Karen LeCraft Henderson

This case involved appeals from bankruptcy court orders in two Chapter 13 proceedings where debtors challenged the valuation of secured claims held by creditors National Bank of South Carolina and Chemical Financial Corporation on collateral consisting of an automobile and a mobile home. The creditors had recourse agreements with the original dealers, but the debtors argued that the claims should be valued at wholesale rather than retail prices under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's rulings, which had set the secured claims at retail value. The court reasoned that the statute requires valuation based on the purpose of the valuation and proposed disposition of the property, that recourse agreements with third parties must be disregarded, and that creditors not engaged in retail sales should receive wholesale valuations absent evidence of retail capacity.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Smith v. Prudential Financial Services, Inc., the plaintiff sued coworker Lance Roberson for sexual harassment that allegedly caused her psychological harm and led her to quit her job at Prudential. Roberson moved for dismissal or summary judgment, contending there is no common-law cause of action for sexual harassment in South Carolina, that any such claim would be preempted by the workers' compensation statute, and that he was not an "employer" subject to liability under Title VII or the South Carolina Human Affairs Law. The court granted summary judgment to Roberson after converting the motion, concluding that no common-law sexual harassment claim exists in the state and that Roberson, a non-supervisory employee, could not be held liable as an employer under the federal or state anti-discrimination laws.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved plaintiff Ngoc Huynh Due, who purchased a house with an existing termite treatment contract from defendant Orkin Exterminating Co. and renewed the annual fee; after signing a sale contract for the house, an Orkin inspection report noted water damage to subflooring (but no termites), and Due alleged that Orkin's failure to conduct required annual inspections or report plumbing leaks earlier caused unrepairable water damage that prevented the sale, leading to claims for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud seeking repair costs. The court granted Orkin's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact. It held that the negligence claim failed because Orkin owed no duty independent of the contract under South Carolina law distinguishing contract and tort claims; the breach of contract claim failed because the contract and guarantee limited liability to termite damage (not water damage) and there was no evidence Orkin knew of leaks earlier; and the fraud claim failed because a mere breach of contract does not constitute fraud. The court also awarded sanctions for discovery violations.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a dispute over whether an automobile insurance policy's uninsured motorist coverage applies to injuries sustained by Nancy Howser from a gunshot fired by an unknown driver who bumped her vehicle on the road. Wausau Underwriters Insurance sought a declaration that the policy did not cover the injuries, while Howser argued it did. The court granted summary judgment to Wausau, holding that the injuries did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle as required by the policy and South Carolina law, because the shooting constituted an independent act without sufficient causal connection to the vehicle's use.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between Defender Industries and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance over a life insurance policy. Defender claimed that Northwestern's agents fraudulently promised a premium rebate if the coverage was later reduced, which Defender relied on in purchasing an $8 million policy on a key executive. The court allowed the fraud claims to proceed despite a state statute prohibiting premium rebates, reasoning that the law does not bar reliance in fraud actions. The jury awarded actual and punitive damages, but the court set aside the punitive damages as excessive while upholding the actual damages with prejudgment interest.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether a city could forfeit a contractor's bid bond after the contractor submitted a low bid due to a calculation error in a public construction project and sought to withdraw or correct the bid upon discovering the mistake. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company that issued the bid bond and the contractor, denying the city's claim to the bond amount. The court reasoned that under South Carolina law, rescission is available for an honest, material mistake in a bid where the error is promptly disclosed, the city is not prejudiced, and the bidder has not acted negligently in a way that bars relief, considering the city's own procurement regulations allowing for correction or withdrawal of erroneous bids.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiff Joseph Moody sued defendant J.G. Ferguson, a South Carolina Highway Patrol trooper, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment rights by using unreasonable force after a traffic stop and by charging him with assault with intent to kill without probable cause, as well as under South Carolina law for assault. Following a bench trial, the court found Ferguson liable on all three claims and awarded Moody $15,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. The court credited the testimony of Moody and his cousin over Ferguson's inconsistent accounts, concluding that Ferguson lacked probable cause for the assault charge and that firing at Moody's fleeing vehicle constituted unreasonable force and assault. The decision rested on findings that Moody's rapid departure did not justify the force used or the elevated criminal charge.

