Janis Graham Jack

In Lemus v. CMH Homes, Inc., plaintiff Jesus Lemus and intervenor Vickie Long asserted state-law claims and RICO claims against CMH Homes, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Clayton Homes, and others arising from a 2003 retail installment contract for a manufactured home, alleged forgery of signatures on related deeds of trust and liens on Lemus's property, secret lien releases stating the debt was paid in full, and continued collection efforts. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the contract. The court granted the motion to compel, ordered binding arbitration of all claims in Corpus Christi with defendants bearing arbitrator costs, and stayed the action pending arbitration. The core reasoning was that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate, the parties had agreed to arbitrate disputes relating to the contract, and performance under the contract ratified it and waived objections to its formation.

procedurepropertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case is a class action civil rights suit filed by children in the Permanent Managing Conservatorship of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, claiming that deficiencies in the state's foster care system violate their substantive and procedural due process rights and rights of familial association under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, with relief sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs allege harms including repeated placements, over-medication, abuse, neglect, and separation from siblings. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger and Burford doctrines because state district courts already oversee foster care matters. The court denied the motion, holding that subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and that Younger abstention is unwarranted because the class-wide claims for systemic injunctive relief do not interfere with particular ongoing state judicial proceedings in the manner required by that doctrine.

civil rightsfamily lawfederal power

This case is a putative class action brought by plaintiffs who purchased manufactured homes financed by defendants, alleging that the defendants secretly filed releases of mortgage liens and deeds of trust stating debts were paid in full but continued billing and collecting payments, in violation of Texas law on fraud, debt collection, and related claims; one defendant also asserted counterclaims for breach of contract. The district court granted the defendants' motions to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' individual claims and the counterclaims. The court reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of valid arbitration agreements in the retail installment contracts, that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the broad scope of those clauses because they related to the underlying financing transactions and lien releases, and that no external legal constraints prevented arbitration, leading to a stay of the federal action under 9 U.S.C. § 3.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case arose from a November 2008 car collision in Texas in which defendant Felix Patrick Keeley, Jr. turned left without yielding the right of way, striking a southbound vehicle driven by plaintiff Daniel Powell and injuring Powell, John McGrath, and Dan Powell while killing Timothy McGrath. Plaintiffs asserted claims including negligence per se based on violations of Texas Transportation Code provisions on yielding and safe lane changes, and John McGrath added a bystander claim for mental anguish from witnessing his brother's fatal injuries. Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the bystander and negligence per se claims, while plaintiffs cross-moved to eliminate defendant's contributory negligence defense. The court granted defendant's motion, dismissing those two claims, and denied plaintiffs' motion, holding that genuine factual disputes existed as to whether the Powell vehicle was speeding or otherwise contributorily negligent. The rulings rested on application of Texas tort law standards for bystander recovery and comparative responsibility under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requirements for summary judgment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case was a civil enforcement action by the United States against landowners Michael Brink and Dr. Steven Kalter for building a concrete dam on La Para Creek near its confluence with the Nueces River without first obtaining a Section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The district court granted the government's motions for summary judgment on the Clean Water Act claim and on the defendants' affirmative defenses. The court concluded that La Para Creek qualifies as waters of the United States due to its direct connection to the navigable Nueces River and Lake Corpus Christi, that the dam construction constituted a discharge of fill material requiring a federal permit, and that the defendants' arguments regarding state-law exemptions, waiver, estoppel, and equal protection lacked merit based on the undisputed facts and expert evidence.

environmentfederal power

This case involves employment discrimination claims brought by Josie Hernandez, a former captain in the Corpus Christi Police Department, against the City of Corpus Christi. Hernandez alleged that she was passed over for promotions to higher positions due to her gender, national origin, race, and age, and that she faced retaliation and a hostile work environment after filing an EEOC charge. The court considered the City's motion for summary judgment on these claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and related state and constitutional claims. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing certain claims such as due process violations while allowing others to proceed.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved claims by borrowers Cesar Flores and Alvin King against Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. for fraud in connection with manufactured home financing contracts, as well as claims by intervenors Maria and Arturo Trevino against Vanderbilt, CMH Homes, and Clayton Homes, Inc. under Texas's fraudulent lien statute for filing invalid liens on their property. After a jury trial in which the plaintiffs and intervenors prevailed on their claims, the court entered judgment awarding damages, and the defendants filed multiple post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. The court denied all motions, finding that the jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for its verdicts on fraud and fraudulent lien claims, that personal jurisdiction existed over the defendants, that the claims were not barred by limitations, and that the evidence supported liability and damages awards. The core reasoning relied on the standard for Rule 50(b) motions, prior rulings in the case, and the jury's findings regarding the defendants' conduct in filing and enforcing liens.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Potter v. Bailey, appellant Allan Potter appealed the bankruptcy court's orders approving compensation and denying rehearing on his request for attorney's fees incurred while representing debtor William Bailey in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. The district court vacated the bankruptcy court's orders and remanded for further proceedings. The court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 and applied de novo review to legal questions; it identified disputes over whether the fee agreement was a fixed $3,085 amount or an hourly rate of $235, and concluded that the bankruptcy court had not properly considered the relevant agreements or statutory standards such as 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) in awarding an additional $2,000 in fees.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a challenge by neighboring property owners to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' handling of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit originally issued in 2003 to develop wetlands along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway for a commercial marina. After the permittee altered plans to a residential project and the Corps investigated compliance issues including mitigation requirements, the plaintiffs sought to compel revocation or additional review under the Administrative Procedure Act and NEPA. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the Corps' motion, upholding the agency's decisions. The core reasoning was that the Corps had adequately considered practicable alternatives, environmental impacts, and project purpose in its environmental assessment and alternatives analysis, without procedural violations warranting further relief.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case is an appeal by Sandburg Financial Corporation from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court order in a Chapter 11 proceeding involving American Rice, Inc., concerning the enforceability of pre-petition, post-petition, and post-confirmation agreements that Sandburg sought to use to collect approximately $19 million, as well as sanctions for violating the discharge injunction. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment in full, ruling that pre- and post-petition agreements were discharged and unenforceable under the confirmation order, while post-confirmation efforts constituted a willful violation of the injunction warranting contempt sanctions. The court applied de novo review to legal conclusions and clear-error review to facts, finding that the agreements did not create new, independent post-discharge obligations and that Sandburg's intentional collection actions justified the sanctions imposed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a dispute between Pension Advisory Group, Ltd., its principals, and Country Life Insurance Company over the ownership of patent applications and trade secrets related to a group long-term disability insurance product developed under confidentiality and exclusivity agreements. Plaintiffs allege that after disclosures and collaboration, Country Life improperly claimed ownership of the intellectual property and demanded withdrawal of a patent application, causing delays. The court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for a more definite statement, and to strike, while also granting in part and denying in part the individual defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; it denied the motion to transfer venue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves plaintiff Sarina Wojciechowski's claims of sex discrimination against her former employer, National Oilwell Varco, under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and related state law. She alleged she received lower pay, heavier assignments with less support, and fewer benefits such as a company vehicle than similarly situated male employees during her roles as administrative assistant, office manager, and entry-level sales manager. The court addressed the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims after dismissing the wrongful discharge allegation for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, along with a motion to strike certain evidence. It granted the summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part, finding genuine issues of material fact on some wage and assignment claims but not others, while applying standards requiring proof of discriminatory intent for Title VII claims and similarly resolving evidentiary objections on a partial basis.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Casterline v. Indy Mac/One West, a Texas homeowner sued her mortgage lender alleging that it induced her to enter a predatory refinance loan through fraud, failed to provide required notices, charged improper fees, and initiated improper collection and foreclosure proceedings, asserting claims under RESPA, TILA, and Texas common law for fraud, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to disqualify the presiding judge, finding no basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455, and granted the defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the plaintiff presented no evidence supporting her claims, that the lender-borrower relationship does not create fiduciary duties or a duty of good faith under Texas law, and that the federal statutory claims lacked factual or legal support.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a pro se prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Eugene Blackmon against several Texas Department of Criminal Justice officials, alleging that excessive indoor heat in the C-8 dorm at the Garza East Unit violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Blackmon, who has hypertension, claimed the dorm routinely exceeded 90 degrees Fahrenheit in summer months with inadequate ventilation, fans, and water access, and that defendants were deliberately indifferent despite his grievances. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted defendants' motion in part by dismissing claims against Livingston, Latorre, and Mark Garza and dismissing the request for injunctive relief as moot, but denied the motion as to Warden Kukua and Assistant Warden Exiquio Garza in their individual capacities, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding their knowledge and response to the conditions. The court also denied Blackmon's motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on the record of temperature data, medical evidence, grievance filings, and qualified immunity analysis under federal summary judgment standards.

civil rightscriminal law

In Molina v. Vilsack, a USDA employee alleged that comments by his supervisor and a human resources officer during a 2007 meeting created a hostile work environment based on his race and national origin, and that his subsequent reassignment to a different facility constituted discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff filed suit after contacting an EEO counselor more than 45 days after the relevant events. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the claims were time-barred under federal regulations requiring contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory action, with no basis for equitable tolling.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance sued borrowers Cesar Flores and Alvin King to foreclose on a manufactured home after they defaulted on payments under a retail installment contract secured by liens on property owned by relatives; the borrowers counterclaimed alleging fraud, unfair debt collection, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, and RICO claims, arguing that lien releases filed by Vanderbilt and CMH Homes had discharged the debt as "paid in full." The court denied both Vanderbilt's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims and the borrowers' motion for partial summary judgment on the paid-in-full issue. The core reasoning was that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the legal effect and intent of the lien releases (one of which used "paid in full" language while the other did not), whether the releases discharged the underlying debt, and the borrowers' evidence supporting their fraud and RICO allegations based on the releases and continued collection efforts.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involves intervenors Maria and Arturo Trevino alleging that their signatures were forged on a deed of trust and builder's mechanic's lien placed on their Texas property to secure financing for a third party's purchase of a manufactured home through defendants CMH Homes, Vanderbilt Mortgage, Clayton Homes, and Kevin Clayton, with claims including violations of RICO and Texas law prohibiting fraudulent liens. The court addressed multiple cross-motions for summary judgment, denying the intervenors' motion for partial summary judgment in full, granting Kevin Clayton's motion for summary judgment entirely, and granting in part and denying in part the motions filed by the corporate defendants. The rulings turned on disputed facts regarding the authenticity of the signatures, the circumstances of notarization, the defendants' knowledge and response to irregularities at the Corpus Christi sales location, and whether specific statutory elements of the claims could be met on the existing record without trial.

criminal lawpropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which American Western Home Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment regarding its obligations under a commercial general liability policy issued to Lynn Israel. The underlying state-court lawsuit alleged negligence, premises liability, and related claims against Israel and others after a tenant was assaulted and injured at an apartment complex. The policy contained an exclusion barring coverage for bodily injury arising out of assault or battery or any act in connection with preventing or suppressing such acts. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the exclusion applied to the claims and that the insurer therefore had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds. The decision rested on the eight-corners rule and precedent interpreting similar assault-and-battery exclusions as precluding coverage for injuries stemming from third-party assaults even when the underlying complaint framed the claims in negligence terms.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case is a patent infringement suit brought by W. Lynn Frazier against Map Oil Tools, Inc. under 35 U.S.C. § 271, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,796,376 relating to a bridge plug device used in wellbores. Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on Claim 4 only, which the court granted after finding that the claim language, using the agreed definition of “superposed” as “located above or over,” described an impossible physical configuration for connecting bridge plugs. Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to correct the claim as a clerical error, but the court denied the motion because the plaintiff had previously disclaimed any error and Rule 59(e) does not permit raising new arguments after judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves intervenors Maria and Arturo Trevino, who allege that defendants including Vanderbilt Mortgage, Clayton Homes, CMH Homes, and others forged signatures on deeds of trust and lien documents to encumber the Trevinos' Texas property as security for a mobile home purchase by third parties, and engaged in related misrepresentations about financing rates as part of an alleged RICO enterprise aimed at facilitating loan securitization. The intervenors brought federal RICO claims along with state law claims after being added to an existing foreclosure action. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the intervenors' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The partial denial turned on findings that the pleadings sufficiently alleged a RICO enterprise distinct from the RICO persons, predicate acts including mail and wire fraud, and other elements needed to state viable claims.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryproperty