Joe L. Heaton

Peoples Electric Cooperative sued Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, alleging breach of fiduciary duty among other claims, stemming from WFEC's implementation of a two-tier rate structure that increased rates for non-extending members like PEC to secure additional federal loans for power generation. The court granted WFEC's motion to dismiss the fiduciary duty claim. The decision was based on the absence of controlling Oklahoma authority recognizing a fiduciary duty owed by a generation and transmission cooperative to its member distribution cooperatives in these circumstances, distinguishing it from duties owed by trustees to ratepayers, and analogizing to corporate law where no such duty exists between the entity and shareholders.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Tucker v. Oliver, appellant Stephanie Tucker challenged a bankruptcy court ruling that a debt for attorneys' fees owed to her by appellees Karen and Mark Oliver was dischargeable in bankruptcy. The debt stemmed from an Oklahoma state court judgment in favor of Tucker in a proceeding where the Olivers, as grandparents, unsuccessfully sought visitation rights with Tucker's child. The district court reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the debt did not qualify as a non-dischargeable "domestic support obligation" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) because Tucker, as the former daughter-in-law, was not among the statutorily specified persons to whom such an obligation must be owed. The court rejected arguments to extend the statute based on precedents like Jones v. Jones and Miller v. Gentry, noting those cases involved custody disputes between parents rather than grandparent visitation claims and did not override the plain statutory language defining who must be owed the debt.

family law

This case is a class action filed in Oklahoma state court by local residents against companies that operated a zinc smelter, along with related entities, asserting state-law claims of nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and unjust enrichment arising from alleged property contamination. The defendants removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, CERCLA, and the federal officer removal statute, prompting the plaintiffs to seek remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court examined each asserted ground for federal jurisdiction in turn, concluding that the state-law claims did not satisfy the requirements for removal under CAFA, did not present a substantial federal question under CERCLA, and did not involve private parties acting under a federal officer for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Accordingly, the court granted the motion to remand the case to state court.

environmentprocedurefederal powertorts & liability

In this case, a state prisoner filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and larceny after a blind guilty plea, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to suppress his confession and investigate, as well as violations of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. The court adopted the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations after de novo review of objections, denying relief on all claims. On the ineffective assistance claims, the court found no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart because ample other evidence existed and the petitioner likely would have pled guilty regardless. On the double jeopardy claims, the court held that the offenses were separate crimes under Oklahoma law involving distinct victims or elements, so no constitutional violation occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

Plaintiff Shawna Melton sued her former employer Farmers Insurance alleging wrongful discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and Oklahoma public policy, along with a breach of contract claim, after her termination for excessive absenteeism. Farmers moved for summary judgment, arguing she was not discriminated or retaliated against and was fired due to attendance issues. The court granted the motion, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Core reasoning included that the plaintiff's absences were properly counted as chargeable under company policy, her requests to work from home were denied because she was not herself disabled, she failed to show pretext in the termination decision, and she was not treated differently from similarly situated employees.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the United States seeking to enforce two IRS administrative summonses directed at Kenneth B. Rinehart personally and as president of Unta Bent Inc. to obtain books, records, and testimony related to the tax liabilities of Rinehart and the corporation for tax year 2003. Rinehart objected on grounds that the IRS was acting in bad faith and that compelled production or testimony would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in light of pending state criminal charges. The court concluded that the government had met its burden under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 by showing the summonses sought relevant information not already in its possession, followed proper procedures, and were issued in good faith without evidence of harassment or improper coordination with state authorities, and therefore ordered enforcement of the summonses subject to further proceedings on the self-incrimination claims.

taxescriminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a former non-tribal director of planning at the Comanche Nation College suing the college and its president in federal court for breach of a three-year employment contract and for violating rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act after her termination without cause or buyout. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing tribal sovereign immunity barred the claims. The court dismissed the breach of contract claim, finding no congressional or tribal waiver of immunity. For the ICRA claim, the court analyzed the narrow Dry Creek Lodge exception to immunity but concluded it did not apply because the employment dispute constituted an internal tribal affair, leaving no federal jurisdiction.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedurelabor & employment

In this case, plaintiff Douglas Brown filed a class action against General Motors alleging that certain 1999-2003 model year GM vehicles had a manufacturing defect known as piston slap, which caused engine damage and other problems, and that GM breached express and implied warranties, violated Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, and was unjustly enriched. GM moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) for failure to state a claim and insufficient particularity. The court granted the motion only as to the unjust enrichment claim because an express warranty existed that precluded quasi-contract recovery under Florida law, but denied dismissal of the remaining claims, concluding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a manifested defect and resulting injury under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8 and that the FDUTPA claim did not require heightened fraud pleading.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, owners of GM trucks filed a class action alleging that certain 1999-2003 model year engines had a manufacturing defect causing piston slap, which led to engine damage, reduced performance, and other harms; they asserted claims for breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. GM moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b), arguing lack of cognizable injury and insufficient particularity in pleading. The court granted the motion in part by dismissing the class damages claim under the KCPA but denied it in all other respects, allowing plaintiffs ten days to amend their KCPA claim. It reasoned that under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a), the complaint sufficiently alleged an actual manifested defect causing present harm rather than mere noise or potential injury, distinguishing it from no-injury product cases, and that unjust enrichment could be pled alongside contract claims.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

Plaintiff Michael Gouthro, owner of a 2002 Chevrolet Silverado, filed a class action against General Motors alleging that certain 1999-2003 model engines suffered from an excessive piston slap defect causing engine damage, noise, higher emissions, reduced performance, and lower resale value. The complaint asserted claims for negligent design and manufacture, breach of express and implied warranties, violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection act, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. GM moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the economic loss doctrine barred the negligence claim, the plaintiff failed to allege injury or a breach, and other relief was unavailable. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the negligence claim because Massachusetts law applies the economic loss doctrine absent personal injury or damage to other property, while allowing the remaining claims to proceed based on allegations that the defect had manifested and caused actual harm to the plaintiff's vehicle.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a class action by a New York owner of a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado truck alleging that General Motors' 1999-2003 model year engines had a manufacturing or design defect known as piston slap, causing engine damage, excessive noise, fuel and oil consumption, higher emissions, reduced performance, and lower resale value. The plaintiff asserted claims for breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, violation of New York’s Consumer Protection Act, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief. GM moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b), arguing that the complaint failed to allege a compensable injury or particularized misrepresentation. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff's allegations of actual manifestation of the defect and resulting harm were sufficient under the liberal standards of Rule 8(a), distinguishing the case from no-injury product defect precedents, and that the consumer protection claim did not require heightened pleading or proof of reliance.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiff Scott Largent, owner of a 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche, brought a class action against General Motors alleging that certain 1999-2003 model year engines suffered from a piston slap defect causing knocking noise, engine damage, increased emissions and fuel consumption, and reduced resale value. The complaint asserted claims for breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violation of Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court granted GM's Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part, dismissing the DTPA claim for failure to plead reliance or satisfy Rule 8 or 9(b) particularity requirements and dismissing the unjust enrichment claim because an express warranty contract governed the dispute, but denied dismissal of the warranty claims after finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actual manifested defect and resulting injury under the lenient pleading standards.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves plaintiffs suing for injuries from a defective ladder tree stand in a diversity action, initially against the manufacturer and later adding the seller and insurer. The insurer moved to dismiss, arguing that under Oklahoma choice-of-law rules, the Louisiana direct action statute allowing suit against the insurer was either procedural (inapplicable) or that Oklahoma substantive law should apply instead. The court denied the motion, concluding that the direct action statute is substantive for Erie purposes, and under Oklahoma's choice-of-law principles, the law of the state where the insurance contract was made (Louisiana) governs, permitting the direct action against the insurer.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a plaintiff's claim for uninsured motorist benefits under an insurance policy issued by the defendant, following an accident with a bucket truck, along with related claims for breach of contract and bad faith. The court had previously ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under Oklahoma's uninsured motorist statute, 36 Okla. Stat. § 3636, due to the lack of a causal connection between the injuries and the vehicle's use. After reviewing supplemental briefs, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on both claims, finding that the policy's coverage language was materially the same as the statute and did not provide broader protection. The court further determined that a legitimate dispute over coverage existed, so the insurer's denial of the claim was not unreasonable or in bad faith.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involves the United States moving to hold individual defendants in civil contempt for failing to file corporate income tax returns on behalf of corporate defendants, as required by a prior preliminary injunction order from April 2004 and an extension granted in June 2004. The court granted the contempt motion in part against defendants Louise Qualls and Eric Wolf with respect to TSI Installers and Erectors, Inc. and Titan Management, Inc., finding they had not shown a present inability to comply and had made no effort to file the returns despite having access to records and an accountant. For the remaining companies, the court held the contempt motion in abeyance pending further discovery, noting the defendants' late-raised claim that the companies had been sold in 2001 to Nations Personnel, Inc., which required additional evidence to assess its validity and the defendants' ongoing control. The court also deferred any ruling on whether the corporations had properly appeared by counsel.

