The case concerned convictions of several newspaper managers under a Wisconsin statute that criminalized combinations formed to willfully or maliciously injure another person in their trade or business. The defendants had agreed that if advertisers accepted a competitor's rate increase, they would face higher rates in the defendants' papers as well, and the informations alleged this was done with intent to maliciously harm the competitor's business. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute, properly construed, reached combinations undertaken with a purely malevolent purpose to cause harm as an end in itself rather than as a means to legitimate gain, and that punishing such conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that even acts that might otherwise be lawful in trade competition lose constitutional protection when undertaken as part of a malicious scheme, and that the statute's focus on malicious motive was within the state's power to regulate.
The case concerned two Greek citizens who had lawfully resided in New York but left for what was intended as a temporary visit to Greece in 1923; their stay extended due to family circumstances, and upon attempting re-entry in 1930 via Canada they lacked valid immigration visas or re-entry permits. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that they were properly excluded from the United States under Section 13 of the Immigration Act of 1924. The Court held that the relators bore the burden of proving a legal right to enter, which requires either an unexpired immigration visa or a return permit issued under regulations, neither of which they possessed, and the Secretary of Labor had not exercised discretion to admit them. Aliens have no inherent right to enter the country, and permission must be affirmatively granted by the United States through authorized channels.
In Dunn v. United States, the defendant was indicted on three counts under federal Prohibition-era liquor laws for maintaining a common nuisance by keeping intoxicating liquor for sale at his establishment, unlawful possession, and unlawful sale. The jury acquitted on the possession and sale counts but convicted on the nuisance count, all based on the same evidence of drinks served at the defendant's bar. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that verdicts on separate counts need not be consistent because each count is treated as an independent indictment, and an acquittal on one cannot preclude conviction on another even with identical evidence. The Court reasoned that any inconsistency could stem from jury lenity or mistake but does not invalidate the guilty verdict or allow speculation into deliberations to upset it.
This case involved a challenge by the Interstate Natural Gas Company to Mississippi's privilege tax law, which the state sought to apply to the company's natural gas pipeline operations running from Louisiana through Mississippi. The company made limited sales of gas to distributors in Mississippi but maintained that its activities were part of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's permanent injunction barring enforcement of the tax against the company. The Court reasoned that the company's work in Mississippi, including measuring the gas and reducing its pressure for delivery, was incidental to the interstate transportation and wholesale delivery of gas and did not create taxable intrastate commerce.
The case involved the Kirby Lumber Company, which in 1923 issued its own bonds at par value and later repurchased some of them on the open market at a discount, creating a $137,521.30 difference. The question presented was whether this difference qualified as taxable gain or income under the Revenue Act of 1921. The Supreme Court held that it did constitute taxable income and reversed the lower court's judgment. The Court reasoned that the statute's definition of gross income encompasses gains from any source, and applicable Treasury Regulations specifically provide that the excess of a bond's face value over its repurchase price is income in the year of retirement. Distinguishing a prior case involving an overall loss, the Court found here a clear accession to income because the repurchase freed up assets without any corresponding shrinkage.
The case concerned a mortgage on a bankrupt's assets that was invalid under California recording laws against creditors existing at the time of the mortgage or before it was recorded. The question was whether the mortgage also lost priority to creditors who extended credit only after the mortgage was recorded. The lower courts had upheld the mortgage's priority over those later creditors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the federal Bankruptcy Act the trustee acquires all property that could have been reached by any creditors, that invalid liens are not enforceable against the estate, and that recovered assets must be distributed equally among allowed claims rather than respecting the mortgage's claimed priority.