This case involves a dispute between High Street Lofts Condominium Association and American Family Mutual Insurance Company over whether the insurance policy covers damage to the building allegedly caused by vibrations from nearby road construction work. The insurer denied the claim based on policy exclusions for earth movement, including soil settlement and shifting, and an anti-concurrent cause provision. High Street sued for declaratory judgment on coverage, breach of contract, and unreasonable denial of benefits. The court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the cause of the damage and the applicability of exclusions, and rejecting arguments for judicial estoppel based on positions taken in a prior lawsuit against the contractor.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
In Olson v. City of Golden, Ms. Olson challenged the City of Golden’s campaign finance ordinance both facially and as applied, claiming it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and unduly burdened freedom of speech and the press by requiring disclosure of non-committee expenditures exceeding $50 within three business days. The court granted judgment to the defendant City. The court reasoned that the ordinance served the compelling governmental interest in combating actual or apparent undue influence in elections through disclosure requirements, was not vague or overbroad, and did not violate the First Amendment by applying to media entities without a press exemption.
This case involves a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which relator Bobby L. Maxwell, an MMS auditor, alleged that Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. submitted false royalty reports on federal oil and gas leases from 1999 to 2003. After a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff resulting in a trebled damages judgment of over $22 million plus penalties, the relator applied for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). The court granted the full requested lodestar amount of $2,178,632.25 in attorneys' fees and $109,341.79 in expenses, including certain expert fees, while denying a contingency-based enhancement and any recovery for the relator's own work as an expert witness. The ruling rests on the FCA's mandatory fee-shifting provision for prevailing relators, the lodestar method as the presumptively reasonable fee, and precedent allowing expert expenses but not party witness fees.
This case involves the SEC's allegations that several Qwest Communications executives engaged in securities fraud between 1999 and 2002 by failing to disclose that revenue from one-time IRU network sales was being aggregated into the "communications services" reporting category alongside recurring monthly service revenue, potentially misleading investors about the sources and sustainability of Qwest's growth. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims after prior rulings had narrowed the issues. The court granted the motions in part, dismissing certain fraud claims against defendants including Kozlowski and Noyes on the grounds that the SEC failed to produce evidence creating a triable issue of scienter, as the record showed the executives had relied on assurances from outside auditors regarding disclosure decisions and no contrary evidence existed. The court emphasized that undisputed facts must be accepted at summary judgment and that credibility disputes require competing evidence.
In this case, prisoner Hazhar A. Sayed brought a single claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Darryl R. Profitt, alleging that the Colorado Department of Corrections violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by not allowing him to shower for full ablution before Friday Jum'ah services at Limón Correctional Facility. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It held that the claim for injunctive relief was moot because Sayed had been transferred to Fremont Correctional Facility, where he had access to showers before services. The court also concluded that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the official-capacity claims and qualified immunity protected the defendant in his individual capacity.
The case involves plaintiffs, as representatives of a class holding a nearly $2 billion Hawaii judgment against Ferdinand Marcos' estate, seeking to quiet title to Colorado real property nominally held by Denman Investment Corporation in order to execute on that judgment. After the Hawaii judgment expired in 2005, the plaintiffs registered it in Illinois in 1997 and later revived the Illinois registration in 2008, then attempted to register the result in Colorado. The court granted Denman's motion to dismiss, holding that registration of a judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 does not create a new, independent judgment enforceable in other states and that the Illinois revival proceeding was merely a procedural continuation that did not produce a transferable new judgment.
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