Mark R. Kravitz

This case involves Shawn Tellado's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or correct his 2007 federal sentence for cocaine conspiracy, in which he was classified as a career offender based on two prior Connecticut narcotics convictions from Alford guilty pleas. The court considered whether the Second Circuit's 2008 decision in United States v. Savage—which held that such Alford pleas under Connecticut law do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines—should allow resentencing to a lower range of 92-115 months instead of 188 months. Although the government conceded Savage could apply retroactively and Tellado's classification was erroneous, the court denied relief. The core reasoning centered on the strong societal interest in the finality of judgments outweighing the petitioner's interest in a shorter sentence, particularly given the passage of time since the sentence became final in 2007 and issues with the timeliness of the collateral attack.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a securities fraud claim by investor Poptech against Stewardship Credit Arbitrage Fund and related entities, including a control person liability claim under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act against defendant Paul Seidenwar. The court denied Seidenwar's motion to dismiss the Section 20(a) claim. Assuming the primary violation claims against the fund and advisors were adequately pled, the court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged Seidenwar's control over the primary violators and his culpable participation in the alleged fraud, based on his role in the entities and knowledge or willful blindness regarding misrepresentations about investment due diligence.

business & regulatory

In this case, exotic dancers sued the owners of two Connecticut clubs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state employment laws, alleging they were misclassified as tenants rather than employees entitled to wages. The defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss class claims based on leases containing arbitration clauses that some of the plaintiffs had signed. The court denied the motion as to one plaintiff because the record showed no agreement to arbitrate, but granted it as to the other two plaintiffs, ordering individual arbitration after the defendants conceded they would not enforce certain provisions; the court reasoned that the agreements were validly formed under Connecticut law, not unconscionable, and that the FAA and recent Supreme Court precedent supported enforcement of the individual arbitration requirement.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a third-party claim for common law indemnification under Connecticut law brought by Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. and employee Lorraine Halica against attorney Mark Singer. The claim arose after Finance California sued the title company over its role as escrow agent in an $8 million commercial real estate loan that involved an illusory consulting agreement and undisclosed credit, leading to a settlement with the original plaintiff. A jury found Singer liable as the active tortfeasor, and he moved under Rules 50 and 59 to set aside the verdict or obtain a new trial on grounds including insufficient evidence, erroneous jury instructions, and denial of a continuance. The court denied both motions, concluding that the evidence supported the jury's finding that the third-party plaintiffs were only passive tortfeasors and that no trial errors warranted relief.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves Bank of America seeking a prejudgment remedy against Samuel Klein on his personal guarantee of a $3.2 million loan made by its predecessor to Agrippa, LLC, which was secured by a Manhattan apartment. Klein conceded probable cause for the remedy in the amount of $3 million after agreeing to summary judgment on liability, and the court granted the motion under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-278d. The court found probable cause that a judgment of at least that amount would be rendered in Bank of America's favor, noted that no defenses regarding insurance, exemptions, or bonding were raised, and held that the security interest in the apartment did not bar separate pursuit of the guarantor. The court ordered Klein to disclose assets and allowed the remedy to proceed while the underlying debt amount is resolved in bankruptcy court.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

In Smith v. Da Ros, a former Facilities Manager for the Town of Branford sued the town and its First Selectman under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51q and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation for his political criticisms of the defendant's handling of land issues and for his political affiliation and campaign support. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims after the plaintiff withdrew his procedural due process claim. The court reasoned that the plaintiff could not establish that his protected speech or political activities were a substantial or motivating factor in the extension of his probationary period or his termination, that the defendants had legitimate non-retaliatory reasons supported by the record, and that there was no evidence of pretext.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights

This case involves a dispute over an indemnification clause in a 2001 vehicle lease agreement between John Pambianchi and Chrysler Financial for a Jeep Cherokee leased for his son. After the son caused an accident injuring two motorcyclists, the victims sued the Pambianchis and Chrysler Financial, which was held liable as owner under Connecticut law; DaimlerChrysler Insurance then paid a settlement and, as subrogee, along with Chrysler Financial, sought reimbursement from Pambianchi under the lease. The court granted summary judgment to the Chrysler entities on their indemnification claims and dismissed Pambianchi's counterclaims and third-party claims. It held that the lease's indemnification provision was unambiguous and enforceable under Connecticut law, that Pambianchi had not shown unconscionability, and that the entities had not waived or forfeited their rights through subsequent conduct or representations.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

Plaintiffs sued Unlimited Systems, LLC and its owner for unpaid wages under the FLSA and Connecticut law, obtaining a default judgment for damages, fees, and costs. They then moved to enforce that judgment against U.S. Stucco, LLC, arguing it was a successor entity. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found U.S. Stucco to be the successor in interest because the companies shared the same owners, officers, employees, business address, equipment, suppliers, contractors, and types of work, with Unlimited Systems having ceased operations around the time U.S. Stucco was formed. Applying the substantial-continuity test for successor liability under the FLSA in the Second Circuit, the court granted the motion and held U.S. Stucco liable for the full judgment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from an August 2009 fire at a Connecticut marina that destroyed petitioner Robert Carter's motorboat, the Indigo Sky, while it was stored on land, and damaged other boats and property also stored on land; Carter, as boat owner, filed a petition in federal court under the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act to limit his potential liability for the resulting damages. Claimants Allstate and Continental moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the incident occurred entirely on land. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the petition, holding that the Limitation Act does not independently confer admiralty jurisdiction over claims from land-based incidents. The court reasoned that federal admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 requires a connection to navigable waters, which was absent here since the fire and all damage occurred on land, and that the Act functions as a defense rather than an independent grant of jurisdiction. The court noted that precedents like Richardson v. Harmon remain controlling absent explicit overruling by the Supreme Court.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action originally filed in Connecticut Superior Court concerning property at 85 Westport Road in Easton, where defendant Fabiola Is Ra El Bey had borrowed $372,000 from SunTrust Mortgage in 2006 and later attempted to cancel the loan citing alleged nondisclosure and fraud under the Truth in Lending Act. After the lender sent a default notice, the defendant filed notices purporting to revoke the mortgage and remove the case to federal court, asserting theories related to her membership in the Moorish Science Temple and claims that the loan was invalid. Bank of America moved to remand the action to state court. The district court granted the motion to remand, holding that the case did not arise under federal law for purposes of removal jurisdiction and that the defendant remained a Connecticut citizen, so diversity jurisdiction was also lacking. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that her religious beliefs or other theories conferred immunity from state court jurisdiction or created a federal question.

procedureproperty

This case arose from the 2008 bankruptcies and closures of the Archway cookie companies, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants, including Insight LLC as a management firm, violated the federal WARN Act and California WARN Act by failing to give employees 60 days' advance notice of the plant closings. The pending motion was Insight's renewed request to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), raising two threshold legal questions about whether Connecticut's long-arm statute applies to foreign LLCs and the standards for imputing contacts. The court resolved both legal issues in the plaintiffs' favor, holding that the statute covers foreign LLCs and that their principals' Connecticut board service and meetings could support jurisdiction, then denied the motion without prejudice pending an evidentiary hearing on the factual basis for jurisdiction.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Brian Danzi, who was charged with marijuana distribution and conspiracy offenses and who moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the government had violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to turn over exculpatory evidence before he entered the plea. The court confirmed that a Brady violation had occurred but denied the motion to withdraw the plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), holding that Danzi had not shown a fair and just reason for withdrawal or a reasonable probability that timely disclosure would have caused him to proceed to trial instead. The ruling rested on the thoroughness of the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the voluntariness of the plea, Danzi’s statements under oath that he was guilty, and the absence of any claim of actual innocence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Aliki Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc. involved a commercial dispute between a frozen foods seller and its Canadian manufacturer over shipments of fettuccine alfredo that tested positive for Listeria, resulting in a USDA hold, recall, and claimed losses from spoiled product, discontinued sales, and reputational harm. Aliki sued for breach of contract and negligence, alleging that Otter Valley failed to promptly notify it of the hold and mishandled USDA submissions and labeling. The court granted Otter Valley's motion for partial summary judgment on the negligence count, ruling that the claim was barred by Connecticut's economic loss doctrine as set forth in Flagg Energy Development Corp. v. General Motors Corp., which confines recovery for purely economic losses arising from a commercial contract to the parties' contractual remedies rather than tort claims.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a pro se plaintiff who challenged a mortgage on real property in Connecticut, alleging that the original lender fraudulently converted a promissory note, that the debt was thereby extinguished, and that CitiMortgage and credit agencies committed RICO violations and defamation by reporting the loan as delinquent after the plaintiff attempted to rescind it using recorded documents. CitiMortgage filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim seeking foreclosure. The court granted the motion to dismiss in full, holding that the complaint failed to state any plausible claim because it rested on legally invalid theories associated with the Redemptionist movement, provided no factual support for fraud or conspiracy, and did not identify any inaccuracy in the credit reporting. The plaintiff was permitted one final opportunity to amend.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Rivera v. United States, pro se petitioner Carlos Rivera, who was convicted in 2006 on five counts of sexual exploitation of minors and possession of child pornography and sentenced to life imprisonment, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence after his direct appeals concluded in 2009. The court considered whether the petition was timely under AEDPA's one-year limitations period, which expired on February 23, 2010, and evaluated Rivera's request for equitable tolling due to delays in obtaining transcripts from his attorney and prison mail restrictions. The court denied the § 2255 motion and the accompanying motion to file out of time, concluding that the petition was time-barred because Rivera had not shown rare and exceptional circumstances justifying tolling and had not filed an actual petition by the deadline.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from the suicide of pretrial detainee Andre Mario Lyle at a Connecticut correctional facility, with his estate suing the Department of Corrections, Correctional Managed Health Care, and several individual staff members over alleged inadequate mental health treatment, housing with a convicted inmate, and related constitutional violations. The complaint asserted claims for denial of adequate mental health care, substantive due process, equal protection under federal and state constitutions, and wrongful death. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the allegations failed to state viable constitutional claims, lacked sufficient personal involvement or differential treatment evidence, and were barred by immunity doctrines. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing claims based on housing arrangements, certain equal protection allegations, official-capacity suits, and some immunity issues, but denied it in part to allow other mental health care and supervisory claims to proceed based on the sufficiency of the pleaded facts under Iqbal standards.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

James O'Neill, a former Bridgeport police officer and Seventh Day Adventist, sued the City of Bridgeport Police Department under Title VII alleging failure to accommodate his religious observance of the Sabbath by not requiring Saturday work and retaliation for his accommodation requests. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim but denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim. The court determined that O'Neill had not established a viable discrimination claim based on the available scheduling options and use of vacation time, while factual disputes existed as to whether actions like shift reassignments and discipline were motivated by his protected requests and rose to the level of adverse employment actions.

civil rightsreligious libertylabor & employment

This case arises under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act but centers on an undecided question of Connecticut law regarding post-judgment interest. Plaintiff Susan Ballou had two small claims judgments entered against her with court-ordered installment payment plans, and Defendant Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C. sought to collect those judgments plus 10% post-judgment interest via bank execution without the small claims court having ordered such interest. The district court did not resolve the FDCPA claim on the merits but instead certified two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-356d(e) provides for automatic accrual of post-judgment interest on judgments subject to installment orders, and if so, at what rate. The court chose certification because the underlying facts were undisputed, the legal issue is important and affects thousands of cases, and an appeal would likely lead the Second Circuit to certify the same questions.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Marlon Spaulding, a lawful permanent resident, suing Alejandro Mayorkas, Director of USCIS, for judicial review of the agency's denial of his application for a certificate of citizenship based on derivative citizenship through his mother's naturalization when he was a minor. Spaulding conceded he did not appeal the denial to the Administrative Appeals Office within the required time but attributed the failure to his paid attorney, who did not file the appeal. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), holding that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), though the dismissal was without prejudice to allow Spaulding to seek reopening with USCIS. The claim against the attorney was not dismissed.

immigrationprocedure

The case involved a law firm suing Bank of America after original client documents stored in the bank's vault were damaged by flooding from a burst pipe in 2007, with the firm asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence/bailment, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim but denied it on the breach of contract, negligence/bailment, and CUTPA claims. The ruling was based on the existence of disputed factual issues regarding the terms of the safe deposit contract, the bank's standard of care as a bailee, and whether the bank's conduct rose to the level of an unfair trade practice, while the promissory estoppel claim lacked sufficient evidence of a clear promise or reasonable reliance.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability