nurse Association of Western Pennsylvania and a secured creditor to return a $78,737.31 periodic interim payment (PIP) received from Medicare after the debtor had ceased operations. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the funds were held in a constructive trust under Pennsylvania law and thus were not property of the bankruptcy estate. The court found a confidential relationship between the debtor and Medicare arising from the PIP program's special nature, that the debtor was unjustly enriched by retaining the payment for services not rendered, and that the trustee's strong-arm powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) did not defeat the government's interest because neither judgment nor execution creditors could prevail over a constructive trust beneficiary under state law.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership of amusement rides and vehicles previously owned by Ken-Penn Amusement, Inc. The FDIC, as a judgment creditor, sought to set aside a 1988 sheriff's sale of the property to Edythe Sanders for one dollar, alleging it was a sham transaction based on a nonexistent debt intended to shield assets from creditors. Sanders moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, while the FDIC cross-moved, arguing the sale was invalid as a fraudulent conveyance. The court granted the FDIC's motion for summary judgment and denied Sanders', finding no genuine disputes of material fact and that the confessed judgment and sale lacked any reliable evidence of an underlying debt, allowing the FDIC to sell the property free and clear. The court also addressed related claims by Citizens Bank of Elizabethton but focused primarily on the FDIC-Sanders dispute.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Nichols v. Costa, plaintiff Edward Nichols, initially proceeding pro se, sued New York attorney Peter L. Costa for fraud, alleging that Costa assisted two self-represented defendants in a related Pennsylvania lawsuit by providing legal advice and notarizing affidavits, which complicated and increased the cost of Nichols's case. Costa moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction because Costa had no minimum contacts with Pennsylvania—all relevant actions occurred in New York—and Costa did not purposefully avail himself of the forum state's laws. The court additionally observed that the fraud claim failed as a matter of law, since notarizing affidavits does not constitute a misrepresentation that the affiants were appearing without attorney assistance.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by the administrator of the estate of Raymond G. Perciavalle, who died by suicide in an Ambridge police holding cell shortly after his arrest for simple assault and reckless endangerment following a reported gun-pointing incident. The district court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff and defendants including the borough, police department, individual officers, the police chief, and the mayor, addressing Fourth Amendment claims arising from the arrest and search as well as claims that officials failed to prevent the suicide through adequate training or policies. The court granted summary judgment to officers on certain constitutional claims and qualified immunity grounds, to the chief on failure-to-train claims, and to the mayor and chief in their official capacities, but denied summary judgment on custom-or-policy claims against the chief and mayor in their individual capacities, finding triable issues of fact as to whether deliberate indifference in maintaining procedures for detainee monitoring and removal of harmful items caused the deprivation of rights.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Boyd v. Petsock, a prisoner sued the superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the prison's mail delivery system violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and access to the courts. Boyd alleged that he never received a briefing schedule mailed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court for his appeal, causing the appeal to be dismissed for failure to file a timely brief, and that the system lacked procedures to document receipt of legal mail. The court, applying summary judgment standards to the stipulated facts and applicable precedent, held that the mail system in place in July 1987—which separately handled legal mail, posted notices, required inmates to claim mail in person, and opened it in their presence—provided reasonably adequate access to the courts. The decision rested on the absence of any showing that the system caused an actual denial of access or that the superintendent had impaired Boyd's rights, leading to dismissal of the claims for monetary and injunctive relief.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Frank Holdampf sued multiple defendants, including his employer J.B. Hunt Transport, co-employee James Tolar, insurers, Sears, a law firm, and Penn DOT, seeking damages for severe injuries from a 1989 tractor-trailer accident at a construction site on Interstate 80 in Pennsylvania. The court granted all pending motions for summary judgment and to dismiss. It held that the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred claims against the employer and co-employee, rejecting any intentional tort exception. It further dismissed the law firm for lack of personal jurisdiction due to no minimum contacts with Pennsylvania and Penn DOT based on Eleventh Amendment immunity for state agencies.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liabilityfederal power

This case involves a trustee for debtors Howard Hammonds and IMPS, an export trading company, suing Commerce Union Bank over its handling of an SBA-guaranteed revolving line of credit loan originally from Equibank and later substituted to Commerce. The complaint alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, duress, and breach of contract, stemming from events including loan disbursements, order reductions, default declarations, and a proposed loan modification after IMPS faced financial difficulties. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing all claims except breach of contract. It reasoned that the good faith claim lacked supporting facts beyond contract terms, fraud allegations failed to meet elements like justifiable reliance, duress required absent threats of bodily harm, and no fiduciary duty existed because the bank did not exercise day-to-day control over IMPS operations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this bankruptcy appeal, debtors Wilfred and Anna Burgart filed a Chapter 13 petition that was dismissed without prejudice for failing to submit required schedules and a repayment plan, then filed a second Chapter 13 case shortly afterward. First Seneca Bank moved to dismiss the second case under 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(1), arguing that the first dismissal resulted from the debtors' willful failure to follow court orders. The bankruptcy court denied the motion after finding the filing failure stemmed from technical problems, including an inexperienced courier who did not relay an order to show cause and the inexperience of the debtors' first attorney. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's factual determination of no willfulness was not clearly erroneous and that dismissal without prejudice allowed the debtors to refile for a hearing on the merits.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit filed in 1987 by Elaine Savko against the Port Authority of Allegheny County and two individuals, alleging gender discrimination in promotions, disparate impact, and retaliation for EEOC charges. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to allow compensatory damages for emotional distress under Title VII, the plaintiff sought to add such a claim shortly before trial, prompting the defendants' motion to strike it. The court denied the motion, concluding that the 1991 Act applies retroactively to this pending case. The core reasoning was that, under the presumption from Bradley v. School Board, new statutes apply to cases still pending absent clear contrary statutory language or legislative history and without resulting manifest injustice.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Louis Lee suing Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc. and its parent American Home Products Corporation after he was injured when drain cleaner he used to unclog a sink erupted. Plaintiff asserted claims for strict products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and punitive damages under Pennsylvania law, though he had settled with the third-party manufacturer of one product. The court granted AHP's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff presented no evidence to pierce the corporate veil and failed to respond to the motion. The court also granted Boyle-Midway's motion on grounds of spoliation of evidence, as plaintiff's counsel lost the relevant product container, and because federal law preempted the claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, debtor Civic Center Cleaning Co., Inc. filed a complaint in bankruptcy court against Reginella Corp. seeking to compel turnover of property, but the underlying claim was for breach of a pre-petition contract for unpaid amounts. Reginella moved to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and to have the case heard in state court instead. The district court withdrew the reference because the proceeding was non-core and Reginella was entitled to a jury trial, which bankruptcy courts cannot conduct without party consent. The court retained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) as the case was related to the bankruptcy estate but deferred deciding whether to abstain under § 1334(c) pending further information from the parties on factors such as any pending state court action, the status of the bankruptcy, and the effect on the estate. A discovery and scheduling conference was set to address these issues.

procedurefederal power

In Bailey v. Dell Publishing Co., Inc., former Congressman Donald Bailey sued book publishers Dell and Daring, as well as authors Charles Patterson and G. Lee Tippin, alleging defamation and invasion of privacy over a single passage in the 1985 book The Heroes Who Fell From Grace. The passage suggested that Bailey and another person had taken funds raised for Operation Lazarus. The court first dismissed the claims against Tippin for insufficient service of process under federal rules. It then granted summary judgment to Dell, Daring, and Patterson, holding that Bailey, as a public official, had not shown actual malice on the defendants' part as required by New York Times v. Sullivan, since the publishers had no reason to doubt the statement's truth based on their investigation and sources.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Carol Gilmore suing her former employer Manpower, Inc. after her 1988 termination, alleging in Counts I and II that age discrimination motivated the discharge in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and in Count III asserting a Pennsylvania tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the employer's alleged conduct in supervising and discharging her. The defendant moved for partial summary judgment solely on Count III. The court granted the motion, ruling that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred the emotional distress claim because it supplies the sole remedy for job-related injuries, including intentional torts connected to employment and termination.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a former attorney suing his prior law firm, its pension and profit-sharing plans, and individual directors for unpaid benefits following his 1989 withdrawal from the plans, along with claims related to the termination of his employment and shareholder status. The plaintiff asserted a claim under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (Count VI) and a state-law tort claim for willful interference with shareholder rights (Count VII) against the directors. The court dismissed Count VI, holding that it was preempted by ERISA based on Third Circuit precedent applying to similar claims for employee benefits. The court dismissed Count VII as a state-law claim lacking independent federal jurisdiction or diversity, declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction after all federal claims had been resolved or transferred.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case was a Title VII employment discrimination suit brought by the plaintiff, the sole holder of a unique paraprofessional Coordinator of Planning and Communications position at a regional Lutheran synod, after the synod eliminated her job in early 1985. The court found that the synod had decided to abolish the position because an impending national church merger would centralize functions, sharply reduce the need for localized planning and communications work, and lower the overall time staff devoted to those tasks, as confirmed by time records, budgets, and post-termination data showing no one assumed the core duties. The synod provided three months of severance despite owing only two weeks under its policies, and the plaintiff did not pursue an internal appeal. Treating the case as a pretext claim rather than a mixed-motive case, the court held that the plaintiff failed to show her sex was a but-for cause of the termination and that the employer’s legitimate business reasons were not a pretext for discrimination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Wittekamp sued defendants Gulf & Western and related entities for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract, alleging that he was induced to leave his prior CEO position and invest in the Mac-Hemp division without disclosure of significant unfunded pension liabilities and retiree medical benefits that later contributed to the division's bankruptcy. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the misrepresentation claim. The court denied both motions, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether material facts were undisclosed, whether defendants acted with intent to mislead, and whether any nondisclosure proximately caused plaintiff's pecuniary losses. The court reasoned that these factual questions, including those involving intent and reasonableness, were properly reserved for a jury rather than resolved on summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves the United States seeking to recover response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) for hazardous substances released at the Metcoa Radiation Site in Pennsylvania, where defendants allegedly sent scrap materials containing substances like cadmium, lead, and thorium for processing. The court granted the government's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the seventeen moving defendants' cross-motions, holding that the defendants qualify as responsible persons under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) because they arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances they owned or possessed. The decision establishes liability for past, present, and future response costs on a joint and several basis but does not yet determine the amount or allocation of those costs, as other elements of the CERCLA claim remain for later resolution. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report with minor revisions, rejecting arguments that the scrap had residual value or that defendants did not select the site.

environment