This case is a declaratory judgment action in which State College Area School District sought to void a 2006 swap agreement and 2007 amendment with Royal Bank of Canada under the Local Government Unit Debt Act, after which Royal Bank filed third-party claims against the district's bond counsel (Rhoads) and solicitor (Miller Kistler) for negligent misrepresentation based on opinion letters they issued stating the agreement was valid and enforceable. The court granted Miller Kistler's motion to dismiss but denied Rhoads' motion. It reasoned that Miller Kistler's letter contained no representations that would be rendered false if the agreement were later declared void, while Rhoads' letter implicitly asserted facts about compliance steps that could prove false, making the issues of falsity, duty, and justifiable reliance matters for discovery rather than dismissal.
This case involves a plaintiff's negligence and products liability claims against rail companies and ACF Industries arising from a 2007 workplace accident caused by an ACF cushion unit that had been removed from service and was awaiting disposal. ACF moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were preempted by federal statutes including the Boiler Inspection Act (BIA), Federal Rail Safety Act, and Safety Appliance Act under field preemption principles derived from the Supremacy Clause. The court denied the motion, holding that BIA preemption does not apply because the detached cushion unit was no longer part of active locomotive equipment or intended for reinstallation, placing it outside the federally regulated field of locomotive design, construction, and operation as interpreted in Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton. The decision emphasized that extending preemption to discarded parts long removed from rail use would exceed congressional intent.
This case involved a class action brought by individuals with intellectual disabilities residing in Pennsylvania's state intermediate care facilities, who alleged that the Department of Public Welfare violated the integration mandates of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide community-based services to those appropriate for and not opposed to such placements. After granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs in 2011 and declaring the violations, the court referred the parties to mediation, which resulted in a proposed class settlement agreement. The court approved the settlement following a fairness hearing, finding it fair and reasonable as it established a planning process for evaluating and transitioning eligible residents without forcing placements on those opposed, and it also awarded requested attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel.
This case involves defendants John and Timothy Rigas, former Adelphia executives, who face federal charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and multiple counts of tax evasion arising from alleged diversion of corporate funds and securities purchases without reporting income. The defendants filed a motion to compel the government to produce notes and materials from interviews with witnesses including Adelphia counsel Carl Rothenberger, other Buchanan Ingersoll attorneys, bank representatives, and James Brown, arguing the materials could be exculpatory. The court granted the motion in part, ordering the government to produce notes from Rothenberger's interviews with the U.S. Attorney's Office and SEC, and to prepare a privilege log for the remaining requested materials within 45 days, after which the defendants may seek further court intervention. The core reasoning rested on the government's obligations under Brady v. Maryland to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence and the Jencks Act's provisions for witness statements, while distinguishing between already-produced transcripts and withheld notes.
This case involves an appeal by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee from a bankruptcy court order directing the turnover of undistributed plan payments to the debtor after the case was converted to Chapter 7. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the funds, which consisted of post-petition wages paid under a wage attachment order, are the property of the debtor rather than the creditors or the Chapter 7 estate. The court reasoned that under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f), absent bad faith by the debtor, the estate in the converted case includes only property that the debtor possessed as of the original petition date, and post-petition earnings are excluded from the estate per § 541(a)(6). It further noted that returning the funds to the debtor places the parties in the position they would have been in had the debtor filed under Chapter 7 initially, consistent with congressional intent in the Bankruptcy Code.
The case involved plaintiffs who invested in a film production project and later sued Merrill Lynch, its employee Bellmore, and the Jacobs defendants alleging RICO violations, fraud, conversion, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and related claims arising from a financing agreement that the plaintiffs claimed was induced by misrepresentations about control of deposited funds. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in the Financing Agreement between the plaintiffs and the Jacobs defendants and in Bellmore's Form U-4 agreement with Merrill Lynch. The court granted the motions to compel arbitration, stayed the federal action pending arbitration, and denied as moot a related motion to stay proceedings. The core reasoning was that the disputes fell within the scope of the valid arbitration provisions in the parties' agreements, requiring submission of the claims to arbitration rather than resolution in court.
_verso_John_3%2C_14-18%2C_34-36.jpg?width=900)