Lynn Nettleton Hughes

This case involves an enforcement action by York Group, an American casket company, against Wuxi Taihu Tractor Company, a Chinese casket company, following a 2007 Texas state court judgment that enjoined Tractor from copying York's casket designs and selling them in the U.S. Tractor removed the enforcement suit to federal court and later petitioned the state court for a bill of review to challenge the judgment, which York also removed; Tractor sought remand while York moved to dismiss the petition. The court denied remand and granted summary judgment to York, dismissing the bill of review. It reasoned that removal converted the state judgment into one of the federal court, which has authority to review it; res judicata barred relitigation because Tractor had appeared in the original suit but failed to raise defenses; and Tractor could not show the judgment resulted from court error or York's fraud rather than its own deliberate inaction in not retaining counsel or defending the case.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved the Office of Thrift Supervision's motion to renew a nearly 20-year-old judgment lien of about $4.2 million against David J. Felt, entered in 1990 and held in trust for private investors who had purchased stock from him. The court decided that the lien could not be renewed under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act because the judgment was not a qualifying "debt" as defined by the statute. The core reasoning was that the obligation was owed to the individual investors rather than the United States and arose from a contract between Felt and those investors to which the government was not a party, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B).

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This ERISA case involved former employee Kenneth Kujanek's claims against his ex-employer Houston Poly Bag and plan administrator Pension Benefit Administrators for wrongful denial of a 2007 profit-sharing contribution, breach of fiduciary duty by delaying access to his vested benefits for 18 months after resignation (resulting in over $180,000 in losses), and failure to timely provide plan documents upon written request. The court granted summary judgment to Kujanek on the fiduciary breach and document disclosure claims against Houston Poly Bag, awarding monetary relief, statutory penalties, costs, and attorney fees, while dismissing the contribution claim with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the plan entitled Kujanek to a rollover distribution as soon as administratively feasible after the plan year-end, but the employer's one-year waiting rule and delays violated ERISA fiduciary duties; documents were not furnished promptly despite requests, triggering penalties under ERISA section 502(c).

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a Medicare-certified hospice provider challenging repayment demands from HHS for exceeding annual payment caps in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, calculated under a regulation the provider claims contradicts the Medicare Act. The court denied the 2006 claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to untimely filing with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. For the 2007 claim, the court held that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid because it conflicts with the statutory formula in 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2), set aside the repayment demand, remanded the matter to HHS for recalculation under the statute, and permanently enjoined future enforcement of the regulation against the provider.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Canal Indemnity Company was obligated under its surplus liability policy, including attached MCS-90 and Form F endorsements, to defend or indemnify Williams Logging & Tree Services, Inc. and its owner for damages from a pickup truck accident that injured a motorcyclist. The pickup, titled to the owner doing business as the company, was not listed on the policy and was used to transport the owner and fuel/tools for work sites. The court granted summary judgment to Canal, ruling it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the vehicle did not qualify as a commercial motor carrier under federal or Texas statutes and regulations. The pickup weighed less than 10,000 pounds, did not transport cargo or hazardous materials for compensation, and thus fell outside the scope of the required endorsements for motor carriers.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, petitioner Jerry Hartfield challenged his decades-long state confinement following the 1980 reversal of his capital murder conviction by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which had ordered a new trial that never occurred; the state instead obtained a purported commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment. Hartfield filed a federal habeas petition asserting speedy trial and due process violations. The magistrate judge recommended denying the state's motion for summary judgment, which had sought dismissal under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. The court reasoned that because no valid state court judgment of conviction existed, the petition was properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 rather than AEDPA and thus not subject to its time limits, and that the case should be transferred to the Eastern District of Texas for proper venue.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves three plaintiffs who are royalty owners accusing oil companies, primarily Shell, of miscalculating royalty payments for carbon dioxide gas produced from the McElmo Dome in Colorado by improperly deducting transportation and processing costs. The plaintiffs claimed breach of contract and fraud related to the unit agreement and leases, seeking royalties based on the downstream price in Texas without deductions. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the royalty calculation method of subtracting transportation costs from the sales price to determine wellhead value was proper under the clear terms of the contracts. The disputes had been litigated for many years across multiple courts, with most other owners settling previously.