taxescriminal lawprocedure

This case involves a group of Oklahoma peanut farmers suing Dow Agrosciences, the manufacturer of the herbicide Strongarm, for alleged crop damage, reduced yields, and ongoing soil harm after its use in 2000, asserting claims under Oklahoma law including negligence, breach of warranties, fraud, and strict liability. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that most claims were barred by 2 Okla. Stat. § 3-82(H) for failure to timely report damages, preempted by FIFRA's regulation of pesticide labeling, or otherwise deficient. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, ruling that Section 3-82(H) applies only to licensed pesticide applicators and not manufacturers, so it did not bar the claims. On the FIFRA issue, the court addressed preemption of claims related to product efficacy and phytotoxicity based on Tenth Circuit precedent interpreting the scope of federal labeling requirements.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

The State of Oklahoma, through its Tax Commission, sued the International Registration Plan, Inc. seeking a declaration that sanctions imposed by the Plan's Dispute Resolution Committee were improper and requesting a preliminary injunction to halt their enforcement. The case arose from disputes over Oklahoma's compliance with Plan rules on establishing a place of business for vehicle registration and use of estimated mileage for apportioning fees among participating states, which led the Committee to order other jurisdictions to withhold funds from Oklahoma in favor of Illinois. The court held a hearing and granted the preliminary injunction, concluding it was warranted based on the State's showing regarding the sanctions' imposition. The core reasoning centered on the procedural and substantive requirements under the Plan for resolving disputes and imposing sanctions, including questions of authority and compliance steps.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a diversity action for personal injuries from a 2000 traffic accident in Oklahoma involving an Oklahoma plaintiff and a Nebraska trucking corporation. The suit was filed in Nebraska federal court more than two years later and then transferred to Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The sole issue was whether Nebraska’s four-year or Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations governed the claim. Applying the transferor court’s law, the court held that Nebraska’s choice-of-law statute (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-215) bars use of a shorter foreign limitations period, so the four-year Nebraska statute controls.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved claims by plaintiffs against Morgan Keegan and other defendants for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Oklahoma Securities Act arising from the sale of certain Oklahoma municipal bonds. Morgan Keegan moved for a determination that only Tennessee law applied to the state securities claims, arguing Tennessee had the most significant relationship to the transactions. The court denied the motion, holding that multiple states' Blue Sky laws may apply to a single securities transaction without creating a conflict of laws issue, as each state has interests in protecting its residents and issuers. The opinion reasoned that the Oklahoma Securities Act's territorial provisions could reach the transactions if an offer originated from or was directed to Oklahoma, and it rejected the need for a traditional choice-of-law analysis. The court also addressed related summary judgment motions on the defendant's underwriter status but focused its written ruling on the applicable law question.

business & regulatoryprocedure