The case involved a motion in limine by defendant Bobby Lee Kimble in a federal criminal prosecution for conspiracy to commit health care fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud, along with related substantive counts, based on allegations that he and others staged automobile accidents to file fraudulent insurance claims. The government sought to introduce evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of three prior unindicted hit-and-run claims made by Kimble in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The court denied the motion, holding that the evidence was admissible because it was relevant to issues of intent, knowledge, and lack of accident or mistake rather than character. The decision relied on Fifth Circuit precedent in United States v. Floyd, which upheld admission of similar extrinsic evidence in a staged-accident fraud case, and found that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, with limiting jury instructions to be provided.
This case involves a lawsuit by Mary Salard, as natural tutrix for her minor children L.A.S. and S.S., against Greg Salard for compensatory and exemplary damages arising from alleged sexual abuse constituting battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved for summary judgment after his bankruptcy discharge in Alaska, arguing that the claims were discharged because no timely objection was filed despite the plaintiff's notice of the proceedings. The court granted the motion, finding that the mother had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy deadlines but failed to preserve the claims on behalf of the children, resulting in their discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. The claims were dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.
This case involves a dispute over whether a 1950 oil and gas lease on Louisiana property covers deep mineral formations such as the Haynesville Shale that were not accessible or known at the time of the lease. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the lease did not apply to those deeper formations and damages for the defendant's refusal to release any claims to them. On a motion for reconsideration of a prior denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion, holding that the lease's granting clause is clear and unambiguous. The core reasoning was that, under the Louisiana Mineral Code which governs the lease's interpretation, absent any explicit language limiting or excluding depths the lease extends to all minerals at all depths underlying the surface.
The case involved the cities of Alexandria and Pineville, Louisiana, suing FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Army Corps of Engineers, and related officials over FEMA's de-accreditation of the Red River Levee System from the National Flood Insurance Program, which the plaintiffs alleged violated the Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment by imposing costs on local governments for federal responsibilities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, an injunction preventing issuance of new flood maps, and other remedies tied to the National Flood Insurance Act and related statutes. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), holding that sovereign immunity barred the claims because neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor the National Flood Insurance Act provided a waiver of immunity absent a final agency determination under 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g).
federal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
The case concerns a declaratory judgment action by Lafayette Insurance Company regarding its obligations under a commercial general liability policy in connection with an underlying copyright infringement lawsuit filed by Looney Ricks Kiss Architects against developers and others involved in apartment complex projects. Lafayette moved for summary judgment declaring no coverage and no duty to defend, while LRK moved for partial summary judgment asserting a duty to defend. The court granted both motions, holding that LRK lacked standing because it was not an insured under the policy and that the policy excluded coverage for claims arising out of breach of contract under the personal and advertising injury provisions. The decision applied Louisiana insurance law, focusing on the complaint allegations, policy language, and an exclusion for injuries that would not have occurred but for a contract breach, finding no possibility of coverage.
This case involves the EEOC's lawsuit against IESI Louisiana Corp. on behalf of Ronald Harper, alleging that his termination shortly after disclosing his dyslexia violated the Americans with Disabilities Act through discriminatory discharge and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The defendant sought partial summary judgment to exclude damages evidence for discovery violations under Rule 26, bar back pay after 2007 due to failure to mitigate, eliminate front pay claims, and apply a $100,000 cap on compensatory and punitive damages based on employee numbers. The court granted the motion in part by dismissing back pay after Harper's 2007 job loss and all front pay due to voluntary unemployment without mitigation efforts, while denying the rest because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding disclosure sanctions, mitigation overall, and whether IESI entities should be combined to determine the applicable damages cap under Title VII. The decision applied Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 37, and 56 standards for summary judgment and discovery compliance.