business & regulatoryproperty

In this case, real estate investor Robert Ceballos sued Fidelity National Title Insurance Company for negligence and gross negligence after he purchased property encumbered by an IRS tax lien that was not disclosed in the limited records Fidelity provided in response to his informal request; Ceballos had not purchased title insurance and later sought damages when the government pursued foreclosure. The court held that Ceballos and his wife Angela Reid take nothing from Fidelity. The core reasoning was that the claims were barred by the two-year tort statute of limitations, which began to run when Ceballos acquired the deed because the injury from the lien was complete at that time (with both constructive notice from public records and later actual notice), and alternatively that no contract or implied warranty existed, Fidelity reasonably responded to the actual request made, and any reliance on the uncompensated courtesy information was unreasonable given the economic choice to forgo professional title services.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the United States collecting on a defaulted student loan from Marcella Thomas via a civil suit filed after she had declared bankruptcy under Chapter 13. The court vacated the default judgment it had entered against her, withdrew the bankruptcy reference, and ordered Thomas, her bankruptcy counsel, and the law firm to pay attorney fees to the government. It reasoned that a debtor must accurately schedule creditors with their counsel's addresses, formally notify other courts and opposing parties of the bankruptcy filing, and that failure to do so prevents the benefits of the automatic stay and discharge process. The opinion emphasized debtors' and lawyers' duties under bankruptcy rules and professional conduct standards to ensure proper notice and avoid unnecessary litigation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the FDIC suing Charles Hurwitz and affiliated companies for losses from the failure of United Savings Association of Texas, even though Hurwitz had no direct obligation to the thrift or government. The FDIC later dismissed its claims after having secretly paid the Office of Thrift Supervision to pursue a parallel administrative action against Hurwitz and others. The court awarded costs to Hurwitz and the companies because the record showed the FDIC brought and maintained the litigation through improper means, including non-disclosure of records and use of another agency to circumvent its own obligations.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

The case involves a federal prisoner's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation of good conduct time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Petitioner Moreland, serving a 210-month sentence for drug offenses, argued that she was entitled to up to 54 days of credit for each year of the sentence imposed, while the Bureau calculated credits based on time actually served, resulting in fewer total days and a later release date. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, holding that the statutory phrase 'term of imprisonment' refers to the sentence imposed rather than time served. The reasoning focused on consistent usage of the phrase within the statute itself, legislative history, and the rule of lenity requiring strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the prisoner.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Rogelio Montemayor Seguy, the former director of Mexico's national oil company, seeking to vacate a certification for his extradition to Mexico to face six charges of peculation and wrongful use of governmental powers arising from three financial transactions. The court had previously held an extradition hearing, found probable cause, and certified extradition under the U.S.-Mexico treaty. On habeas review, which was limited to questions of jurisdiction, treaty coverage, and the existence of any evidence supporting probable cause, the court rejected the petitioner's renewed arguments about dual criminality, vagueness, sufficiency of evidence, and procedural irregularities such as allegedly fraudulent evidence or limited discovery. The court concluded that the extradition process complied with constitutional requirements, the treaty, and federal law, and that the cited U.S. statutes were sufficiently analogous to the Mexican charges.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Rogelio Montemayor Seguy, who after a ruling that he could be extradited to Mexico petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus; the petition was randomly assigned to another judge but transferred back to the judge who had presided over the extradition proceeding. Montemayor objected to the reassignment as irregular and creating an appearance of impropriety. The court denied the objection and upheld the transfer, reasoning that habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are not appeals but separate collateral attacks, that federal practice has long allowed the same judge to review prior decisions in analogous habeas matters, and that judicial economy and familiarity with the record supported assignment to the original judge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a request by the Mexican government to extradite Rogelio Montemayor Seguy, the former director general of Mexico's national oil company Pemex, to face charges of peculation and wrongful use of powers stemming from three management-union agreements that transferred substantial funds to the oil workers' union. The U.S. district court determined that the offenses qualified as extraditable under the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty and that there was probable cause to believe Montemayor committed the alleged acts based on evidence regarding the unauthorized diversion of public funds. The court rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the extradition statute, the vagueness of the charges, and other legal arguments, concluding that Montemayor should be extradited to Mexico to stand trial on the six charges.

