Brett M. Kavanaugh

In Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, a Missouri jury awarded damages to plaintiff John Durnell on a state failure-to-warn claim, finding that Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma because the product label lacked a cancer warning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempts such state-law claims. Under FIFRA’s uniformity provision (7 U.S.C. §136v(b)), states may not impose labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” those required by EPA. EPA has repeatedly registered glyphosate-based products like Roundup after determining that the pesticide is not likely carcinogenic and that no cancer warning is needed on the label; federal law then requires manufacturers to use that exact EPA-approved label unless the agency later approves or mandates a change. Because Durnell’s tort claim would compel Monsanto to add a warning that EPA has not required, it imposes a labeling obligation different from federal law and is therefore preempted, consistent with precedents such as Bates v. Dow Agrosciences and Riegel v. Medtronic.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal powertorts & liability

The Supreme Court case concerned whether U.S. nationals could sue Cuban government-owned companies under the 1996 Helms-Burton Act for “trafficking” in property confiscated by Cuba after 1959, or whether those instrumentalities remained immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) unless one of its enumerated exceptions applied. The Court held that the Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates sovereign immunity for Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, so plaintiffs need not also satisfy an FSIA exception. It reached this conclusion because the statute expressly creates a private right of action against “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” places jurisdiction under the general federal-question statute rather than the FSIA’s provision, and gives the President broad authority to suspend suits—features inconsistent with requiring FSIA exceptions that would be nearly impossible to meet under the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The decision reversed the D.C. Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power

In Pitchford v. Cain, the Supreme Court considered a Batson claim raised by Terry Pitchford, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Mississippi after the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against four of five Black prospective jurors. The Court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably found waiver under the AEDPA standards, reversing the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. The trial court had raised a prima facie Batson objection at step one, accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations at step two, but never completed step three by allowing defense counsel to rebut those reasons as pretextual or making findings on the issue. The Court explained that Pitchford did not waive the claim, as counsel attempted to raise it again after jury selection and the trial court assured that the objection was preserved in the record; the state court’s conclusion that a separate pretext argument was required was an unreasonable reading of the record and Batson procedure.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) qualifies as criminal punishment, which would make it subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause; petitioner Ellingburg, who committed his offense before the MVRA’s enactment but was later sentenced to pay $7,567.25 in restitution, challenged his ongoing obligation on that ground after the Eighth Circuit ruled that MVRA restitution is not punishment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the statute’s text and structure, which label restitution a “penalty” imposed only on convicted defendants at sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines, place the government in the adversarial role, and codify the provisions in Title 18 under “Miscellaneous Sentencing Provisions”; the Court also noted that victims cannot initiate or control the process as they would in a civil proceeding and that prior precedents have treated such restitution as punishment.

criminal law

The case concerned President Trump’s October 2025 order federalizing roughly 300 Illinois and Texas National Guard members under 10 U.S.C. §12406(3) to protect federal immigration officers and property in the Chicago area amid reported obstructions and protests. The Northern District of Illinois issued a temporary restraining order blocking the federalization and deployment; after the Seventh Circuit declined to stay that order in full, the Government sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court. The Court denied the application for a stay. It held that the statutory phrase “regular forces” likely refers to the regular U.S. military rather than civilian law-enforcement agencies, so the President may invoke §12406(3) only when he lacks authority or capacity to use the military itself to execute federal law—an authority constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act. Because the Government had identified no statutory or constitutional basis permitting the military to perform the protective functions at issue, it had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits at this preliminary stage.

immigrationfederal power

The case concerned NetChoice’s request for emergency Supreme Court relief to block enforcement of a Mississippi law regulating online platforms, after a district court had enjoined the law but a stay allowed it to take effect. The Court denied the application to vacate the stay. Justice Kavanaugh concurred, explaining that NetChoice had not shown the balance of harms and equities favored interim relief at this stage. He added that NetChoice was nevertheless likely to succeed on the merits, because the law would probably violate the First Amendment rights of NetChoice’s members under precedents such as Moody v. NetChoice and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., consistent with injunctions issued by multiple other federal district courts against similar state laws.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether members of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force are "principal" or "inferior" officers under the Constitution's Appointments Clause. Plaintiffs, including individuals and businesses objecting to the Affordable Care Act's preventive-services coverage mandate, argued that the Task Force members exercise significant authority without adequate supervision and therefore must be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation rather than by the HHS Secretary. The Supreme Court held that Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary is constitutional. It reasoned that the Secretary, a principal officer, directs and supervises their work through at-will removal authority and statutory powers to review and block recommendations before they become binding on insurers. This supervision satisfies the standard for inferior officers set out in precedents such as Edmond v. United States.

federal powerhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a constitutional challenge to the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, an HHS body whose “A” or “B” recommendations on preventive care must be covered without cost-sharing by most insurers under the Affordable Care Act. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers who can be appointed only by the President with Senate confirmation, not by the HHS Secretary. The Supreme Court held that the members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary satisfies the Appointments Clause. The Court reasoned that the Secretary, a principal officer, directs and supervises the Task Force through at-will removal authority and statutory power to review and block recommendations before they become binding on insurers.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a class-action lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), in which McLaughlin Chiropractic alleged that McKesson sent unsolicited fax advertisements without required opt-out notices; the proposed class included recipients using both traditional fax machines and online fax services. After the FCC issued the Amerifactors order interpreting the TCPA to exclude online fax services, the district court and Ninth Circuit treated that order as binding under the Hobbs Act and limited the case to a small number of traditional fax claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Hobbs Act does not require district courts in enforcement proceedings to follow an agency’s statutory interpretation. Instead, courts must independently interpret the statute under ordinary principles of construction while giving the agency’s view appropriate respect. The Court reasoned that the Hobbs Act’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals to “determine the validity” of agency orders applies only to pre-enforcement declaratory relief and does not preclude independent judicial review in later enforcement actions.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether fuel producers had Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval of California regulations requiring automakers to reduce average greenhouse-gas emissions and increase production of electric vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the fuel producers possess standing. Their monetary injury from reduced demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels was clear and directly traceable to the EPA-approved rules, which were designed to lower liquid-fuel consumption. Redressability was also satisfied because vacating the approval would likely cause automakers to produce more gasoline-powered vehicles, increasing fuel sales, based on ordinary economic incentives and record evidence.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a TCPA lawsuit brought by McLaughlin Chiropractic against McKesson for sending unsolicited fax advertisements without required opt-out notices. McLaughlin sought to represent a class of recipients that included both traditional fax machines and online fax services, but after the FCC issued the Amerifactors order interpreting the TCPA to exclude online faxes, the district court and Ninth Circuit treated that order as binding under the Hobbs Act, decertified the class, and limited McLaughlin to a small damages award. The Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not require district courts in enforcement proceedings to follow an agency’s statutory interpretation. Instead, district courts must independently interpret the statute under ordinary principles of statutory construction, while giving the agency’s view appropriate respect. The Court reasoned that the Hobbs Act’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals to “determine the validity” of agency orders applies only to pre-enforcement declaratory relief and does not displace the default rule—codified in the APA—that allows judicial review of agency interpretations during later enforcement actions.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether fuel producers had Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval under the Clean Air Act of California regulations that require automakers to reduce average greenhouse-gas emissions and produce a higher percentage of electric vehicles. The D.C. Circuit held that the producers lacked standing because they had not shown that invalidating the EPA’s approval would likely cause automakers to sell more gasoline-powered vehicles. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the producers satisfied the requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. It reasoned that the regulations’ explicit goal of cutting liquid-fuel consumption made the producers’ monetary injury traceable to the EPA’s action, and that vacating the approval would likely increase demand for their products under ordinary economic principles and the record evidence, even though automakers are independent third parties.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether Texas and Fasken Land and Minerals could challenge in federal court the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision to license a private spent nuclear fuel storage facility in West Texas. The Supreme Court held that they could not, because the Hobbs Act limits judicial review of such licensing orders to "parties aggrieved" by the agency's final decision, and neither Texas nor Fasken qualified as parties. Under the Atomic Energy Act, party status in an NRC licensing proceeding requires either being the license applicant or successfully intervening after requesting a hearing; submitting comments on the environmental impact statement or an unsuccessful intervention petition does not suffice. The Court further ruled that Fasken could not relitigate its denied intervention through this separate suit after losing that issue in the D.C. Circuit, and that nonstatutory ultra vires review was unavailable because the agency had not acted in clear excess of a specific statutory prohibition.