Paul J. Barbadoro

Melissa Simmons appealed the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability benefits, claiming she was disabled due to multiple sclerosis. The ALJ had determined that her condition did not meet or equal the criteria in the Listing of Impairments and that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, holding that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court concluded it lacked authority to overturn the decision where such evidence existed.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involves George W. O’Dell’s appeal of the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits based on a 1990 back injury sustained while working as a car salesman. O’Dell challenged the determination that he remained capable of performing sedentary work without restriction during the period he was insured. The court reviewed medical records from the relevant timeframe, including evaluations noting only lower back strain without objective evidence of severe impairment and evidence of O’Dell’s activities, and found that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s conclusion that O’Dell was not disabled as of his date last insured. The court therefore affirmed the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether three New Hampshire statutes regulating the use and disposal of construction and demolition (C&D) debris—redefining the material, banning combustion of its wood component except for limited incidental burning at pre-2006 municipal facilities, and excluding it from renewable biomass fuel definitions—violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state producers or excessively burdening interstate commerce. Plaintiffs, a national recycling association and a Massachusetts company selling C&D-derived fuel, sued state environmental officials, alleging the laws favored in-state virgin timber producers in the biomass fuel market. On the state's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the statutes had no discriminatory purpose, as they addressed uniform public health and environmental concerns about burning C&D materials from any source, and assumed without deciding that the products competed in the same market but found no evidence of discriminatory effect or undue burden on interstate commerce.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

This case is a class action ERISA lawsuit brought by participants in Tyco-sponsored retirement plans against the company, its parent, plan administrators, and former officers and directors. The claims allege breach of fiduciary duty in Count I through material misstatements about Tyco's financial condition and the risks of the Tyco Stock Fund, and in Count II through negligence in designating that fund as an investment option. On plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court addressed defendants' affirmative defense under ERISA section 404(c), which shields fiduciaries from certain claims when participants exercise control over their accounts. The court granted the motion in part, ruling that the defense is unavailable for claims challenging a fiduciary's designation of investment options. It reasoned that such designation decisions are fiduciary acts, and under Department of Labor regulations and preamble, resulting losses are not the direct and necessary result of any participant's exercise of control.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a June 2007 school-wide search for illegal drugs at Contoocook Valley Regional High School, during which drug-sniffing dogs examined students' belongings and the student body was temporarily relocated outdoors. Parents of three students sued the school district, board, principal, town, and police chief, claiming the search violated the students' rights under the Fourth Amendment and the New Hampshire Constitution and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendants' motions as to the federal constitutional claim, holding that the dog sniffs of belongings did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment; it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim and remanded that count to state court.

criminal lawcivil rights

In this case, Raynald Pinet, a lawful permanent resident and U.S. military veteran, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services after it denied his application for naturalization based on his 2003 conviction for using a communication facility to facilitate a cocaine transaction. The court addressed whether this conviction barred Pinet from meeting the statutory good moral character requirement for citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony, which permanently precludes a finding of good moral character regardless of when it occurred or the timing rules in the military naturalization regulation. The decision rested on the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8), which disqualifies anyone who has ever been convicted of an aggravated felony, combined with the requirement that good moral character must exist while a naturalization application is pending.

immigrationcriminal law

This multidistrict class action alleged that Tyco International, its auditor PwC, and several executives violated federal securities laws by misrepresenting the company's financial condition and acquisitions during 1999-2002, which enabled looting through bonuses, loans, and insider trading while PwC issued false audit certifications. Lead plaintiffs reached a proposed settlement with Tyco and PwC and sought court approval along with an award of attorneys' fees and expense reimbursement for class counsel. The court approved both the settlement and the fee petition after reviewing the allegations, prior rulings on motions to dismiss and class certification, and comparisons to similar large securities cases.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves pro se plaintiff Randolph Chambers, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, who filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to provide dental care to fill a cavity diagnosed in May 2007. The magistrate judge recommended granting the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction after a hearing, finding he had shown both a likelihood of success on the merits and a substantial risk of irreparable harm from the denial of care. The district judge approved the report and recommendation, ordering the prison to provide the necessary dental treatment within 30 days while dismissing claims against certain defendants like Dr. John Doe. The core reasoning relied on established precedent that deliberate indifference by prison authorities to an inmate's serious medical needs, including dental care, constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation, with evidence that supervisors knew of the plaintiff's pain and need but failed to act promptly.

civil rightscriminal law

Paul Cossette sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after the Forest Service did not hire him for a Resource Assistant position when he was 60 years old. The court granted the USDA's motion for summary judgment. The opinion found that Cossette lacked the required qualifications, including one year of graduate education or specialized experience equivalent to the GS-05 level, and did not meet all selective placement factors. The court reasoned that his work history and seven months in a senior employment program did not provide the necessary specialized experience, and there was no evidence that the requirements were a pretext for age discrimination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the Conservation Law Foundation challenging the Federal Highway Administration's 2005 Record of Decision approving expansion of a 19.8-mile section of Interstate 93 in New Hampshire by adding two lanes in each direction, on grounds that the agencies violated NEPA and the Federal-Aid Highway Act by inadequately evaluating alternatives such as rail service, induced population growth and traffic effects, and by failing to release certain traffic modeling data for public comment. The court resolved the dispute on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the environmental impact statement satisfied most NEPA requirements for considering alternatives and indirect effects but that the agencies violated NEPA's public-participation mandates by withholding the traffic study analysis until after the decision. The reasoning focused on NEPA's statutory and regulatory demands for a hard look at foreseeable environmental consequences and for public input during EIS preparation.

environmentprocedure

In this case, wireless provider U.S. Cellular sued the Town of Bow, New Hampshire, after the town's Zoning Board of Adjustment denied a variance needed to build a 125-foot cell tower on residential property to address a service gap, invoking the Telecommunications Act of 1996's limits on local zoning decisions. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment and upheld the denial, ruling that the ZBA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record regarding factors such as impacts on property values and neighborhood character. It further held that the zoning rules did not effectively prohibit U.S. Cellular from providing service, as the TCA's anti-prohibition clause was not violated. The decision rested on a narrow, deferential review of the administrative record without finding any genuine issues of material fact that would warrant overturning the local board.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

The case concerned a challenge by data mining companies IMS Health and Verispan to New Hampshire's Prescription Information Law, which barred pharmacies and similar entities from transferring or using prescriber-identifiable data for certain commercial purposes such as pharmaceutical marketing. The court held that the law violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech. The reasoning focused on the law's direct restriction of commercial speech involving de-identified prescription data that had been lawfully acquired, noting that it did not effectively protect patient privacy since the data remained accessible for other uses and that prescribers in a regulated industry had a diminished privacy expectation. The opinion rejected the state's justifications related to cost control or coercion of providers as insufficient to sustain the speech restrictions.

free speechhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

Kathleen Sousa sued her former employer, TD Banknorth Insurance Agency, alleging gender-based harassment and discrimination, violations of federal and Massachusetts anti-discrimination laws, a wage claim, and common-law claims including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination. The employer moved to transfer venue from the District of New Hampshire to the District of Massachusetts and to dismiss the complaint. The court denied the transfer motion, citing the strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's chosen forum in her home state and finding that convenience factors did not sufficiently favor transfer. It granted the motion to dismiss the good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim because Sousa did not allege that her termination was intended to deprive her of already-earned compensation, and it dismissed the conceded emotional-distress and wrongful-termination claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involves motions by plaintiffs in several consolidated securities fraud cases to remand their actions back to state court. These cases were filed exclusively under the federal Securities Act of 1933. The court had to determine if SLUSA allows removal of such federal claims to federal court. The court decided that the cases do not qualify for removal under SLUSA because the removal provision applies only to covered class actions based on state law that meet certain criteria. The reasoning focused on the statutory language and punctuation in 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c), concluding that the phrase "as set forth in subsection (b)" modifies the type of class action rather than the securities involved.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a class action lawsuit brought by current and former New England Subaru dealers against their distributor, Subaru of New England, Inc., and its executives, alleging that the distributor misused its vehicle allocation system to coerce dealers into buying unwanted accessories, in violation of the Automobile Dealer Day in Court Act, state dealer protection statutes, RICO, antitrust laws, and contractual obligations. The court addressed dueling motions for summary judgment by analyzing the Fair Share II distribution system, which allocated vehicles based on sales performance with discretionary and turndown vehicles, and the installation of accessories on those vehicles. The court reasoned that state dealer acts prohibit requiring accessory purchases through undue economic pressure but do not bar such requirements when tied to benefits not otherwise guaranteed to dealers, and it distinguished between claims suitable for class treatment and those requiring individualized evidence.

