This case involves a dispute between Denim North America Holdings, LLC and Swift Textiles, LLC along with related entities over a joint venture to manufacture and sell denim products, with Holdings alleging that defendants fraudulently induced it into the venture and breached fiduciary duties. Defendants moved for dismissal or an adverse inference based on spoliation of emails, to strike an affidavit, and for summary judgment on the claims. The court denied the spoliation sanctions and motion to strike, finding no bad faith in the routine deletion of emails and that the affidavit was admissible, then granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that genuine factual disputes existed on claims involving sales projections and competition but not on claims regarding concealment of financial condition or certain foreign ventures.
Mary Lee Salser, a speech language pathologist employed by the Clarke County School District who has rheumatoid arthritis, sued the School District and its employees, claiming discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court had previously granted partial summary judgment dismissing some ADA claims based on events before October 2007. On the remaining claims, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Salser and concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the ADA and FMLA claims.
In this case, former TSYS employees Ginger Hooper and Larry Marshall sued their employer for alleged discrimination, with Hooper claiming gender-based pay disparities, termination, and retaliation under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and Marshall alleging race-based pay issues, denial of promotions, termination, and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981. Plaintiffs supported their claims with comparator evidence and expert statistical testimony from Dr. Michael Daniels, which the court addressed alongside TSYS's motions. The court granted TSYS's motion to strike Daniels's testimony, finding it unreliable and not probative because his analysis failed to account for key factors like job responsibilities, performance, division, and salary history that TSYS used in its compensation and termination decisions. On summary judgment, the court denied the motion as to Hooper's Equal Pay Act and Title VII wage discrimination claims and Marshall's discriminatory discharge claims but granted it as to all other claims due to lack of sufficient evidence of discrimination or legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions.
This qui tam case under the False Claims Act involved relators alleging that University of Georgia researchers and EPA employees submitted a false 1999 grant application to the EPA for a study on sewage sludge application to land, using the funds to produce fabricated scientific data. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After discovery, the court found that the relators' claims relied on information obtained through public records requests and other publicly available sources, which triggered the FCA's public disclosure bar. The court further determined that the relators were not original sources of the information, depriving the court of jurisdiction and requiring dismissal of the action.
This case is a bankruptcy appeal involving disputes between former dental partners James Winchester and E. Murray Newlin over partnership interests, duties under their agreement, and post-petition proceeds, all complicated by Newlin's Chapter 11 conversion to Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After Newlin sued Winchester in state court, the bankruptcy trustee intervened, the case was removed to bankruptcy court, Winchester's answer and counterclaim were deemed untimely resulting in default, the trustee's counterclaim was assigned to Winchester, and the bankruptcy court found the proceeding non-core before remanding to state court. Winchester appealed the default, remand, and jury demand rulings, while Newlin appealed the assignment to Winchester. The district court, reviewing the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, affirmed all of the bankruptcy court's rulings on procedural timeliness, substitution of parties, and remand.
This case is a declaratory judgment action concerning the amount of liability insurance available under a State Auto policy after an insured driver struck two bicyclists riding in close spatial and temporal proximity. State Auto argued the incident was one accident subject to a single per-accident limit, while the defendants contended there were two separate accidents allowing for two limits; the policy left the term "accident" undefined. Following certification, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the cause theory for determining the number of accidents, focusing on whether there was one proximate cause or an intervening cause after the driver regained control. Reviewing evidence that the driver may have made a steering correction between the impacts separated by roughly one second, the court found genuine issues of material fact on that issue. The court therefore denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.