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether Texas and a private business (Fasken) could challenge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision to license a private facility in West Texas for storing spent nuclear fuel. The Supreme Court held that they could not obtain judicial review of the licensing order. Under the Hobbs Act, only a “party aggrieved” by an NRC licensing decision may seek review in court, and the Atomic Energy Act provides that a person becomes a party only by requesting and being formally admitted to participate in the proceeding. Texas and Fasken submitted comments but were not admitted as parties (Fasken’s intervention request was denied and upheld by the D.C. Circuit), and the narrow exception for ultra vires agency action did not apply to allow review outside the statutory scheme.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned the U.S. Surface Transportation Board’s approval of an 88-mile railroad line in Utah intended to carry crude oil from the Uinta Basin to the national rail network. The Board prepared an environmental impact statement under NEPA that addressed the project’s direct effects but did not fully analyze upstream oil drilling or downstream refining; the D.C. Circuit held this omission violated NEPA and vacated both the statement and the approval order. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the D.C. Circuit failed to apply the required deference to the agency and that NEPA did not obligate the Board to evaluate environmental effects of separate upstream and downstream activities. The Court reasoned that NEPA is a procedural statute focused on the proposed action itself, that agencies have discretion to determine the scope and detail of indirect effects they examine, and that the Board lacked authority to regulate or reject the project based on oil-production or refining impacts outside its jurisdiction.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned the Surface Transportation Board’s approval of an 88-mile railroad line in Utah to transport crude oil, and whether the Board’s environmental impact statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was legally sufficient. The D.C. Circuit vacated the approval, holding that the EIS failed to adequately analyze the effects of increased upstream oil drilling and downstream refining. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the D.C. Circuit had not given the Board the required deference in NEPA cases and had misinterpreted the statute to demand review of environmental effects from separate projects over which the Board had no regulatory authority. The Court explained that NEPA is a procedural statute focused on the proposed action itself, that agencies have discretion to determine the appropriate scope and level of detail in an EIS, and that foreseeable effects need not be analyzed if the agency cannot lawfully prevent or mitigate them.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned unemployed Alabama workers who sued the state Secretary of Labor in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful delays in processing their unemployment benefits claims and seeking an order to expedite the process. The state trial court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Alabama Code § 25–4–95, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that § 1983 did not preempt the state exhaustion requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that state courts may not apply a state exhaustion rule to bar § 1983 claims when doing so effectively immunizes officials from challenges to administrative delays. The Court reasoned that, under precedents such as Felder v. Casey, Howlett v. Rose, and Haywood v. Drown, a state procedural rule that functions to shield government conduct from § 1983 liability is preempted, regardless of whether it is labeled jurisdictional or offers alternatives like mandamus.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Alabama unemployment claimants who sued the state labor secretary in state court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging unlawful delays in processing their benefits and seeking an order to expedite the administrative process. The Alabama trial court and Supreme Court dismissed the suits for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under state law, which requires a final agency decision before judicial review. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state exhaustion rule may not be applied to bar §1983 claims when it effectively immunizes officials from challenges to delays in the very administrative process at issue. The Court reasoned that precedents such as Felder v. Casey, Howlett v. Rose, and Haywood v. Drown preempt state rules that function as immunity from §1983 suits in state court, regardless of whether the rule is labeled jurisdictional or offers alternatives like mandamus.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedurefederal power

In E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, sales representatives sued their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime, claiming they did not qualify for the statutory exemption for outside salesmen. The district court ruled for the employees after requiring the employer to prove the exemption by clear and convincing evidence, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed based on its precedent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to establish an FLSA exemption. The Court reasoned that the FLSA is silent on the burden of proof, so the default civil standard governs, as it does in analogous employment cases like those under Title VII, and no statute or constitutional requirement justified a higher standard. The case was remanded for further proceedings under the correct standard.

labor & employmentprocedure

In E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, sales representatives sued their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime, and the company defended by claiming the employees qualified as exempt “outside salesmen.” The district court ruled for the employees after applying a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to the exemption, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs when an employer seeks to prove an FLSA exemption. The Court reasoned that preponderance is the default rule in civil litigation unless a statute or the Constitution requires a higher standard, the FLSA is silent on the issue, and the case does not involve constitutional rights or unusual coercive government action. The Court noted that FLSA exemption disputes are comparable to Title VII employment cases, where the preponderance standard has long applied.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory