Elena Kagan

In *Chatrie v. United States*, the case concerned whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by using a geofence warrant to obtain Google Location History data revealing cell phones near a bank robbery, which ultimately identified petitioner Okello Chatrie as a suspect. The Supreme Court held that the police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google. The Court reasoned that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements as recorded by cell-phone location information, and that Location History provides an even more detailed and revealing record than the cell-site location information at issue in *Carpenter v. United States*. The Court further concluded that the third-party doctrine does not apply to such data, as it is not voluntarily shared in the ordinary sense and is effectively an extension of the user’s private affairs. The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether the multi-step geofence warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Hunter v. United States, the defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud under a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, then challenged a supervised-release condition requiring him to take prescribed mental-health medications as violating due process; the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that such waivers are enforceable except when tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel or when the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Supreme Court vacated that decision and held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it would produce a miscarriage of justice—i.e., leave in place an egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The Court first rejected Hunter’s narrower claim that the district court’s post-sentencing remark about appeal rights and the prosecutor’s silence had modified or forfeited the waiver, because the plea agreement required any modification to be in writing and signed by the parties and because the government’s right to enforce the waiver arises only after an appeal is filed. It then reasoned that because district and appellate courts must approve and implement plea agreements, they have an institutional interest in preventing enforcement of waivers that would cement plainly unlawful sentences (such as those exceeding statutory limits, resting on unconstitutional factors like race, or imposed without basic procedural safeguards), and therefore adopted the miscarriage-of-justice standard already used by most circuits while remanding for the Fifth Circuit to apply it in the first instance.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hunter v. United States, petitioner Munson Hunter III pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud under a written plea agreement that included an appeal waiver, in exchange for dismissal of other charges; at sentencing, the district court imposed a supervised-release condition requiring him to take prescribed mental-health medication, which Hunter sought to challenge on due-process grounds. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the waiver remained valid and enforceable except in narrow circumstances such as ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum. The Supreme Court vacated that ruling and held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when it would produce a miscarriage of justice by leaving in place an egregious, obvious error—such as a sentence based on a constitutionally impermissible factor like race, one exceeding the statutory maximum, or one imposed without minimum civilized procedure—that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The Court explained that because district courts must approve plea agreements and courts of appeals control enforcement of waivers, the judiciary has an institutional interest in declining to cement plainly unlawful results, even when the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The case was remanded for the Fifth Circuit to decide whether Hunter’s challenge meets this standard.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned the proper venue for prosecuting a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519, which criminalizes knowingly falsifying a document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation. Petitioner Abouammo created and emailed a fake invoice from his home in Seattle during an FBI interview about his disclosure of Twitter user information to a Saudi official; he was indicted and tried in the Northern District of California, where the agents and investigation were based. The Supreme Court held that venue lies only in the district where the falsification occurred, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the conviction. The Court reasoned that constitutional venue protections require trial where the offense’s essential conduct elements took place, and §1519 prohibits only the act of falsification itself—the statute’s mens rea requirement concerning obstructive intent does not incorporate the investigation’s location or any contemplated effects as conduct elements of the crime.

criminal lawprocedure

In Abouammo v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the proper venue for prosecuting a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519, which makes it a crime to knowingly falsify a document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation. The defendant, Ahmad Abouammo, was indicted in the Northern District of California after creating a fake invoice in Seattle during an FBI interview and emailing it to agents based there; the Ninth Circuit had upheld venue in California because the investigation was located there. The Court held that a defendant charged under the statute must be tried only in the district where the falsification occurred. The reasoning relied on the Constitution’s venue protections, which require trial where the crime was committed, and determined that the statute’s only essential conduct element is the act of falsification itself, while the intent to obstruct is a mens rea requirement that does not expand the location of the offense or allow trial based on contemplated effects elsewhere.

criminal lawprocedure

Gabriel Olivier, a street preacher, was convicted in 2021 under a City of Brandon ordinance that confined “protests” and “demonstrations” near an amphitheater to a designated area; after paying a fine and serving probation, he sued the city under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for a declaration and injunction barring future enforcement of the ordinance on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held that the suit could proceed. The Court reasoned that Heck v. Humphrey bars only §1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior conviction (such as those seeking damages or release), whereas suits requesting wholly prospective relief—here, an injunction against future enforcement—do not collaterally attack the conviction and therefore fall outside Heck’s bar, consistent with Wooley v. Maynard.

free speechcivil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case arose when former immigration detainee Alejandro Menocal sued GEO Group, a private contractor operating an ICE detention facility in Colorado, alleging that GEO’s detainee work policies violated federal prohibitions on forced labor and state unjust-enrichment rules. GEO moved to dismiss, claiming protection under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. because its policies were authorized and directed by the government; the district court rejected that defense, finding the contract did not require the challenged policies, and GEO sought immediate appellate review. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that an order denying Yearsley protection is not an immediately appealable collateral order because Yearsley supplies only a merits defense to liability rather than an immunity from suit. Under the collateral-order doctrine, only rights that would be irretrievably lost without pretrial review—such as true immunities—qualify for immediate appeal; a liability defense can be fully reviewed after final judgment.

immigrationlabor & employmentprocedure

In Case v. Montana, police officers entered William Case’s home without a warrant after his ex-girlfriend called 911 reporting that he was threatening suicide and might have shot himself; the officers saw an empty holster and what appeared to be a suicide note, then entered to provide aid, leading to an officer shooting and injuring Case when he emerged from a closet holding what looked like a gun. Case was later charged with assaulting an officer and moved to suppress evidence from the entry, arguing a Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme Court held that the entry was lawful under the emergency-aid exception. It reaffirmed Brigham City v. Stuart’s rule that officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” someone inside needs emergency assistance, rejecting any requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion and finding the 911 report plus on-scene observations sufficient here.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned a challenge by nonprofit organizations to the Executive Branch’s refusal to spend roughly $10.5 billion in foreign-aid funds appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2025, some of which the President had proposed to rescind under the Impoundment Control Act. After the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Government to obligate the money before it expired on September 30, the Supreme Court granted the Government’s application to stay that injunction as to the disputed funds. The Court concluded that, at this early stage, the Government had made a sufficient showing that the Impoundment Control Act bars the plaintiffs’ suit under the Administrative Procedure Act and that mandamus relief is unavailable, and that the asserted harm to the Executive’s foreign-affairs authority outweighed the potential injury to the plaintiffs. The order is expressly preliminary and does not resolve the merits.

federal power

The case concerned President Trump’s attempt to remove FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter without cause, despite a federal statute requiring “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” for such removals. The Supreme Court granted the government’s application for a stay of the district court’s order blocking the removal, treated the matter as a petition for certiorari before judgment, and scheduled expedited briefing and argument for December 2025. The Court directed the parties to address whether the FTC’s statutory removal protections violate separation of powers and whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) should be overruled, as well as whether courts may block removals from office through equitable or legal relief. In a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, Justice Kagan argued that existing precedent bars the President from removing FTC members without cause and that the emergency docket should not be used to override statutory limits or shift power from Congress to the executive before full merits review.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned President Trump's authority to remove Democratic members of the Consumer Product Safety Commission without cause, despite statutory protections for their independence. The Supreme Court granted the President's application for a stay, halting enforcement of the district court's order that had blocked the removals, pending appeal in the Fourth Circuit and any subsequent certiorari proceedings. The Court held that the application was directly controlled by its recent decision in Trump v. Wilcox, which involved similar removals from other independent agencies. It reasoned that the balance of equities favored the government, as the risk of harm from allowing removed officers to continue exercising executive power outweighed the harm to the officers, and the CPSC operates in a comparable manner to the agency at issue in Wilcox.

federal power

The case concerned whether the FCC’s system for funding universal-service subsidies—under which telecommunications carriers must contribute to a Universal Service Fund based on a quarterly “contribution factor” calculated with input from a private administrator—violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the scheme is constitutional. It reasoned that Section 254 of the Communications Act supplies an “intelligible principle” to guide the FCC by directing it to ensure affordable access to specified services for designated beneficiaries (such as low-income and rural users, schools, and libraries) while considering factors like public safety, subscription rates, and affordability, and by allowing the agency to adopt only those additional principles consistent with the statute. The Court further concluded that any role played by the private administrator in generating financial projections did not constitute an unconstitutional subdelegation, as the FCC retains final authority over the contribution factor.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned whether the FCC’s universal-service contribution scheme under Section 254 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1996, violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine. The scheme requires telecommunications carriers to pay into a Universal Service Fund whose size is determined by a quarterly “contribution factor” calculated from projected expenses and revenues, with day-to-day administration and projections handled by a private company (the Universal Service Administrative Company) under FCC oversight. The Supreme Court held that the scheme is constitutional. It reasoned that Congress supplied an “intelligible principle” by designating the intended beneficiaries (low-income consumers, rural areas, schools, libraries, and rural health-care providers), specifying the services to be supported, and listing policy principles the FCC must follow when determining what to subsidize and at what rates, thereby guiding both the agency’s discretion and its limited use of the private administrator.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned a lawsuit by the Government of Mexico against seven U.S. gun manufacturers, alleging that their distribution, marketing, and oversight practices aided and abetted unlawful firearms sales by retailers, enabling guns to reach Mexican drug cartels and cause harm there. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) generally bars suits against gun makers and sellers for third-party criminal misuse of firearms, subject to a "predicate exception" for cases where the defendant knowingly violated a statute applicable to firearm sales or marketing and that violation proximately caused the harm. The Supreme Court held that PLCAA barred the suit because Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege aiding and abetting of specific unlawful sales. The Court reasoned that aiding-and-abetting liability under federal law requires an affirmative act done with intent to facilitate a particular offense, rather than routine lawful business conduct, omissions, or general practices that only incidentally assist downstream violations by unidentified dealers.

gunscriminal lawbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a lawsuit by the Mexican government against seven U.S. gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful firearms sales by dealers that allowed guns to reach Mexican drug cartels, causing harm there. The Supreme Court held that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) bars the suit. Under PLCAA, lawsuits against gun makers for third-party misuse are generally prohibited unless the predicate exception applies, which requires a plausible claim that the manufacturer knowingly violated a statute governing firearm sales or marketing and that the violation proximately caused the harm. The Court reasoned that aiding-and-abetting liability under the exception demands specific affirmative acts done with intent to facilitate particular unlawful sales, not broad allegations of inadequate distribution controls, failure to prevent trafficking, or marketing choices that might incidentally benefit criminals; Mexico’s complaint lacked such concrete ties to identified statutory violations or dealer misconduct.

gunsbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned President Trump's removal without cause of members of the National Labor Relations Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board, despite statutes requiring cause for such removals, and the district court's orders blocking those removals. The Supreme Court granted the government's application for a stay of those orders, allowing the removals to take effect pending appeal. The Court reasoned that the President generally holds authority under Article II to remove executive officers who exercise executive power on his behalf, subject only to narrow exceptions, and that the government was likely to prevail in showing the boards exercise substantial executive authority. It also found that the balance of harms favored a stay because permitting removed officers to continue exercising executive power posed greater risks than temporary inability to serve, and to prevent repeated removals and reinstatements during litigation. The order expressly stated that the decision does not address the constitutionality of for-cause protections for Federal Reserve Board members.

labor & employmentfederal power

In Barnes v. Felix, the Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim brought by the mother of Ash'tian Barnes, who was fatally shot by Texas state trooper Roberto Felix Jr. during a traffic stop for suspected toll violations. After Barnes began driving away, Felix jumped onto the moving vehicle's doorsill and fired two shots within about two seconds, killing him. Lower courts had upheld the shooting by applying the Fifth Circuit's "moment-of-threat" rule, which examined only whether the officer faced danger in the precise instant force was used and excluded all preceding events. The Court vacated that judgment, holding that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment must instead be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer based on the totality of the circumstances, with no artificial time limit, so that earlier facts may properly inform the evaluation of later ones. This approach, the Court explained, is required by precedents such as Graham v. Connor and cannot be reconciled with a rule that imposes chronological blinders on the analysis.

civil rightsprocedure

In Barnes v. Felix, the mother of Ashtian Barnes sued Texas officer Roberto Felix under the Fourth Amendment after Felix fatally shot Barnes during a traffic stop for suspected toll violations. Barnes began driving away after being ordered to exit the vehicle; Felix jumped onto the car’s doorsill and fired two shots within about two seconds, killing Barnes. The district court and Fifth Circuit upheld the shooting under the circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule, which examined only whether the officer faced danger in the precise instant force was used and excluded all preceding events. The Supreme Court vacated that ruling, holding that Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims require assessing the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without an artificial time cutoff that would blind courts to relevant prior context. The Court explained that earlier facts can clarify whether later conduct reasonably appeared threatening, making the moment-of-threat approach incompatible with established precedent.

civil rights

The case involved a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, in which Dewberry Engineers prevailed against competitor Dewberry Group and sought disgorgement of the defendant's profits from the infringement. The district court awarded nearly $43 million by treating Dewberry Group and its separately incorporated affiliates as a single entity and including the affiliates' real-estate profits, an approach affirmed by a divided Fourth Circuit panel. The Supreme Court vacated that award, holding that the Act's reference to "defendant's profits" covers only the profits of the named defendant itself—not its affiliates—under ordinary principles of corporate separateness. The Court reasoned that the lower courts had not applied the Act's "just-sum provision" to adjust the award and that no veil-piercing showing had been made to disregard corporate formalities. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a trademark infringement lawsuit under the Lanham Act in which Dewberry Engineers prevailed against Dewberry Group and sought a profits award. The district court calculated nearly $43 million in disgorgement by combining the real-estate profits of Dewberry Group’s separately incorporated affiliates, treating the entities as one for “economic reality” reasons, and a divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated that award, holding that the Act’s reference to a “defendant’s profits” permits recovery only of profits attributable to the named defendant itself, not its affiliates. The Court reasoned that the statutory term “defendant” carries its ordinary legal meaning—the party sued—and that background corporate-law principles treat separately incorporated affiliates as distinct entities absent veil-piercing, which was never attempted here. The lower courts did not rely on the Act’s “just-sum provision” to reach a different figure, so that clause did not support the award.

business & regulatory