Sharion Aycock

In Angles v. Flexible Flyer Liquidating Trust, former employees of Flexible Flyer Athletic Company (FFAC) appealed a bankruptcy court ruling that the company did not violate the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act by failing to provide 60 days' notice before a plant closing and mass layoffs. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of the employees' motion for summary judgment and its findings after a bench trial. The court held that the unforeseen business circumstances exception and the faltering company exception to the WARN Act applied, as the sudden termination of financing from creditors and the parent company was not reasonably foreseeable, and the company provided notice as soon as practicable upon filing for bankruptcy.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involves LaFagus O. Carpenter, a former patrolman at Mississippi Valley State University, who alleged that he faced retaliation, including shift changes and demotion, after indicating his willingness to testify in a co-worker's Title VII lawsuit, leading to his resignation in January 2010. He sued MVSU and two individual supervisors under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge; under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations; and for punitive damages. The court addressed the defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, focusing on immunity defenses. MVSU was held immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as an arm of the State of Mississippi, while the individual defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity was analyzed based on whether the claims implicated clearly established constitutional rights and objective reasonableness of their actions.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

In Ivy v. Oxford Municipal Separate School District, an African-American teacher sued the school district alleging racial discrimination in not being hired for administrative positions and in the non-renewal of her teaching contract, claiming violations of Title VII, Sections 1981 and 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework or to show that the district's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual, and her Equal Protection claim similarly lacked evidence of intentional racial discrimination.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned whether State Farm had a duty to defend or indemnify Billie Ann Mitchell under her homeowners and personal liability umbrella policies in two underlying lawsuits: one alleging breach of a business guaranty, misapplication of trust funds, and related fraud claims arising from a car dealership, and the other seeking corporate dissolution and an accounting. The court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policies provided no coverage because the claims involved excluded business pursuits, intentional or criminal acts, and did not allege an “occurrence” causing covered bodily injury or property damage. The court further held that the insurer had an arguable, good-faith basis for denying the claims after investigation, so no breach of contract or extra-contractual damages could be awarded.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved an African-American middle school teacher terminated by the Lowndes County School District after an incident in which he used physical force to remove a student from his classroom, which administrators determined to be excessive. The teacher sued under Title VII and § 1981 alleging racial discrimination, claimed violations of procedural due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and asserted a state-law breach of contract claim. The court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of pretext or disparate treatment of similarly situated white employees to support the discrimination claims, that he received notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to respond sufficient to satisfy due process, and that Mississippi law permitted termination for use of excessive force against a student, precluding the contract claim.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned the EPA's veto, under Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act, of the Yazoo Backwater Project, a federal flood-control effort involving levees and a pump station in Mississippi. The Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners sued, arguing that the project was exempt from the veto under Section 404(r) because it was a congressionally authorized federal project for which an environmental impact statement had been prepared. The court granted summary judgment to the EPA and intervening environmental groups. It held that the exemption did not apply because the required environmental impact statement had not been submitted to Congress before project authorization or funding, as Section 404(r) demands. The decision therefore upheld the EPA's authority to block the project on environmental grounds.

environmentfederal power

The case involved allegations under the False Claims Act that CSMS, a durable medical equipment supplier created by Beverly Enterprises with billing services from McKesson, submitted false claims to Medicare by violating supplier standards related to state licensing, officer disclosures, inventory requirements, and anti-kickback rules. The district court considered multiple motions for summary judgment, including the United States' motion for partial summary judgment on counts alleging violations of specific standards and the defendants' cross-motions and res judicata arguments. The court denied the government's motion for partial summary judgment on the relevant counts, finding no established violations, and deemed other motions moot. The reasoning focused on the administrative record from NSC inspections, the absence of binding agency interpretations requiring additional state permits or on-site inventory, and CSMS's documented compliance efforts during enrollment and re-enrollment processes.

healthcarebusiness & regulatorycriminal law

In United States v. Olivarria, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation during a methamphetamine investigation initiated by a confidential informant. The court found that the defendant was in custody when questioned without Miranda warnings and suppressed his incriminating statements made before and immediately after the vehicle search. However, the court denied suppression of the methamphetamine discovered in the defendant's car, concluding that his spontaneous statement directing officers to the drugs constituted voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances, considering factors such as cooperation, lack of coercion, and the brevity of the encounter. The decision turned on credibility assessments from evidentiary hearings and application of Fifth Circuit precedents on consent and custodial interrogation.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns an African American female employee's claims against her former car dealership employer for race and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation under Title VII, and age discrimination under the ADEA following her 2009 termination for alleged unprofessional conduct. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion to file a sur-rebuttal and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The core reasoning was that the EEOC charge was untimely for the hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff failed to produce evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext or discriminatory motive for the termination or other adverse actions, and there was insufficient proof linking any protected activity to retaliation.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the State of Mississippi suing AstraZeneca pharmaceutical companies in Mississippi state court, asserting claims under state Medicaid laws, the Consumer Protection Act, and common-law theories including fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligence related to statements about drug benefits and pricing. Defendants removed the action to federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction and substantial federal questions under the FDCA and related regulations. The district court granted the State's motion to remand, concluding that the State itself was the real party in interest and is not a citizen for purposes of diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and that the state-law claims did not present a substantial federal issue creating jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court emphasized that removal statutes are strictly construed against federal jurisdiction and that any separate interests of a state employee health plan did not create complete diversity or alter the analysis.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Billy McCamey filing a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his Mississippi state conviction for possession of methamphetamine precursor chemicals and his 33-year sentence. The court granted the petition conditionally after an evidentiary hearing, vacated the conviction, and ordered the state to provide a new trial within 120 days or release McCamey. The core reasoning was that McCamey was denied his rights to an impartial jury and conflict-free counsel because his attorney had actual conflicts arising from prior professional negligence claims and a bar complaint by one of the jurors, and that McCamey's purported waiver of these issues was invalid due to the conflicts and lack of proper disclosure.

