This case concerned a mortgage foreclosure action brought by HSBC Bank USA against Richard and Patricia Vesely. The Veselys had defaulted on a note secured by their property, and the bank had accelerated the debt via a 2012 default letter before filing (and later losing) a 2015 foreclosure suit that was dismissed for failure to prosecute. In 2022 the bank filed a second action, which the defendants moved to dismiss as time-barred under the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division held that the 2022 Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act applied retroactively, estopped the bank from claiming the debt had not been validly accelerated, and barred the action because more than six years had elapsed since the 2012 acceleration. The court therefore affirmed dismissal of the complaint.
The case concerned a dispute between the Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free School District and the New York State Education Department over the district's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education to a student with disabilities who turned 21 during the 2021-2022 school year. The parents filed a complaint alleging inadequate notice and entitlement to services until the student's 22nd birthday under the IDEA, and SED sustained the complaint and directed the district to convene a meeting on compensatory education. The school district brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding arguing that state law limits such services to the 21st birthday or the end of that school year. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling for the district, dismissed the petition, and upheld SED's determination that services must extend to the 22nd birthday to match opportunities for students without disabilities.
The case concerned a dispute between the Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free School District and the New York State Education Department over the district's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education to a student with disabilities who turned 21 during the 2021-2022 school year. The parents filed a complaint alleging inadequate notice and entitlement to services until the student's 22nd birthday under the IDEA, and SED sustained the complaint and directed the district to convene a meeting on compensatory education. The school district brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding arguing that state law limits such services to the 21st birthday or the end of that school year. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling for the district, dismissed the petition, and upheld SED's determination that services must extend to the 22nd birthday to match opportunities for students without disabilities.
This case involved a dispute over whether the Mahopac Central School District was required to continue providing a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to a student with disabilities after he turned 21 during the 2023-2024 school year. The State Education Department (SED) had sustained a parental complaint and directed the district to provide services until the student's 22nd birthday, but the lower court annulled that determination in an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition and upholding SED's ruling. The court reasoned that while the IDEA generally mandates services through age 21 inclusive with a possible state carve-out, New York lacks a law or practice terminating public education at 21, as evidenced by its adult education and GED programs available to nondisabled students beyond that age; therefore, the district must extend equivalent services to students with disabilities until age 22.
This case involved cross-petitions by the parents of a young child to enforce and modify a 2020 consent order that provided for joint legal custody and equal parenting time, with disputes centering on holiday scheduling, missed parenting time, COVID-related activities, and the child's exposure to religion. Family Court dismissed most violation claims but found the mother had willfully violated the order by denying the father parenting time, determined a change in circumstances existed, continued joint custody, and ordered the parties to attend at least 20 coparenting counseling sessions to resolve religious issues while barring the child from religious services until an agreement was reached, with failure to agree constituting grounds for further modification. On cross-appeal, the Appellate Division modified the order by reversing the violation finding against the mother and vacating all findings and directives related to religion, while affirming the balance of the Family Court decision.
The case involved 23 nursing homes participating in New York's Medicaid program that had filed over 160 rate appeals for reimbursement, alleging that the Department of Health failed to process them within statutory time frames due to a legislative moratorium and funding cap extended through 2025. Petitioners sought mandamus relief to compel hearings and rule promulgation, along with declaratory judgments claiming violations of due process and the State Administrative Procedure Act. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of the claims, holding that mandamus was unavailable because prioritization involved agency discretion, petitioners lacked a vested property interest for due process purposes, and the rule-making request became moot after the Department began promulgating regulations as ordered by the lower court.
The case involved 23 New York nursing homes participating in Medicaid that sued the state Health Commissioner, alleging unreasonable delays in processing over 160 rate appeals for reimbursement and seeking a writ of mandamus to compel action, regulations on prioritization, and declarations that the delays violated due process and state administrative procedure rules. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner dismissing the claims and later ordered the agency to promulgate regulations as required by statute. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that mandamus does not lie to compel discretionary prioritization under the statutory cap and moratorium on appeals, that petitioners lacked a vested property interest supporting due process claims, and that the agency's initiation of rulemaking mooted related challenges.
This case involves a dispute over the validity of a 2015 will executed by William G. Linich, which named his agent as executor and sole beneficiary instead of his niece as provided in a prior 2011 will. After the niece filed objections alleging lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud, the Surrogate's Court granted summary judgment dismissing the objections and admitting the will to probate. The Appellate Division modified the order by reversing summary judgment on the capacity and undue influence objections, finding that the niece had raised material factual issues based on evidence of the decedent's mental and physical condition and his financial dependence on the petitioner, while affirming dismissal of the fraud objection due to the absence of specific supporting evidence.
This case involved a divorce action between Meredith Szypula and John Szypula, focusing on the classification of 11 years of Navy pension credits that the husband earned before the 1996 marriage but purchased back in 2012 using marital funds while employed by the State Department. The trial court classified all credits as marital property and awarded the wife a share under equitable distribution. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the nine years of credits earned prior to the marriage constitute the husband's separate property because pension benefits are marital only to the extent earned during the marriage, and the use of marital funds for purchase does not convert pre-marriage service credits into a marital asset. The court remitted the matter to adjust the QDRO accordingly and to equitably distribute only the marital funds used to acquire the credits.