Joseph Normand Laplante

This case is a wrongful death products liability action in which the plaintiff, as administrator of his parents' estates, alleges that a plastic step-stool manufactured by ZAG and distributed by Stanley Works was defectively designed and caused the decedent's fatal fall at work. The parties filed numerous motions in limine seeking to exclude various categories of evidence at trial, including the defendants' theory that the stool's leg was already broken before the accident (supported by an OSHA report), the defendants' safety testing, the decedent's health conditions and conduct, and certain internal documents from the manufacturer. The court denied the plaintiff's motions to bar the defense theory and related evidence, reasoning that the evidence is relevant to causation and damages with no basis for exclusion, and also denied one of the defendants' motions while granting the other by assent. The rulings rest on standard principles of relevance and admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence without any finding of prejudice or other impropriety.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns Green Tree Servicing's effort to equitably reinstate a mistakenly discharged mortgage on the Rickers' New Hampshire property to its original priority position ahead of later-recorded federal tax liens held by the IRS. The action was removed from state court to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1444 and 2410, which permit suits against the United States to quiet title or determine lien priority. Green Tree moved for summary judgment, arguing that the discharge was recorded in error, the IRS did not rely on it, and equitable relief was available under both federal and New Hampshire law. The court denied the motion, holding that federal precedent does not preclude such equitable relief but that Green Tree had not conclusively demonstrated its entitlement under New Hampshire law, which approaches claims to alter established lien priority with caution and requires proof that intervening lienholders did not rely on the discharge.

propertytaxesfederal powerprocedure

The case involves Contour Design suing its former manufacturer Chance Mold Steel and a related company for misappropriating trade secrets in the design, firmware, and tooling of ergonomic computer mice like the Roller Mouse series, as well as breaching confidentiality and non-compete provisions in their agreements. The court addressed multiple motions in limine seeking rulings on the admissibility of evidence at trial, including issues related to prior findings from summary judgment and preliminary injunction proceedings. After oral argument, the court granted Contour's motions and denied Chance's, determining that certain evidence concerning the products, agreements, and alleged misappropriation was admissible while excluding other matters as irrelevant or improper. The rulings were grounded in the record from earlier stages of the litigation and applicable standards for evidence in trade secret and contract disputes under New Hampshire law.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves plaintiff Edward Herbst's claims for strict products liability and negligence against L.B.O. Holding, Inc., owner of Attitash Bear Peak Resort, after he suffered a broken ankle falling from an alpine slide used as a summer activity; the defendant denies the allegations and asserts Herbst's own negligence caused the accident, with jurisdiction based on diversity. The court addressed multiple pretrial motions in limine to determine what evidence would be admissible at the jury trial. It ruled that evidence of Herbst's more than ten-year-old mail fraud conviction could be admitted for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) because its probative value on credibility substantially outweighed prejudice given the nature of the crime, the centrality of Herbst's testimony about the incident, and the importance of credibility issues. The court also decided issues regarding exclusion of the face amount of medical bills, limits on expert testimony about the slide's warnings, and admissibility of evidence from prior and subsequent accidents, requiring substantial similarity for the latter.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a Medicare recipient suing the United States and federal defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, alleging violations of the Commerce Clause, Takings Clause, Presentment Clause, Presidential Oath Clause, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, with particular focus on the individual health insurance mandate and the Act's enactment process. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, reasoning that the plaintiff's Medicare coverage automatically satisfied the mandate so he suffered no injury from it, while his other alleged injuries were too speculative to confer Article III standing.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether judgment creditors could pierce the corporate veil of SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC, a shell company with no assets, to hold its sole owner, L. John Davidson, personally liable for a default judgment obtained against the LLC for unpaid promissory notes related to a debtor-in-possession loan. Plaintiffs Antaeus Enterprises, Inc. and James H. Rand moved for summary judgment under New Hampshire law, contending that Davidson had diverted funds owed to them in a manner constituting fraud or injustice. The court denied the motion, holding that Davidson had offered a competing account of his conduct that a factfinder could view as neither fraudulent nor unjust, so material facts remained in dispute and the veil-piercing claim could not be resolved as a matter of law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is an appeal from the denial of Social Security Disability Benefits to claimant Joseph Dube, who asserted disability based on knee pain and depression that limited his ability to work. Dube argued that the ALJ erred by failing to address relevant medical evidence on his mental health impairments when determining his residual functional capacity for light work and by improperly relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at step five. The court applied the substantial evidence standard under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and concluded that the ALJ had ignored psychiatric evidence contradicting the RFC assessment. The court therefore granted Dube's motion, denied the Commissioner's motion, and remanded the case for further consideration.

