Ronald B. Leighton

In Lensch v. Armada Corp., plaintiff Barbara Lensch sued defendant Armada, a debt collector, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) arising from efforts to collect on a $25 dishonored check, including a Notice of Dishonor that threatened criminal charges and follow-up voicemails that failed to disclose the caller was a debt collector. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on three of her FDCPA claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The court granted the motion, holding that Armada's threats of criminal prosecution violated the FDCPA because the collector neither intended nor was legally authorized to pursue such action, that the FDCPA preempted any contrary state law permitting the cautionary language, and that the voicemails constituted false or misleading representations by omitting required disclosures. The decision rested on the FDCPA's strict prohibition of false or deceptive means in debt collection and the absence of any genuine factual dispute on the violations.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved members of the Port Militarization Resistance group suing a retired Coast Guard Investigative Service agent for allegedly infiltrating and spying on their protests against military shipments at the Port of Olympia in 2007, which they claimed led to their arrests and violated their rights. Plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Washington Constitution, various state torts including false arrest and malicious prosecution, and a Bivens action for constitutional violations plus the Posse Comitatus Act. The court dismissed the § 1983 claim as the defendant was a federal actor, the state tort claims under the Westfall Act's federal employee immunity, claims under the Posse Comitatus Act for lack of a private right of action, and portions of the Bivens claim involving excessive force, while permitting the remainder of the Bivens claim to proceed following limited discovery. The decision rested on the distinctions between federal and state actors, statutory immunity rules, and the need to address qualified immunity early while allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to develop facts supporting their allegations.

civil rightsfree speechfederal powerprocedure

This case involved Major Margaret Witt's challenge to her discharge from the Air Force Reserves under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell statute and regulations, claiming violations of her substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. After a bench trial, the court held that the specific application of DADT to Witt violated her substantive due process rights because it did not significantly further the government's interests in military readiness, unit morale, and cohesion, and less intrusive means could achieve those interests. The court dismissed the procedural due process claim, finding no protected liberty or property interest was implicated by an honorable discharge without stated reasons or stigma, and that Witt had received adequate process including notice and opportunity to be heard. The court ordered Witt restored to her position as a flight nurse subject to applicable qualifications. The opinion followed a Ninth Circuit remand applying heightened scrutiny rather than rational basis review to the substantive claim.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

This case involved a Medicare supplier, RS Medical, challenging four final decisions by the Medicare Appeals Council that denied coverage and payment for claims related to the BIO-1000, a device for treating osteoarthritis of the knee, on the basis that it was not reasonable and necessary under Medicare rules. The plaintiff sought reversal of those denials, while the Secretary of Health and Human Services asked the court to affirm them. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and reversed the decisions, finding them arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence due to inconsistent treatment compared to prior favorable coverage determinations and frequent prior payments for the device without a reasonable distinguishing explanation. The case was remanded for payment in accordance with CMS procedures.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case involved employees at a chemical plant in Washington suing their employer, Emerald Performance Materials, for additional overtime wages under state law after a federal Department of Labor consent judgment had resolved similar claims under the FLSA arising from a collective bargaining agreement that averaged pay for 12-hour shifts over six-week cycles. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss state claims on preemption grounds, granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and granted in part the defendant's motion on state claims, while finding successor liability. The core reasoning was that the defendant expressly assumed limited payroll liabilities from the prior owner in the asset purchase agreement, state wage laws were not preempted because they require separate weekly overtime calculations without full offsets across weeks, and the plaintiffs could recover additional time-and-a-half damages for hours over 40 per workweek (with one plaintiff benefiting from a tolling agreement) but no liquidated damages.

labor & employment

The case concerned a dispute over cigarette tax compacts between the State of Washington and Indian tribes, specifically whether the Squaxin Island Tribe could sell compact-regulated cigarettes on allotted trust lands within the Frank’s Landing Indian Community with that Community’s consent. The Nisqually Indian Tribe sued to block an addendum to the Squaxin compact that extended its geographic scope to those lands. The court denied the Nisqually Tribe’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants’ motions, dismissing the case with prejudice. It held that 1994 federal legislation expressly established Frank’s Landing as a self-governing dependent Indian Community outside any tribe’s jurisdiction and authorized it to enter into the intergovernmental and lease agreements at issue, allowing Squaxin to operate as a tribal retailer there.

federal powertaxesbusiness & regulatory

In Schoening v. McKenna, plaintiff Lance Schoening sued the Washington Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of RCW 9.68A.090, a criminal statute prohibiting communication with a minor or someone believed to be a minor for immoral purposes (with enhanced penalties for electronic communications or prior convictions). The U.S. District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, ruling that the statute is facially constitutional. The court concluded the law is not overbroad because it targets only unprotected speech involving predatory communications aimed at exposing children to sexual misconduct, and is not unconstitutionally vague because the Washington Supreme Court has narrowed "immoral purposes" to a specific predatory purpose that provides fair notice and limits enforcement discretion.

free speechcriminal law

In United States v. Kriesel, a former federal supervised releasee who had previously challenged the constitutionality of the Justice For All Act's DNA collection requirements moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) for return of his DNA sample and removal of related information from the CODIS database after completing his supervision. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that although the defendant's privacy interest was somewhat enhanced once supervision ended, it remained diminished relative to non-convicts, and the government's compelling interests in deterring future crimes and solving past crimes outweighed that interest, so retention did not violate the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves plaintiffs' claims against Chicago Title Insurance Company regarding alleged overcharges for title insurance, originally including a federal RESPA claim that was dismissed along with a declination of supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims for money had and received and unjust enrichment. On the defendant's motion to amend the prior judgment, the court modified its order to retain federal jurisdiction over the state claims under the Class Action Fairness Act due to an independent basis for diversity jurisdiction in the class action context. The court denied the request to dismiss the state claims, reasoning that they are independent common-law theories not prohibited or preempted by Washington's title insurance rate regulations. On the plaintiffs' motion, the court granted leave to add new state claims for breach of implied contract and violation of the Consumer Protection Act but denied any changes to the dismissed RESPA allegations, while deferring a ruling on standing for out-of-state class members.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who alleged that a title insurance company violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by charging more than the required discounted rate for a title policy on a refinanced mortgage and splitting the overcharge with the title agent, seeking to represent a class across multiple states. The plaintiff claimed the excess fee was not for services actually performed under RESPA Section 8(b). The court granted the motion to dismiss the federal claim on the pleadings, holding that the statute prohibits only fee splits where no services are actually performed by the recipients, and both the insurer and agent had performed services here. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims and did not reach issues of standing for out-of-state class members.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerns a patent infringement dispute in which A.G. Design alleged that Trainman Lantern Company infringed its U.S. Patent No. 7,118,245 for a trainman lantern by selling a similar device. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the patent was invalid due to prior art sales, unenforceable because of the inventor's conduct, and not infringed because the accused lantern lacked the required 'plurality of ports' in the reflector. The court addressed issues of prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents in determining whether the patent claims could reach the accused device. It ultimately denied the motion in part and granted it in part.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Olympic Forest Coalition's challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's approval of the Bear Creek Saddle timber sale in the Olympic National Forest, claiming the Environmental Assessment was inadequate under NEPA and the National Forest Management Act with respect to the Aquatic Conservation Strategy objectives in the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's cross-motion, setting aside the project approval under the APA and remanding the matter to the agency for further compliance. The core reasoning was that the EA did not properly evaluate the project's consistency with the ACS objectives at the project level, as required after the invalidation of the 2004 amendments, and that the non-NEPA Interested Party Letter process failed to address this deficiency.

environment

This case involves a student with hypospadias and related medical issues who transferred to a new school district that inherited a Section 504 accommodation plan from his prior school; the student and his mother allege the new district failed to properly implement the plan, evaluate additional needs, or provide required accommodations like extended time on assignments and tests, resulting in declining grades. The court denied the school district's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that genuine issues of material fact remain for a jury, including whether the student qualified as disabled under Section 504, whether the district had notice triggering accommodation duties, and whether its actions (such as unilaterally modifying the plan without parental input) constituted discrimination or denial of benefits.

civil rights

The case concerns two pharmacists and one corporate pharmacy challenging Washington state Board of Pharmacy regulations that make it sanctionable for a pharmacy to allow employees to refuse filling lawful prescriptions, including Plan B emergency contraceptives, based on religious or moral objections; plaintiffs instead sought to continue their 'refuse and refer' practice. The court granted a limited preliminary injunction against enforcement of the regulations as applied to Plan B. Core reasoning focused on the regulations' development amid complaints about refusals, their potential conflict with existing statutory conscience protections in state health care and insurance laws, the balance with anti-discrimination requirements under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, and questions about patient access versus providers' rights, leading to certification of certain state-law issues for further review.

religious libertyhealthcarecivil rights

This case involved plaintiff Hedenburg, a night shift supervisor at Aramark, who was terminated after performance complaints, using profanity with staff, and failing to disclose an intimate relationship with a subordinate in violation of the company's fraternization and business conduct policies. Hedenburg sued Aramark alleging claims including sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination, as well as intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court granted Aramark's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice, finding that Hedenburg failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, that Aramark had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination based on documented performance issues and policy violations, and that she offered no evidence of pretext; the court also denied her motion to strike certain declarations. The emotional distress claims were deemed conceded due to lack of response.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned property owners who challenged a city requirement to upgrade a public stormwater pipe from six to twelve inches as a condition for receiving a development permit to remodel a building and pave a parking lot, after the city had previously vacated an alley retaining a utility easement. Plaintiffs argued this exaction was an unconstitutional federal taking because it was a unique, discretionary imposition rather than a generally applicable fee. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on the takings claims. It reasoned that the requirement did not deny all economically viable use of the property, was authorized by city ordinances and stormwater plans, and did not qualify as the rare regulatory action amounting to a taking under precedents such as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.

propertybusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case involved an ERISA-governed employee health plan administered by Providence Health System, which had paid over $800,000 in medical benefits for injuries to the daughter of plan participant Terri Block following a car accident. After a $2.1 million insurance settlement, Block placed the funds into a Special Needs Trust via state guardianship proceedings, prompting Providence to sue in federal court for a constructive trust or equitable lien under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to enforce the plan's reimbursement provision. The court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction, that the plan's reimbursement terms were subject to the make-whole doctrine (requiring the beneficiary to be fully compensated before any repayment), and denied Providence's motion for summary judgment while re-noting other motions to allow discovery on whether the make-whole requirement had been met. The core reasoning centered on interpreting the plan language alongside ERISA's equitable remedies and federal common law principles governing third-party liability provisions.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case involved Major Margaret Witt, a U.S. Air Force Reserve flight nurse, challenging the constitutionality of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy (10 U.S.C. § 654) after an investigation into her civilian same-sex relationship led to separation proceedings. Witt argued that Lawrence v. Texas established a fundamental liberty interest requiring heightened scrutiny, violating her substantive due process, equal protection, First Amendment, and procedural due process rights. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss and denied her preliminary injunction request, holding that Lawrence did not change the rational basis review applied to military regulations on homosexual conduct. Prior Ninth Circuit precedents upholding DADT remained controlling, no liberty interest was implicated, and there was no procedural due process violation from the delayed hearing.

civil rightsfree speechfederal power

This case involved a trademark dispute in which Nautilus, owner of the Bowflex mark for high-end home exercise equipment, sued Savvier, the exclusive licensee of the BodyFlex mark for a lower-priced exercise bar called the GymBar, alleging infringement. The court granted Savvier's motion for summary judgment, ruling that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks as a matter of law. The decision rested on application of the Ninth Circuit's multi-factor test for confusion, finding that the marks were dissimilar in appearance and connotation, targeted different consumer demographics and price points, had coexisted for years with only minimal evidence of actual confusion, and showed no signs of converging in the marketplace, while two factors mildly favoring Nautilus were insufficient to create a triable issue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a petition by the government to revoke Thomas Kriesel’s supervised release after he refused to provide a DNA sample under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, which requires all federal felons, including non-violent first-time offenders on probation or supervised release, to submit DNA. Kriesel, convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, challenged the requirement on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing it constituted an unreasonable search. The court upheld the Act’s constitutionality, finding that the minimal intrusion of a blood draw was outweighed by substantial government interests in offender identification, deterring recidivism, and solving crimes, when balanced against the reduced privacy expectations of individuals on conditional release. It ordered Kriesel to submit the sample by a set date or face revocation of release. The ruling applied a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and presumed the statute’s validity.

criminal lawcivil rights