David Gregory Kays

In United States v. Ceruti, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, as well as conspiracy to commit money laundering, based on evidence obtained after police arrested him outside his mother's residence following surveillance linked to a drug transaction. The defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle and a statement he made to police, arguing the arrest lacked probable cause and the warrantless vehicle search did not qualify as a valid inventory search under police policy, while also claiming a Miranda violation. The magistrate judge found probable cause supported the arrest based on intercepted calls and observations but determined the government failed to show the search complied with the Kansas City Police Department's towing and impoundment procedures or that any exception to the warrant requirement applied, and that the defendant's statement about drugs in the car resulted from custodial questioning without Miranda warnings. The district court adopted the report and recommendation in full, granting the motion to suppress the physical evidence from the vehicle and the post-arrest statement. The ruling turned on application of Fourth Amendment standards for arrests, inventory searches, and Fifth Amendment protections during custodial interrogation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a debtor who sought to reopen her 1990 Chapter 7 bankruptcy to determine whether a pre-1985 student loan had been discharged under the five-year rule then in effect or on undue-hardship grounds after the loan servicer intercepted her tax refund in 2010. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the original discharge order was final. The district court reversed and remanded, holding that Bankruptcy Rule 4007(b) expressly permits a dischargeability determination “at any time,” that a general discharge does not adjudicate student-loan nondischargeability, and that neither the rule nor precedent imposes a time bar on reopening the case. The court further noted that later financial circumstances remain relevant to any undue-hardship analysis.

procedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling in the Interstate Bakeries bankruptcy proceeding, concerning whether a perpetual, royalty-free trademark license agreement granted to Lewis Brothers Bakeries and Chicago Baking Company qualifies as an executory contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to Interstate Brands Corporation, holding that the agreement is executory. The court reasoned that the licensees' obligation to maintain the character and quality of goods sold under the trademarks represents a material unperformed obligation whose breach would excuse the licensor's performance. It further held that promissory estoppel does not prevent the licensor from asserting the contract's executory status.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit by Christopher Scarlett, a Black Jamaican student at the College of the Ozarks, alleging that the college discriminated against him on the basis of race in administering its mandatory student work program, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI. The court granted the college's motion for summary judgment in part, allowing the core discrimination claims under both statutes to proceed to trial after finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a prima facie case and to show that the college's stated reasons were pretextual. It dismissed two specific Title VI allegations as time-barred under the applicable five-year statute of limitations. The decision applied the standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, viewing facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and relied on precedents regarding proof of discrimination and available remedies.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a putative class action under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act in which plaintiffs alleged that illegal fees were charged at closing on their residential second mortgage loan and sued the companies that later acquired or serviced the loan. The court granted defendants' summary judgment motions in part, holding that Mrs. Mayo lacked standing as she was not a party to the loan, that the funding and underwriting fees violated the Act but other fees did not, that loan servicers did not violate the Act but assignees did by receiving payments that included the illegal fees rolled into principal, and that the remaining plaintiff could pursue interest paid and punitive damages. These conclusions rested on review of the loan documents, the statutory text governing permissible fees on second mortgages, and the distinction between direct and indirect violations by different categories of defendants. All claims against GMAC Mortgage and Residential Funding were dismissed with prejudice.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

Charles Green sued Union Security Insurance Company under ERISA after the insurer denied his claim for long-term disability benefits due to fibromyalgia and related conditions that prevented full-time work. The court granted Green's motion for summary judgment, denied Union's cross-motion, and reversed the denial of benefits. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard because the plan granted the administrator discretionary authority, the court found the denial was not supported by substantial evidence on the record and was undermined by the administrator's structural conflict of interest, which was given added weight because the insurer encouraged a Social Security disability application yet disregarded the SSA's favorable finding while selectively emphasizing certain medical reports over others that supported the claim.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute between homeowner Rhonda Rowan and Standard Fire Insurance Company following a fire that destroyed Rowan's home in January 2005. The insurer argued that the homeowner's policy had been cancelled effective June 14, 2004, due to the condition of the roof, while Rowan contended the policy remained in force. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the policy was properly cancelled under its terms because notice was sent 52 days after issuance, which fell within the initial 60-day period allowing cancellation for any reason with at least 30 days' notice. This conclusion was supported by the policy language distinguishing cancellation rights based on whether the policy had been in effect for less than 60 days and by analogous Missouri precedent permitting the effective date of cancellation to extend beyond the 60-day window if notice was timely mailed.

business & regulatoryproperty