federal powerhealthcare

This case concerned whether a federal district court should abstain from adjudicating a lawsuit brought by Nadezda Montgomery and her minor son to enforce an Affidavit of Support (Form I-864) that Scott Montgomery had signed as a sponsor to obtain their lawful permanent residency after immigrating from Russia. Under federal immigration law, the affidavit created a contractual obligation for Scott to maintain the sponsored aliens at an income of at least 125 percent of the federal poverty level until certain terminating events occurred, and the plaintiffs sought specific performance of that obligation. Scott moved to dismiss, arguing that the court should abstain under Younger v. Harris due to his pending state-court divorce action against Nadezda in New Hampshire family court. The court denied the motion, holding that abstention was not warranted because the federal support obligation exists independently of the parties' marriage and would not interfere with the state divorce proceedings. The court further noted that the affidavit expressly provides that divorce does not terminate the sponsor's obligations, and that the son was not a party to the state proceedings.

immigrationfamily lawfederal power

This case involves a dispute between National Pasteurized Eggs, LLC (NPE) and L. John Davidson over ownership of U.S. Patent No. 6,692,784 and related applications for processes to pasteurize chicken eggs, referred to as the 'Jumbo.' NPE traces its claim to 2001 agreements assigning rights to a bankrupt company whose assets it purchased, while Davidson asserts he retained ownership and that NPE's claims are time-barred. The court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the ownership and limitations issues, finding that the statute of limitations on NPE's claim does not necessarily begin running upon mere notice of an adverse claim without actual injury, and rejected Davidson's arguments that the agreements or laches barred NPE. It granted NPE's motion to dismiss Davidson's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment on the patent claims, concluding it failed to present a justiciable case or controversy.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a products liability lawsuit brought by Karen Bartlett against Mutual Pharmaceutical Company after she suffered severe injuries, including blindness, from taking sulindac, a generic NSAID manufactured by the defendant. Bartlett prevailed at trial on her defective design claim under New Hampshire law, receiving a $21.06 million damages award. The court denied Mutual's post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, finding that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the drug's risks outweighed its benefits and that the claim was not preempted by federal law. The court also determined that the damages were not excessive and that any trial errors were not sufficient to warrant a new trial, noting Mutual's strategic decisions during the proceedings.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved plaintiffs Robert Rockwood and Roxana Marchosky suing SKF USA Inc. for promissory estoppel after SKF declined to purchase their company, Environamics, Inc., following alleged assurances that led the plaintiffs to personally guarantee a bank loan, resulting in foreclosure and $5 million in personal liability. The plaintiffs claimed SKF's words and conduct manifested an intention to buy the company, on which they reasonably relied to their detriment. SKF moved for summary judgment, arguing that its actions never amounted to an enforceable promise and that any reliance was unreasonable given a written option agreement that gave SKF discretion rather than an obligation to buy. The court granted the motion, ruling that New Hampshire law bars promissory estoppel recovery where an enforceable agreement expressly conflicts with the alleged promise, the option agreement superseded prior negotiations as a fully integrated contract, and the plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied on the statements in question.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Steven Goldsmith and segNET Technologies, Inc. suing defendant HSW Financial Recovery, Inc. for attempting to collect a debt from a commercial equipment lease that the plaintiffs claimed had already been paid in full, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and state tort laws including defamation. The court granted the motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim, ruling that the FDCPA does not apply to debts arising from commercial transactions. However, the court denied dismissal of the state-law claims, finding that diversity jurisdiction exists because the plaintiffs plausibly alleged damages exceeding $75,000 from the negative credit report affecting financing costs, and that other arguments for dismissal lacked merit.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a dispute between the Laphams and their marketing company and the Tullys and their dough company over a failed business plan to produce and sell PaneBelle pizza dough. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached an agreement to form a joint company and misappropriated intellectual property including a logo, marketing materials, and a special expandable dough box developed by the plaintiffs. The court partially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the claim seeking a declaration of inventorship and ownership of the dough box cannot proceed while the related patent application is pending before the USPTO, but allowed claims for misappropriation of other intellectual property and services, unjust enrichment, and unfair trade practices to continue. The reasoning was that patent-related issues require USPTO resolution first, while alternative non-patent theories of the other claims do not.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This products liability case involves injuries allegedly caused by the prescription drug Sulindac, a generic NSAID. The court considered sua sponte whether the defendant had sufficient evidence to support affirmative defenses based on the plaintiff's delay in stopping the drug and seeking medical care after symptoms began, and on her doctor's failure to read the warning label or warn her of risks such as SJS/TEN. Finding no expert testimony establishing causation from those alleged failures, and with discovery complete and notice given, the court granted judgment as a matter of law striking the defenses of comparative negligence, plaintiff's misconduct, apportionment of liability, and superseding cause.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case is a products liability action in which plaintiff Karen Bartlett sued Mutual Pharmaceutical after suffering severe side effects from taking the generic drug Sulindac, asserting claims of strict liability and negligence based on defective design. The court addressed cross-motions to exclude or limit expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It granted the motions in part and denied them in part, permitting most of the experts' opinions due to sufficient qualifications and foundational support but barring legal conclusions that would usurp the roles of judge and jury as well as speculation regarding hypothetical FDA actions. The rulings rest on Rule 702's requirements for reliable principles, methods, and relevance, along with the principle that experts may not testify on pure questions of law.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Thomas, Tina, and Jessica Mlodzinski against Bristol police officers and members of a special operations unit who executed arrest and search warrants at their home for Tina's son in connection with an alleged assault. The plaintiffs claimed that the officers' use of handcuffs, pointing of assault rifles at Tina and 15-year-old Jessica for several minutes, and prolonged detention while questioning them violated the Fourth Amendment and constituted state-law torts including assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The court granted summary judgment in part to the defendants, dismissing the claims of unreasonable seizure and unlawful imprisonment apart from the alleged excessive force, as well as all claims against certain officers, but denied summary judgment on the excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment and related state-law claims against the remaining officers. It reasoned that a reasonable jury could find the force used excessive based on the evidence viewed in the plaintiffs' favor, that qualified immunity did not apply because the Fourth Amendment right was clearly established, and that official immunity likewise did not shield the officers from the state tort claims.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., plaintiff Karen Bartlett sued the manufacturer of generic Sulindac after suffering severe side effects including Stevens-Johnson syndrome progressing to toxic epidermal necrolysis, asserting state-law claims of strict products liability, negligence, and fraud on grounds that the drug was unreasonably dangerous and that the safety warnings were inadequate. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the failure-to-warn claims because the prescribing doctor did not read or rely on the label, so changes to the warnings could not have prevented the injury. The claims based on the theory that Sulindac was an unreasonably dangerous product, however, presented genuine disputes of material fact that must be resolved at trial. The court also granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on some of the defendant's affirmative defenses.