criminal lawfederal power

This case concerns the 1983 conviction of Edwin P. Wilson, a former CIA and Naval Intelligence operative, for exporting explosives and firearms to Libya without authorization. The court vacated the conviction upon finding that the government knowingly presented false evidence at trial—an affidavit from a CIA official claiming Wilson had no ongoing agency contacts beyond a minor exception—when in fact there were over 80 such contacts, and suppressed exculpatory evidence of Wilson's continued intelligence work. The government failed to correct the record despite internal awareness of the inaccuracies, both during trial and on appeal. The core reasoning is that the prosecution's use of false evidence and suppression of favorable material violated due process, requiring the judgment to be set aside regardless of other evidence of guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

Joyce Hickman was convicted of defrauding government and private healthcare insurers, and her sentencing range was enhanced because the crime involved a financial institution. On remand after a partial reversal on ex post facto grounds, she argued that insurance companies do not qualify as financial institutions under the relevant definitions, so the enhancement should not apply. The court held that the sentence enhancement remains in place. The sentencing guidelines define financial institutions more broadly than the criminal code statute to include insurance companies, and the Sentencing Commission has independent authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994 to set and amend such definitions and ranges even without a specific congressional directive on insurers.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over ownership of crude oil stored in a tank farm that was transferred as part of a 1998 sale of a pipeline gathering system from Koch to Alliant, where the sale contracts addressed line fill but were silent on the separate inventory of oil in the tanks. Koch later discovered the oil, demanded its return or a refund after Alliant had sold some of it back to Koch, and sued for conversion when Alliant refused. The court held that title to the oil remained with Koch because it did not pass under the sale documents as an appurtenance or by functional relation to the land and equipment. Alliant became a bailee of the found goods and converted them by refusing Koch's demand for redelivery, with the limitations period running from that refusal rather than the original conveyance or resale. Koch was awarded damages measured by the highest market value of the oil from the time of demand onward.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a debtor, Pooja Goswami, who sued a debt collection company, American Collections Enterprise, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for allegedly using misleading practices in a collection letter. Goswami claimed that the envelope's "Priority Letter" marking, a 30-day limited settlement offer with a 30% discount, and the term "amnesty" violated the statute by embarrassing her, misrepresenting the debt, or implying criminal prosecution. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the envelope phrase was neutral and unrelated to debt status, the settlement terms constituted a legitimate negotiating position rather than a false statement, and "amnesty" would not lead an unsophisticated consumer to infer governmental action or threats. The decision emphasized that the FDCPA protects against specific deceptive or harassing tactics but does not shield debtors from the ordinary consequences of unpaid debts or bar constitutionally protected speech on envelopes. The court also noted that Goswami was not a party to any internal agreements between the collector and creditor that might allow greater discounts.

business & regulatoryfree speech

A Louisiana worker injured on a drilling rig in Saudi Arabia sued Saipem, Inc., a Texas subsidiary of an Italian parent company, alleging negligence in the rig's operation through corporate relationships. The court converted a motion to dismiss into summary judgment and ruled for the defendant, finding no direct connection between Saipem Texas and the accident or the Saudi operator, no facts justifying disregard of corporate separateness under Texas law, and that the forum was inconvenient even if jurisdiction existed over the parent. The decision rested on the lack of evidence linking the Texas entity to the injury, the plaintiff's failure to show the corporate form was used deceptively, and the accident's occurrence abroad under Saudi law with witnesses worldwide.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Marriott International hired Exel Transportation Services as a freight forwarder to ship cargo to Hawaii; Exel subcontracted with Cab Logistics, which in turn hired CSX Lines as the carrier. CSX delivered the goods but was never paid by Cab, leading Exel to seek a declaration that it owed nothing further while CSX counterclaimed for the unpaid charges under its tariff. The court granted summary judgment to CSX, holding Exel and Marriott jointly and severally liable for nearly $300,000 in shipping fees. The core reasoning was that shippers and consignees remain liable for carrier charges absent an explicit release or equitable estoppel, that CSX's tariff and bills of lading imposed joint-and-several liability regardless of the parties' internal arrangements, and that CSX's delayed notices did not constitute a misrepresentation releasing the shipper from its obligation.

business & regulatoryprocedure