business & regulatory

The case involved Andrew S., a disabled child enrolled in a Catholic elementary school who received special education services from the Manchester School District under the IDEA and New Hampshire law. His parents sought a due process hearing after disagreeing with the services provided but were denied because neither federal nor state law grants such a hearing to parents of children not enrolled in public school. The parents challenged the denial on constitutional grounds, arguing it violated their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment and RFRA, and procedural due process by denying a forum. The court addressed these claims on cross-motions for summary judgment by first outlining how the IDEA distinguishes between public and private school placements, particularly after the 1997 Amendments clarified that states need not provide individually enforceable rights to services for voluntarily placed private school students. It then analyzed each constitutional and statutory claim in sequence to determine whether the denial imposed an unconstitutional burden or violated protected interests.

civil rightsreligious libertyprocedurefederal power

The case involved an inmate at a New Hampshire correctional facility who alleged that prison officials were denying him the ability to freely exercise his Taoist religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought a preliminary injunction to require the prison to permit Taoist celebrations, religious articles, a special diet, an exemption from shaving requirements, and the practice of Tai Chi. The court recommended denying the motion for interim injunctive relief after a hearing. It determined that the evidence did not establish a current violation of the inmate's constitutional rights, applying the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions and focusing on the lack of likelihood of success on the merits.

religious libertycivil rights

In this bankruptcy case, debtor John J. Diamond sued creditor Premier Capital and its attorney Randall Pratt, alleging that Pratt violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 by threatening to report Diamond to the New Hampshire Real Estate Commission to revoke his license unless Diamond settled a dischargeability proceeding on favorable terms. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the district court affirmed after de novo review. The court reasoned that, under In re Jamo, post-petition settlement negotiations are permitted if they do not involve coercive or harassing tactics, and Pratt's threat—made in good faith and related to the dispute—amounted to permissible hard bargaining rather than an improper attempt to collect a debt. The decision noted that ethical rules and bankruptcy law allow such leverage in negotiations absent bad faith, lack of factual basis, or claims of improper influence over the other forum.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case was a class action brought by New Hampshire residents against Philip Morris alleging that the company violated the state Consumer Protection Act by designing Marlboro Light and Ultralight cigarettes to produce misleadingly low tar and nicotine ratings under the FTC-endorsed Cambridge Filter Method while delivering higher levels to smokers, enabling false advertising claims. Philip Morris removed the case to federal court, asserting both diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction was not met because each named plaintiff's damages (even when trebled) and allocated attorneys' fees fell below $75,000, and that Philip Morris was not acting under the direction of a federal officer in the alleged conduct. The decision rested on strict construction of removal statutes and resolution of jurisdictional doubts in favor of remand to state court.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Alternative Systems Concepts, Inc. (ASC) entered into a temporary letter of understanding with Languages for Design Automation (LEDA) making ASC the exclusive U.S. marketing agent for LEDA's Proton product line, with both sides agreeing to negotiate in good faith toward a permanent agreement but without any obligation to conclude one. After Synopsys acquired LEDA, it declined to continue the arrangement, leading ASC to sue Synopsys (as LEDA's successor) for breach of contract and for intentional interference with contractual and prospective business relations. Synopsys moved for summary judgment solely on the interference claim. The court granted the motion, holding that Synopsys qualified for the competitor's privilege because the record showed no evidence that it used wrongful means when it acquired LEDA and ceased honoring the temporary arrangement.

business & regulatorytorts & liability