This case is a class action by current and former Solvay employees alleging ERISA violations arising from the company's conversion of its pension plan to a cash-balance formula, with the sole remaining issue on remand being whether deficiencies in the ERISA § 204(h) notice regarding early-retirement benefits constituted an egregious failure. The district court granted in part and denied in part Solvay's motion for summary judgment. It found no genuine issue of material fact that most participants received most of the required information and granted summary judgment on that statutory element of egregiousness, but it denied summary judgment on the elements of intentional failure or failure to promptly correct an unintentional failure after discovery because the record contained circumstantial evidence creating triable issues. The court applied the statutory definition of egregious failure in 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(6)(B) and the Rule 56 summary-judgment standards requiring a movant to show the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact.
In Large v. Fremont County, five enrolled members of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes residing on the Wind River Indian Reservation sued Fremont County, its commissioners, and its clerk, alleging that the county's at-large, plurality-vote system for electing its five-member commission diluted Indian voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. After a nine-day bench trial, the court evaluated the claim by applying the Thornburg v. Gingles framework and the Senate Report factors, reviewing 2000 census data showing an approximately 20% Indian population heavily concentrated in a few communities, evidence of racially polarized voting, historical official discrimination, and socioeconomic disparities that hindered political participation. The court's core reasoning assessed whether, under the totality of circumstances, the at-large structure minimized or canceled out the ability of Indian voters to elect their preferred candidates relative to white voters.
This case involved a common law trademark infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) brought by plaintiffs against defendants for unauthorized use of the fanciful mark “UNKER’S” on personal care products. The court found that the plaintiffs established their claim through stipulated facts showing approximately 18 years of prior use, a protectable mark, defendants' use in commerce, and both likelihood and instances of actual consumer confusion. Defendants raised affirmative defenses including naked licensing to contract manufacturers, failure to join necessary parties, and lack of continuous use, but the court rejected these after trial evidence showed the arrangements were standard industry contract manufacturing practices that did not abandon the mark and that the formula in question was not protectable or actually transferred. The court concluded plaintiffs met their burden on liability, leaving only damages for further proceedings.
The case challenged the Bureau of Land Management's approval of a large-scale coalbed methane development project in the Powder River Basin spanning Wyoming and Montana, which authorized up to 51,000 wells along with extensive roads, pipelines, water extraction, and waste disposal. Plaintiffs argued that the environmental impact statement violated NEPA due to rushed procedures influenced by political priorities, inadequate analysis of water quality and air impacts, and failure to consider reasonable alternatives such as phased development or limits on new leasing. The court upheld the BLM's decisions and EIS, reasoning that tiering from broader to site-specific analyses was appropriate under NEPA regulations, that alternatives delaying existing leases were unreasonable given statutory requirements for timely permitting and maximum economic recovery under the Mineral Leasing Act, and that the chosen approach adequately addressed the project's scope and impacts.
In Jensen v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., plaintiffs challenged a 2005 amendment to Solvay's defined benefit pension plan, alleging it froze benefits for older, longer-service employees, reduced accrual rates based on age, and provided inadequate notice in violation of ERISA and the ADEA. After the plan administrator denied their claims, plaintiffs filed suit seeking equitable relief and moved for discovery beyond the administrative record. A magistrate judge denied the motion, limiting discovery under ERISA precedent. The district court reversed that order, holding that the claims arose under ERISA § 502(a)(3) rather than § 502(a)(1)(B), so traditional federal discovery rules applied without the administrative-record restriction, and the ADEA claims did not alter that analysis.
In Jensen v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., plaintiffs alleged that a 2005 amendment to their employer's defined benefit pension plan froze benefits for older employees, violated ERISA accrual and nonforfeitability rules, provided inadequate notice of changes, and reduced benefit accrual rates based on age. Defendants moved to dismiss the ERISA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the plan. The court denied the motion, holding that the claims asserted statutory violations rather than claims for benefits, and that ERISA does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies for such statutory claims where plan administrators lack relevant expertise and exhaustion would serve no meaningful purpose. The decision relied on Tenth Circuit precedent excusing exhaustion in similar statutory ERISA enforcement actions.