The case is a petition for writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court of Texas in In re Demaree Reed, involving questions about the primary-jurisdiction doctrine in a dispute that may implicate agency authority over a FELA matter. The concurring opinion agrees with the Court's resolution but does not decide the underlying dispute, instead focusing on the doctrine's development. It traces the doctrine to its federal origins in cases like Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., where it required courts to defer to agencies like the ICC on issues within their exclusive jurisdiction to promote uniformity and avoid branch friction. The concurrence argues that the doctrine's expansion beyond its original narrow scope may now hinder judicial functions and proposes considering a return to its initial formulation or alternatives such as amicus briefs in future cases.
The case concerned whether qui tam claims under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act survive the death of the relator. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the claims do survive the relator's death. The core reasoning was that the claims belong to the State, which is the party allegedly injured and remains in existence. Concurring justices agreed with this holding on the narrow question presented but noted that other issues, such as standing and separation of powers under the Act, were not raised and may require future resolution.
This case concerns whether sovereign immunity bars JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC from bringing a repurchase claim against the State of Texas under Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code following an eminent-domain action. The Supreme Court of Texas held that sovereign immunity does not prevent such suits. The core reasoning is that by locating the statutory repurchase right within the comprehensive eminent-domain provisions of Chapter 21—where sovereign immunity is already understood not to apply—the legislature effected a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity. Justice Young concurred, agreeing with the result but arguing that the analysis should rest solely on the statute’s text and placement rather than additional factors from prior precedent.
This case involved the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services seeking termination of both parents' rights to their three children, based on the father's history of self-harm, threats of violence, and physical aggression toward the mother in the children's presence, along with the mother's alleged failure to protect them. A jury found grounds for termination as to both parents, the trial court entered judgment accordingly, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed termination of the father's rights, concluding that legally sufficient evidence supported findings that he endangered the children and that termination was in their best interest. The Court reversed as to the mother, holding that the government failed to meet the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to show termination of her rights was in the children's best interest, given the strong presumption against termination and the statutory preference for family rehabilitation over severance of parental bonds. The Court rendered judgment in the mother's favor while noting she would become the children's sole legal parent.
This case involved a proceeding by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services to terminate a mother's parental rights to her two children. The Supreme Court of Texas held that neither the trial court nor the court of appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits. Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), the trial court's jurisdiction automatically terminated on the one-year anniversary of the temporary conservatorship order because no trial on the merits had begun and no valid extension had been granted beforehand. The court reasoned that an attempted oral extension at a pretrial hearing was ineffective, particularly given the absence of a proper court reporter and the lack of any written order before the deadline, making dismissal mandatory by operation of law without judicial action.
The case involved a dispute between MV Transportation, Inc. and GDS Transport, LLC arising from a subcontract for providing vehicles and drivers for paratransit and microtransit services under a master agreement with the Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority (DART). GDS sued MV Transportation for fraud, among other claims, but the trial court dismissed the fraud claim under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the dismissal was proper because the allegations in the petition established that MV Transportation was exercising DART's functions pursuant to the contract, making it liable for damages only to the extent DART would be, and DART could not be held liable for fraud under Tex. Transp. Code § 452.056(d). The court reversed the court of appeals' decision that had reinstated the fraud claim and remanded the remaining case to the trial court. The core reasoning was that the live pleading confirmed MV Transportation's contractual authority to manage DART's operations, triggering the statutory limitation on liability.