torts & liabilityhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

In Skinner v. Salem School District, a former food service employee sued her public employer under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging she was discriminated against and terminated because of her arthritic condition. The school district moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that employment discrimination claims against public entities must proceed under Title I rather than Title II. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Title II's language is ambiguous on this point and that the court must therefore defer under Chevron to the implementing agency's reasonable construction permitting such claims. The decision relied on First Circuit dicta in Currie v. Group Insurance Commission indicating that overlapping rights under the ADA titles are possible.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved wireless service providers suing two New Hampshire towns after local land-use boards denied permits to build cellphone towers, claiming violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Local abutters intervened in each case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, asserting impacts on their property interests, but they filed no counterclaims, cross-claims, or independent federal claims. After the providers and towns reached settlements allowing construction under specified conditions, the intervenors objected; the court ruled that intervenors who present no independent claims cannot block a consent judgment resolving the original parties' dispute. The core reasoning was that, under Supreme Court precedent such as Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, a court may enter judgment on settled claims when no third-party claims have been properly asserted, and the intervenors here had never raised any.

procedure

The case was about whether an affidavit from the defendant's 2007 immigration application, in which he described a 2006 arrest for selling unauthorized brand-name handbags, could be admitted as evidence in his federal trial on four counts of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The court denied the government's motion in limine to introduce the affidavit in its case-in-chief. The core reasoning was that the affidavit was not specially probative of the defendant's knowledge that the goods in this case bore counterfeit marks, as it mainly addressed his prior lack of awareness of illegality, and any limited relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.

criminal lawprocedure