civil rightscriminal lawtorts & liability

In Lightner v. Duke Power Co., plaintiff Moses Lightner sued Duke Power Company for negligence after being injured by a metal bolt allegedly left by Duke's agents and propelled by a lawnmower at a school where he worked. Duke filed a third-party complaint against Ford New Holland, the lawnmower manufacturer, seeking indemnification and contribution under theories of strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. The court granted Ford's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, reasoning that indemnity was unavailable because Duke was defending its own alleged negligence rather than being held vicariously liable, and that the South Carolina Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act did not apply retroactively to injuries occurring before its effective date. The court also granted Duke's motion to join the South Carolina School Board Insurance Trust as a party plaintiff under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) due to its subrogation interest from paying workers' compensation benefits.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a challenge by the South Carolina State Education Assistance Authority, a guarantor in the federal Guaranteed Student Loan Program, to 1987 amendments to the Higher Education Act that cap excess cash reserves held by guaranty agencies and require the Department of Education to recoup amounts above the cap through methods such as repayment of advances or reduced reimbursements. The Authority argued that these provisions violated its contractual rights to reinsurance payments and other federal funds, amounting to an unconstitutional taking. The court granted the Authority's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motion, holding that the amendments effected a taking of property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment by altering vested contractual rights established under prior law and agreements. The decision rested on precedents limiting Congress's ability to impair federal contractual obligations and noted that the amendments explicitly made certain payments subject to the new reserve limitations.

federal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves fourteen former salaried employees at Square D Company's Columbia, South Carolina plant who sued for wrongful discharge after layoffs in 1986 and 1987. The plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of employment contract based on an employee handbook promising layoff by reverse seniority, intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage), and, for nine of them, age discrimination under the ADEA. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the outrage and ADEA claims, finding insufficient evidence of outrageous conduct and no prima facie case of age discrimination or rebuttal of the employer's legitimate reasons. It denied summary judgment on the breach of contract claims, holding that the handbook could create enforceable rights under South Carolina law as clarified in Small v. Springs Industries and its retroactive application in this case, that factual disputes existed regarding whether the handbook was breached, and that a later revised handbook with a disclaimer did not conclusively bar recovery for all plaintiffs.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, a pro se plaintiff from Georgia sued the NCAA in federal court in South Carolina after the University of Georgia denied admission to his son. The plaintiff filed numerous pleadings but did not clearly identify any legal claims against the NCAA. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff failed to state any legally cognizable claim and lacked standing to sue on behalf of his emancipated son, as established in Allen v. Wright. The magistrate's recommendation was adopted after de novo review, resulting in dismissal of the complaint.

procedure

This case involved a breach of contract claim by Kline Iron & Steel against Gray Communications Consultants over an alleged oral agreement for the manufacture and erection of a television tower for $1,485,368. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that any agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that no contract had been formed. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact and holding that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the parties' writings did not satisfy the requirements of South Carolina's UCC statute of frauds for a contract for the sale of goods over $500, including the absence of a signed writing by the defendant or sufficient confirmation under the merchant's exception. The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff but determined that the proposal and correspondence failed to create a binding contract under the applicable legal standards.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves consolidated actions by plaintiff Thomas B. McTeer, Jr. against Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company and State Farm Life Insurance Company arising from McTeer's purchase and subsequent sale of a shopping center financed by four first-priority mortgage notes held by the defendants. McTeer alleged breach of contract, violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and conversion after the defendants charged him 83 days of interest on prepayment of the notes, including 60 days attributable to their waiver of the contractual notice requirement. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the UTPA and conversion claims, arguing that the transaction was not trade or commerce under the UTPA, did not affect the public interest, and was exempt as an activity regulated under state insurance laws. The court took the facts in the light most favorable to McTeer and concluded that the transaction constituted the sale of property within the UTPA's definition of trade or commerce, while also addressing the regulatory exemption and public-interest requirements before granting the motions in part and denying them in part.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

The plaintiff, a grassroots organization, sued South Carolina state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment rights by denying a permit to display a political sign on State House grounds, selectively enforcing a 30-day application rule, adopting a policy against fixed signs, and threatening criminal sanctions. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing all claims against them in their official capacities and holding them not liable in their individual capacities for adopting or applying the fixed-signs policy. It reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment bars damages suits against state officials in their official capacities under § 1983, and that the fixed-signs policy was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on expression in a public forum. The court noted that claims based on the selective enforcement of the 30-day rule and the timing of the permit denial remained unresolved.

free speechcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death and survival action brought by a South Carolina plaintiff after her husband died in a 1985 airplane crash in Tennessee; the aircraft had been manufactured by the defendant in 1972 and purchased in South Carolina in 1984. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the negligence and strict liability claims but denied it as to the warranty claims. For the tort claims, the court applied South Carolina's choice-of-law rules, which required use of Tennessee substantive law including its statute of repose that barred the claims as untimely from the date of the product's first sale. For the warranty claims, the court determined that South Carolina law governed because the action sounded in contract and the contract was formed and performed in South Carolina.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a § 1983 action by the plaintiff alleging that her decedent was deprived of life without due process of law when a deputy sheriff killed him during a personal dispute, together with pendent state wrongful death and survivorship claims against the sheriff and other officials. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the deputy acted under color of state law, whether any failure to supervise violated a clearly established constitutional right in 1985, and Eleventh Amendment immunity barring suit against state officials in federal court.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Central National Insurance Company to determine its duty to defend truck driver Michael Metz under a non-trucking use liability policy issued to Key Way Transport. The accident occurred when Metz, after delivering a load in South Carolina, was driving empty to pick up paperwork and a return load arranged through Key Way's agent. The court found that the policy's exclusions for autos used to carry property in any business or used in the business of anyone to whom the auto is rented applied, as Metz remained within the scope of his lease agreement and was furthering Key Way's business at the time. Accordingly, the court held that Central National had no coverage obligation and no duty to defend Metz in the underlying tort suits arising from the fatal collision and injuries.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved the bankruptcy of Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc. (PTL), where the bankruptcy court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the IRS from revoking PTL's tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), retroactive to 1981. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's order on appeal, holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The court reasoned that revocation of tax-exempt status does not qualify as an act to collect, assess, or recover taxes under the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and that the Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C. § 7421) bars suits to enjoin such IRS actions and is not preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.

taxesfederal power

The case involved a former civilian boiler plant operator at Fort Jackson who sued the Department of the Army under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Alcohol Abuse Act after his removal for repeated AWOL incidents tied to alcoholism. He claimed the Army failed to reasonably accommodate his handicap by not offering a firm choice between rehabilitation and termination. After denying summary judgment and holding a bench trial with witness testimony and exhibits, the court issued findings of fact detailing the plaintiff's DUI convictions, workplace absences, prior discipline, and participation in an alcohol program. The court concluded that the Army had satisfied its legal obligations to confirm the link between the plaintiff's performance issues and alcoholism and to provide appropriate accommodation before removal.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned whether South Carolina National Bank could obtain a declaratory judgment preventing enforcement in South Carolina of an Australian court judgment that had awarded Westpac Banking Corp. over $665,000 on a letter of credit dispute. The letter of credit had been issued by SCN in favor of an Australian company for shipment of goods, and after SCN rejected Westpac's presentation of documents, Westpac sued in Australia; SCN appeared, litigated jurisdiction and the merits, lost at trial, won on intermediate appeal, but ultimately lost before the Privy Council. The district court granted summary judgment to Westpac, holding the Australian judgment enforceable under South Carolina law. It applied the comity principles from Hilton v. Guyot, finding that the Australian court had jurisdiction, SCN received a full and fair opportunity to be heard, the judgment was not procured by fraud, and enforcement did not violate public policy. Because the foreign judgment was enforceable, the court did not reach the underlying letter-of-credit issues.

procedurebusiness & regulatory