criminal lawprocedure

William Ray Hughes, an inmate on death row in Mississippi, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his capital murder conviction and death sentence for the 1996 kidnapping, rape, and murder of 16-year-old Ashley Galloway. The petition raised multiple claims, including that Hughes is intellectually disabled (formerly termed mentally retarded), which would bar execution under Supreme Court precedent. After an evidentiary hearing and review of expert reports on IQ scores and adaptive functioning deficits in areas such as conceptual, social, and practical skills, the court found that Hughes met the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability under standards from the AAMR and DSM-IV-TR. The court therefore vacated the death sentence on that ground, rendering other sentencing-phase claims moot, while leaving the underlying conviction intact.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's declaratory judgment action against Franklin Corporation seeking to establish that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Franklin under workers' compensation and employers' liability policies for an underlying state-court lawsuit brought by Franklin employees. The employees alleged injuries from inadequate ventilation and protective equipment related to adhesives used in manufacturing, resulting in a jury verdict including punitive damages against Franklin. Liberty Mutual had defended the case under a reservation of rights and sought reimbursement for defense costs and benefits paid, arguing that intentional acts were excluded from coverage. Franklin counterclaimed that Liberty Mutual breached fiduciary duties by failing to advise it of conflicts and the right to independent counsel. The court granted partial summary judgment to Liberty Mutual, holding that the policies provided no coverage for the claims, that defense costs for non-covered claims could be recouped, and that Franklin's counterclaims were dismissed.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Shelia Shumpert, an employee at the Lee County Juvenile Detention Center, was terminated after she reported witnessing police officers assaulting an arrestee and then spoke with an attorney about the incident, which violated a department policy requiring sheriff authorization for such contacts. Shumpert sued Sheriff Jim Johnson, claiming her termination was retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. A jury found in her favor and awarded $34,000 in damages, answering special interrogatories that supported her claims under the Pickering balancing test. The court denied the defendant's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, concluding that Shumpert's interest in free speech outweighed the employer's interest in efficient operations and that the jury instructions were proper when viewed as a whole.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

This case involved an appeal by the United States Trustee from a bankruptcy court's denial of a motion to dismiss Nick Adams' Chapter 7 petition. The Trustee contended that Adams had improperly deducted his 401(k) loan obligation as a secured claim on the means test form, which could prevent a presumption of abuse from arising under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's order, holding that a 401(k) loan is not a "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code because the plan administrator has no enforceable right to repayment from the debtor personally and can only offset against the retirement account. The court reasoned that retirement plan assets are excluded from the estate and that the lack of a mutual debt precludes setoff treatment under Section 553, so the obligation cannot be listed as a secured claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

procedurefederal power

This case is a declaratory judgment action in which Liberty Mutual Insurance seeks reimbursement from Franklin Corporation for defense costs, workers' compensation benefits, and litigation expenses paid in an underlying state court case involving workplace injury claims and punitive damages. Franklin filed a counterclaim alleging that Liberty Mutual breached fiduciary duties by failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest and Franklin's right under Mississippi law to retain independent counsel, citing principles from Moeller v. American Guarantee. The disputes before the court included motions for summary judgment, attorney disqualification, and appeals of magistrate orders, all centered on issues of attorney-client and work product privilege triggered by the counterclaim. The court affirmed the magistrate judges' decisions, ruled that the equitable estoppel counterclaim waived privilege for relevant communications, and dismissed the summary judgment motion as premature to allow further discovery.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff's state-law claims against an insurance agency, its agent, and an insurer for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and related causes after denial of benefits under a critical illness policy she obtained through her employer shortly before suffering a heart attack. The defendants removed the action to federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction because the policy was part of an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan that preempted the claims. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the employer's promotion and offering of the policy made it an ERISA plan and that the claims were sufficiently intertwined with the plan to create federal jurisdiction and trigger preemption. The court further found that the insurance agency and agent were not traditional ERISA fiduciaries but that their conduct still fell under ERISA preemption due to its relation to the plan.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedurefederal power

The case involved a student suspended from Tupelo High School under the district's JICK policy after reports and visible evidence of self-inflicted cuts, requiring a mental health evaluation for readmission; the student was suspended for under ten days after her parent declined an alternative school placement. The Fosters sued the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the student's Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights due to insufficient evidence and lack of opportunity to make up work. The court granted the district's motion for summary judgment, holding that the school provided adequate notice and a hearing meeting Goss v. Lopez standards, that no protected property interest in public education was denied because alternative schooling was offered, and that the evaluation requirement did not constitute a substantive due process violation.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves a mortgage foreclosure action brought by Ocwen Loan Servicing on behalf of Wells Fargo against borrower Barbara Branaman, who defaulted on a 2002 promissory note secured by a deed of trust on her Mississippi property. Ocwen sought summary judgment to enforce the note, accelerate payments, recover the debt plus fees, and foreclose, arguing it was a holder in due course immune to Branaman's claims of fraud in the original loan transaction. The court granted partial summary judgment, holding that under Mississippi law Wells Fargo qualified as a holder in due course and was protected from defenses based on predecessor misconduct, but denied summary judgment on the foreclosure and monetary remedies because Ocwen failed to provide sufficient evidence of default, proper acceleration notice, and amounts owed. The court reasoned that while the holder-in-due-course status shields the current holder from prior fraud allegations, additional proof is required before granting enforcement relief, leaving those issues for trial.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure