Irene Patricia Murphy Keeley

The case involved three debtors who filed adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court against Capital One Bank, alleging that the bank violated West Virginia's Consumer Credit and Protection Act by continuing debt collection calls after being notified that the debtors had retained counsel and planned to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims as preempted by the National Bank Act under conflict preemption principles. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the state provision does not qualify as a preempted "State consumer financial law" under the Dodd-Frank Act because it addresses unfair collection practices rather than the terms of financial transactions or accounts, and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which Erie Insurance sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend its insureds—a daycare center and its owners—in a state-court lawsuit brought by former employees. The underlying complaint alleged claims including sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment, retaliatory discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy. The court compared the policy language to the complaint allegations and held that the Ultraflex Policy's employment-related practices exclusion applied to all claims because they arose out of the employment relationship. As a result, the court declared that Erie had no duty to defend and dismissed the action with prejudice.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

Ryan Environmental sued Hess Oil and its insurers, the C&I defendants, in West Virginia state court seeking payment of roughly $253,000 for remediation work performed at a contaminated former gas station site. The C&I defendants removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Hess Oil, a dissolved West Virginia corporation, was not a proper party whose citizenship or consent to removal mattered. The district court granted Ryan Environmental’s motion to remand, holding that complete diversity was lacking because Hess Oil remained a West Virginia citizen adverse to the plaintiff, that arguments for fraudulent joinder, misjoinder, or realignment failed, and that Hess Oil’s consent to removal had not been obtained. Because the case was returned to state court, the court denied the C&I defendants’ pending motion to dismiss as moot.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Jones v. Price, a state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that a correctional officer violated his constitutional rights by conducting a visual strip search in a non-private area of the jail in view of a female office worker. The district court sustained the plaintiff's objections, rejected the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denied the defendant's second motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiff's continuance motion as moot. The court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the location and manner of the search, including whether a private area was available nearby and the visibility to the female clerk. It held that the inmate's right to privacy of his genitals from unreasonable opposite-sex exposure was clearly established, and that disputes over the facts and witness credibility made qualified immunity unavailable at the summary judgment stage.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a Louisiana plaintiff suing Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a generic anti-epileptic drug called Phenytoin, for severe injuries her special-needs son suffered after developing Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis from the medication. The plaintiff alleged inadequate warnings about heightened risks for African-American patients, while Mylan sought summary judgment arguing that Louisiana law and federal preemption barred the claims. The court held that the Louisiana Products Liability Act governs the claims and bars some of them, that the learned intermediary doctrine violates West Virginia public policy and thus does not apply, and that federal law does not preempt the remaining state-law failure-to-warn claims. It therefore granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The reasoning rested on choice-of-law analysis, West Virginia precedent rejecting the learned intermediary doctrine, and Supreme Court authority such as Wyeth v. Levine regarding generic drug labeling obligations.

torts & liabilityhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

In Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, alleging disability from physical conditions like tendonitis and bursitis as well as mental impairments. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full after no objections were filed. The court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiff's motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's credibility findings against the claimant and the decision to accord little weight to her treating source opinions and GAF scores.

healthcareprocedure

In this case, Cytec Industries sued former employee Joseph Powell in federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act to compel arbitration of claims Powell had raised against Cytec and his supervisor in a parallel West Virginia state court action alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and other state laws. Powell moved to dismiss, arguing that his supervisor Amy Mather was a necessary and indispensable party whose joinder would destroy complete diversity between the parties. The court dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that Mather was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 because the claims against her and Cytec arose from the same employment relationship and termination. The court further reasoned that, following Vaden v. Discover Bank, it must look through the FAA petition to the underlying state-court controversy, which lacked diversity due to Mather's West Virginia citizenship, precluding federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

procedurelabor & employment

This case involves plaintiff Nicholson's challenge to the denial of his application for Childhood Disability Benefits and SSI by the Social Security Administration after he reached age 18, based on claimed impairments such as scoliosis, Tetralogy of Fallot, ADHD, depression, anxiety, borderline intellectual functioning, and a lazy eye. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, remanding the matter solely for further proceedings to determine whether Nicholson's lazy eye qualifies as a severe impairment meeting or equaling a listed condition and, if not, whether it affects the ALJ's conclusion that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that he can perform. In all other respects, the court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, upholding the ALJ's findings that Nicholson was not disabled during the relevant period beginning November 1, 2003. The core reasoning was that the administrative record required additional development only on the narrow issue of the lazy eye's vocational impact, while the ALJ's determinations on other impairments and the lack of good cause to reopen prior decisions were supported by the evidence.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case involved environmental groups suing the Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) for discharging pollutants from point sources at eighteen reclaimed surface mine sites into navigable waterways without National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits required by the Clean Water Act. The plaintiffs brought a citizen suit under the CWA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the WVDEP to apply for and obtain the permits. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declared that the WVDEP was violating the CWA by emitting pollutants without permits, and ordered the WVDEP to obtain NPDES permits for the sites. The court's reasoning rested on the CWA's plain language prohibiting any discharge of pollutants from point sources without a permit, which applies to states and their agencies, along with the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar prospective injunctive relief against state officials.

environmentfederal power

In this case, plaintiff Leatrice Burgess-Lester sought to substitute counsel by adding attorney Benjamin Bailey from the firm Bailey & Glasser as co-counsel in her lawsuit against defendant Ford Motor Company, prompting Ford to oppose the substitution and move to vacate the court's initial approval order. The court granted Ford's motion, vacated the prior order, and disqualified Bailey & Glasser from representing the plaintiff. The core reasoning was that a current attorney at the firm had previously worked on Ford matters, including this case, at another firm, creating a conflict under West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.9(b) and 1.10(b) due to the risk of using protected confidential information in a substantially related matter; the court found the firm's screening procedures insufficient to eliminate doubts about inadvertent disclosure or the appearance of impropriety.

procedure

In United States v. Cameron, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a police encounter at a public library on August 22, 2007, after an employee reported him taking photos of a child against the mother's wishes. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied the motion to suppress. The court conducted a de novo review of the record, including hearing transcripts, and determined that the officers' account of events was more credible than the defendant's. Based on that finding, the encounter was either a consensual police-citizen interaction or a valid Terry stop that did not violate the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Simonton Building Products sought a declaratory judgment that Johnson and Jones were not inventors on two of its pending patent applications and that those applications did not incorporate claims from Am-Rad's existing patents, meaning Simonton had no obligation under a prior license agreement and joint venture to contribute the applications or name the individuals as inventors. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, concluding that the claims were not ripe for review because the patent applications were still pending before the PTO, whose decisions could alter or moot the issues of inventorship and claim overlap. The court also declined to exercise declaratory judgment authority on prudential grounds due to the uncertainties surrounding the PTO's eventual rulings on the applications.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

This case involves Jerry L. Shinaberry's challenge to the denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits, in which he alleged disability from shortness of breath, chest pain, and lower back and leg pain stemming from pneumoconiosis and degenerative disc disease. The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process, found that Shinaberry retained the residual functional capacity for a limited range of sedentary work, and concluded he was not disabled because he could perform jobs such as assembler, surveillance monitor, or general office clerk. After the Appeals Council denied review, Shinaberry filed suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in full, denied Shinaberry's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the action, finding no error in the ALJ's credibility determination, evaluation of listed impairments, or vocational findings.

healthcareprocedure

This case involved Mylan Pharmaceuticals seeking to vacate an arbitration award that reinstated employee John Jones after his discharge for falsifying sieve test data on drug materials, in violation of company rules and FDA good manufacturing practices. The arbitrator ruled that Mylan lacked just cause for termination under the collective bargaining agreement because Jones received disparate treatment compared to other employees for a first-time offense, ordering instead a ten-day suspension. The Union sought to enforce the award. The court denied Mylan's summary judgment motion, granted the Union's, and upheld the award, reasoning that it drew its essence from the CBA, did not violate public policy, and that the arbitrator acted within his authority to interpret the agreement's just-cause and disciplinary provisions.

labor & employment

This case involves former employee Anita George and her family suing Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings and supervisors after her 2005 termination, claiming retaliatory discharge for criticizing her supervisor's performance and related loss of consortium claims tied to promissory estoppel counts. The court granted the defendant's partial motion to dismiss, eliminating Count B (retaliatory discharge) and the loss of consortium claims in Counts C, D, E, and F. The core reasoning relied on West Virginia Supreme Court precedent in Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center holding that the state constitution's free speech protections do not apply to private-sector employers or create a cause of action for termination based on employee speech. The court further determined that loss of consortium claims under West Virginia law arise only from tort actions and cannot be brought alongside contract-based claims such as promissory estoppel.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a widow's claim for accidental death benefits under an ERISA-governed group accident insurance policy provided by her deceased husband's employer. The insurer denied the claim, asserting that the death resulted from an intentionally self-inflicted injury due to an overdose of fentanyl patches and other medications. The court reviewed the denial and determined that the death was accidental, as the evidence showed the decedent intended only to relieve pain rather than cause injury or death. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering payment of the benefits, and denied the defendant's motion.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case involves a citizen suit brought by plaintiffs against Longview Power, LLC under the Clean Air Act, alleging that the company lacked a valid Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit for constructing a power plant in West Virginia. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the federal court should abstain from deciding the case under Burford abstention principles to avoid interfering with state regulatory decisions. The court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs' claims amounted to a collateral attack on the West Virginia Division of Air Quality's permitting decisions under the state's approved implementation plan, and that adequate state review processes exist for such matters. The core reasoning relied on precedents requiring federal courts to abstain from cases primarily involving complex state law issues in regulated areas like environmental permitting.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involves product liability claims by Steven Rattay and his wife against Medtronic, Inc., arising from the rupture of an InDura intrathecal catheter that was part of a Synchromed EL infusion pump system implanted in 2002 to deliver morphine; the fragment could not be removed, and the plaintiffs alleged strict liability, negligence in design/manufacture/marketing, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium. Medtronic moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claims were preempted by the FDA's premarket approval (PMA) of the device under the Medical Device Amendments and that remaining claims lacked factual or legal support. The court reviewed the extensive PMA process, which requires detailed submissions on design, manufacturing, and labeling and prohibits changes without further approval, and analyzed whether state tort claims impose requirements different from or in addition to federal ones under 21 U.S.C. § 360k, drawing on precedents like Medtronic v. Lohr and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences. No controlling Fourth Circuit authority existed on the preemptive effect of PMA approval for such devices. The opinion addressed procedural standards for summary judgment while noting the formidable requirements of the PMA pathway compared to other FDA reviews.

healthcarebusiness & regulatorytorts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved an inmate, Anthony Dellarciprete, who petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the Federal Bureau of Prisons denied his application to the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP), which could have led to early release. The denial was based on inconsistencies between his reported drug history during the RDAP interview and the information in his pre-sentence investigation report. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal, finding that the BOP has broad statutory discretion to determine RDAP eligibility and that its decision was reasonable. The district court affirmed the recommendation after de novo review, concluding that the petitioner's claims lacked merit, and dismissed the petition with prejudice.

criminal lawfederal power

The case Gizzi v. Educational Credit Management Corp. concerned whether Crystal Lea Gizzi's approximately $19,203 in student loan debt could be discharged in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding under the undue hardship exception of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's discharge order. Applying the Brunner test, the court held that Gizzi failed to demonstrate undue hardship because her household income, including her husband's earnings, allowed for a minimal standard of living while repaying the loans, and she had not shown good-faith efforts to repay despite her low personal income.

federal powerprocedure