This case involved a patent infringement dispute between Brass Smith, LLC and RPI Industries, Inc., which the parties resolved through a private settlement agreement requiring the defendant to cease certain activities by specific future dates. The parties requested dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) along with an order incorporating terms that would allow the district court to retain indefinite jurisdiction to enforce the agreement and resolve any related disputes. The court declined the request to retain such open-ended jurisdiction. It reasoned that federal courts possess only limited jurisdiction that cannot be expanded by party consent, that enforcement of a settlement is a separate contract claim requiring an independent jurisdictional basis or proper incorporation for ancillary jurisdiction, and that no statute or rule supports perpetual oversight of a private dispute lacking substantial public interest.
This case concerned parents' challenge to a school board's decision to declassify their child, H.M., as eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act after determining she no longer needed them to progress in the general curriculum. The parents sought reversal of an administrative law judge's ruling upholding the declassification, along with compensatory education and tuition reimbursement. The district court denied the parents' motion for summary judgment and granted the board's cross-motion, affirming the ALJ's decision. The court reasoned that the board had met its burden to show the child was no longer eligible and that prior IEPs had provided a free appropriate public education, based on the administrative record and supplemented evidence.
The case involved plaintiff Joanne Trafton suing the City of Woodbury, its police department, and Officer Harold Holmstrom under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for alleged false arrest and physical injury after an encounter at a CVS pharmacy. The incident arose when police investigated photographs of two minors with guns and a crossbow that Trafton had dropped off for development; she refused to provide her name or identification during questioning, leading to an attempted arrest for obstruction or hindrance, her resistance, and her eventual handcuffing. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Core reasoning addressed whether probable cause existed for arrest under New Jersey obstruction statutes, which the court interpreted to require either an independent unlawful act or physical interference with officers rather than mere refusal to answer questions or attempts to create personal space.
The case concerns a New Jersey pediatric medical daycare provider and several Medicaid-eligible children challenging state regulations that tightened clinical eligibility criteria for pediatric medical day care services, increased staffing and service requirements for providers, and imposed a moratorium on new or expanded facilities, claiming these changes violated federal Medicaid requirements for early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services as well as constitutional protections. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiffs' allegations, accepted as true, sufficiently pleaded violations of Medicaid statutory provisions regarding access, promptness, and equal treatment that could proceed to further litigation.
In this ERISA case, plaintiff Gail Connor, a former bank branch manager, sued the PNC long-term disability plan and its administrator Sedgwick after her benefits for lupus and Raynaud’s disease were approved and then terminated. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the termination was arbitrary and capricious under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The court granted plaintiff’s motion in part and denied defendant’s cross-motion, holding that the administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to properly weigh the treating physician’s evidence of functional limitations and the Social Security disability finding while relying on reviewing physicians whose opinions did not adequately address the medical record. The ruling is limited to the plan’s “regular occupation” disability standard and does not decide eligibility under the later “any occupation” standard.
Marla Hunter, a Bureau of Prisons employee since 1996, was terminated in 2004 after an investigation found she had engaged in an inappropriate relationship with an inmate by sending personal communications and failing to report contacts with the inmate's family. Hunter filed a grievance alleging the termination was retaliation for prior Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, but an arbitrator upheld the removal, finding the charges substantiated and no retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed the arbitrator's decision, and the EEOC concurred. Hunter then sued in federal court under Title VII, claiming retaliation and challenging the administrative decision as arbitrary, capricious, procedurally flawed, and unsupported by evidence. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the termination, the penalty was reasonable, and Hunter presented no evidence of retaliatory motive.
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