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Born 1932 · Clearwater, FL
Citizens Nat. Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-07-18 · cited 30×
The case concerned whether a bank could exercise a right of set-off against funds in a non-negotiable certificate of deposit that had been assigned as collateral for a bond purchase, after the assignee sought payment. The Florida Supreme Court answered certified questions from the Fifth Circuit by holding that the assignment was covered by Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code as a transaction creating a security interest in an instrument. It further concluded that the transfer was not excluded under sections 679.104(9) or (11), that section 679.318(4) did not invalidate contractual prohibitions on assignment, and that the bank was not an account debtor entitled to defenses under section 679.318(1). The court's reasoning rested on the statutory definitions and scope of Article 9, the intent to create a security interest, and the classification of the certificate of deposit as personal property subject to secured transaction rules rather than excluded deposit accounts or general intangibles. The opinion did not resolve whether the bank ultimately prevailed on its set-off claim outside Article 9.
business & regulatoryproperty
Roberts v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-07-18 · cited 2×
The case involved a university professor who showed the film 'Deep Throat' to his class and voluntarily surrendered the videotape to prosecutors during an investigation; the state then petitioned under Florida Statute section 847.011(7) to have the film confiscated and destroyed as obscene. The trial court upheld the statute and ordered destruction, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed. The court held that no valid 'seizure' occurred because the professor withdrew consent and no neutral magistrate made a preliminary finding of probable obscenity, as required by established Fourth Amendment standards for materials protected by the First Amendment. It further reasoned that the statute's destruction provision is ancillary and applies only after a judicial determination of criminal conduct under the statute's other subsections, which had not happened here.
criminal lawfree speechprocedure
City of Pensacola v. Owens
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-02-01 · cited 41×
The case concerned a malicious prosecution claim brought by Kiplan Owens against the City of Pensacola after police arrested him for obstructing an officer by placing "Speed Trap Ahead" signs, charges that a county judge later dismissed. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a certified question on whether the court or jury decides the existence of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action when the underlying facts are undisputed. The court held that the trial judge determines probable cause as a matter of law in such circumstances, quashed the First District's reversal, and directed affirmance of the trial court's directed verdict for the city, disapproving Oosterhoudt v. Montgomery Ward & Co. to the extent it assigned the issue to the jury.
criminal lawproceduretorts & liability
Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-01-18 · cited 14×
The case concerned whether Florida landowners could retain an agricultural tax assessment and classification for property that had been rezoned at their request from one non-agricultural category (R-1AA) to another (planned unit development), even though the actual use of the land remained agricultural. The trial court upheld denial of the classification under section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973). The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute applies only when land is rezoned from an agricultural use to a non-agricultural use, because the Greenbelt law's purpose is to encourage ongoing agricultural production and the provision targets speculative rezoning away from agriculture. The court construed the statute's language in favor of taxpayers where ambiguous and therefore did not reach the constitutional challenge to the law.
taxesproperty
ABA Industries, Inc. v. City of Pinellas Park
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-01-11 · cited 14×
The case concerned the constitutionality of Section 171.0413(5), Florida Statutes (1977), which set conditions for municipalities to annex contiguous unincorporated territory, specifically requiring consent from a majority of non-registered-elector landowners if the area was 'predominantly owned' by them. A.B.A. Industries, a corporate landowner in the proposed annexation area, sued the City of Pinellas Park to enjoin a referendum, arguing the city had not obtained the required consents. The trial court ruled the provision unconstitutionally vague and in violation of one-person-one-vote principles. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on vagueness grounds, holding that the statute failed to define key terms such as 'predominantly owned' (whether by number of owners or land area) or specify when consent must be obtained, leaving impermissible ambiguity that the judiciary could not resolve. The court did not reach the equal-protection claim.
propertyprocedure
Faulkner v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Supreme Court of Florida · 1979-01-04 · cited 21×
In Faulkner v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether an injured driver's failure to meet the no-fault insurance threshold under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act barred recovery for property damages, barred the spouse's derivative claim for loss of consortium, and precluded further litigation. The court held that the threshold requirement does not affect property damage claims, which remain available independently, but does bar loss of consortium claims because they are derivative and also ends further litigation on the personal injury matters. The decision reversed the lower courts because the trial court's jury instructions on the threshold and property damages were confusing and potentially misleading. The reasoning centered on the statute's text, which limits tort exemptions to bodily injury benefits under sections 627.736 and 627.737, and on prior precedent like Kluger v. White preserving constitutional access to courts for property damage remedies.
torts & liabilityproperty
State v. Barnett
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-12-21 · cited 15×
The case involved the State of Florida appealing the trial court's dismissal of informations charging defendants with bookmaking under Section 849.25(3), Florida Statutes (1975), on grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, the informations were facially insufficient, and speedy trial time had expired. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute is constitutional, determining that the term 'common bookmaking scheme' is sufficiently clear to require proof of a joint plan with three or more persons to take or receive wagers on contests of skill, speed, power, or endurance. The court further reasoned that the new informations adequately alleged the elements by specifying dates, location, and the nature of the wagers, and that the state need not name the other persons if their identities are unknown, as conviction can rest on direct or circumstantial evidence. It also addressed speedy trial by directing the trial court to apply the 90-day extension rule upon remand following the appellate proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
Kendry v. DIV. OF ADMIN., STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP.
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-12-07 · cited 10×
The case involved property owners whose land was subject to a state easement for widening a highway, with a restriction against raising the road's elevation; the state violated this by elevating the road five feet during expansion, leading to claims of inverse condemnation for loss of access, flooding, and riparian rights. After initial proceedings established a taking via the easement violation, the state initiated eminent domain, but the trial court denied severance damages beyond nominal amounts based on a stipulation, and the district court affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision, holding that owners may recover severance damages for harm to the remainder of their property caused by a partial taking, even when that taking stems from breaching an easement restriction. The core reasoning was that Article X, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution mandates full compensation for eminent domain takings, including damages under statute for the remainder when less than the whole parcel is taken, and the easement breach constituted such a taking without negating the right to those damages. Issues of water damage and riparian rights were deemed res judicata.
property
Martinez v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-11-16 · cited 24×
In Martinez v. State, the appellant was charged with multiple counts under Florida statutes prohibiting prostitution, lewdness, assignation, and practicing massage without a license; she moved to dismiss on vagueness grounds, pleaded nolo contendere while reserving appeal rights, and sought to challenge the denial of a requested jury instruction defining sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the facial validity of Sections 796.07 and 480.02(1) based on prior precedents such as State v. Bales, found the charging informations sufficient because they tracked the statutory language and adequately informed the defendant without risking double jeopardy, and held that a trial court's ruling on jury instructions cannot be appealed following a nolo contendere plea since such rulings involve mixed questions of law and fact dependent on evidence presented. The court therefore affirmed the judgments below.
criminal lawprocedure
Kimball v. Hawkins
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-11-02 · cited 7×
The case involved a motor carrier's application to the Florida Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide passenger transportation services to dog tracks and local tourist attractions in the Tampa Bay area. The hearing examiner recommended partial approval for local tours, but the Commission denied the application in full, finding insufficient proof of need, lack of applicant qualifications, and potential harm to existing carriers. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the carrier's petition for certiorari, holding that findings by a Commission-employed examiner are not entitled to the same weight under the Administrative Procedure Act as those from a Division of Administrative Hearings officer, and that Section 323.07 gives the Commission broad discretion not to be bound by such findings. The Court further ruled that Commission orders carry a presumption of correctness supported by competent substantial evidence, which the petitioner failed to overcome by providing the record.
business & regulatoryprocedure
MANATEE CTY. v. Town of Longboat Key
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-10-26 · cited 46×
This case concerned whether Article VIII, Section 1(h) of the Florida Constitution and its implementing statute, Section 125.01(6), Florida Statutes, restrict counties from using county-wide revenues to fund services benefiting only unincorporated areas, and whether municipalities may sue to enforce compliance. Several cities in Manatee County filed resolutions identifying such services and, after the county took no action, sued for relief including reimbursement and restructuring of financing. The trial court found imbalances in taxes and services and ordered payments plus creation of special taxing units. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that the constitutional limit applies only to property taxes, that municipalities may sue directly without joining individual taxpayers, and that courts may determine whether services qualify and direct counties to develop appropriate financing mechanisms under the statute but may not mandate specific methods or award past damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these limits on judicial remedies.
taxespropertyprocedure
State v. Thomas
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-09-21 · cited 28×
The case involved defendants convicted of possession of burglary tools under Florida Statute 810.06, where the trial court refused to instruct the jury on attempted possession of such tools. The Florida Supreme Court held that attempted possession of burglary tools is not a crime in the state, so no jury instruction on attempt was required. The court reasoned that the offense requires actual or constructive possession of the tools along with criminal intent or usage, meaning the attempt itself does not constitute a separate punishable act unlike contraband per se. It distinguished this from general rules on lesser-included offenses and jury pardons, quashed the district court's reversal, and reinstated the trial court's conviction.
criminal lawprocedure
Graham v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-09-14 · cited 23×
In Graham v. State, the appellant, a shrimp boat captain, was convicted under Section 370.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1974), for molesting stone crab traps belonging to others after traps and buoys were found in his nets during a fishing operation. The Supreme Court of Florida addressed multiple constitutional challenges to the statute, including vagueness regarding the term "molest" and overbreadth. The court upheld the statute's constitutionality when narrowed to willful or malicious conduct, finding the word's ordinary meaning sufficient to provide notice. However, it reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial because the jury instructions erroneously permitted liability based on ordinary negligence, which falls below the gross negligence standard required for criminal punishment.
criminal lawprocedure
Seaboard Coast Line RR Co. v. Swain
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-07-28 · cited 14×
This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit filed in Florida circuit court by a Georgia resident against a railroad company whose principal place of business was in Jacksonville, Florida, arising from a fatal accident at a railroad crossing in Georgia. The railroad moved to dismiss the action on grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that Georgia was a more convenient forum. The trial court denied the motion, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court's decision rested on established precedent holding that Florida courts may dismiss a case in favor of an out-of-state forum only when none of the parties are Florida residents; because the defendant railroad maintained its principal place of business in the state, dismissal was not permitted.
proceduretorts & liability
Rinker Materials Corp. v. PALMER FIRST NAT. BANK & TRUST CO.
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-07-20 · cited 51×
The case concerned whether subcontractors could use equitable estoppel to gain priority over a bank's recorded construction mortgage based on the bank's assurances that funds were sufficient and liens were unnecessary, without any showing of fraud or misrepresentation by the bank. The trial court applied estoppel to subordinate the mortgage, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that estoppel requires proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or affirmative deception. The Florida Supreme Court approved that reversal, reasoning that the essential elements of equitable estoppel include a false representation or concealment of material facts, and that prior Florida decisions consistently require such wrongdoing to impose an equitable lien overriding mortgage priority in construction loan disputes. The court overruled conflicting district court precedents that had allowed estoppel without proof of fraud.
propertyprocedure
In Re Estate of Burris
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-07-20 · cited 14×
This case concerned whether Florida's former statute requiring a written acknowledgment of paternity by the father was constitutional for allowing illegitimate children to inherit from their natural father in intestate succession. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statute violated equal protection under the state and federal constitutions, holding that the deceased's illegitimate children could share equally in the estate with his legitimate children. The decision was based on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Trimble v. Gordon, which invalidated a similar Illinois law, and emphasized that while states have an interest in preventing spurious claims, the statute's exclusive reliance on written acknowledgment created an impermissible barrier to equal protection.
family lawcivil rights
State v. Holmes
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-07-13 · cited 106×
The case concerned whether split sentences under Florida's sentencing statute, which combine a period of incarceration with a subsequent period of probation, could total more than the maximum term of imprisonment allowed for the underlying offense. Defendants convicted of third-degree felony breaking and entering received combined terms exceeding the five-year statutory maximum and challenged the sentences on appeal. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the combined periods of incarceration and probation at the time of original sentencing cannot exceed the maximum incarceration period provided by statute for the crime. The court reasoned that the statute must be strictly construed in favor of defendants, that no express statutory authority existed after 1974 to permit longer probation terms, and that exceeding the maximum would produce unacceptable results; it also clarified that upon probation revocation a judge may impose any sentence originally authorized minus prior jail time, without crediting time on probation. The decision approved the district court's modification of the sentences and overruled conflicting language from a prior case.
criminal lawprocedure
Century Village, Inc. v. WELLINGTON, ETC.
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-07-13 · cited 39×
This case involved condominium associations suing a developer to challenge the validity of recreational facility leases and rent escalation clauses, with the associations depositing disputed escalated rents into a court registry or escrow account under Section 711.63(4), Florida Statutes, during the litigation. The developer later contested the deposit procedure, leading the trial court to uphold the statute's constitutionality, its retroactive application to pre-existing leases, and its use by plaintiff associations. On review, the Florida Supreme Court considered issues of retroactivity, potential impairment of contractual rights under state and federal constitutions, and the statute's availability to suing parties. The court affirmed the trial court's orders in part and reversed in part, determining that the statute applies retroactively without impairing vested rights, while remanding for further proceedings and declining to address due process claims not raised below.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
The Florida Bar v. McCain
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-06-15 · cited 32×
The case was a Florida Bar disciplinary proceeding against former Supreme Court Justice David Lucius McCain for misconduct while serving on the bench. McCain was charged with attempting to influence a district court decision in a criminal appeal involving a union official who provided him political support, and with calling a county judge to seek favorable treatment on a continuance motion in an estate case handled by his campaign manager. The referee found McCain guilty on those two counts and recommended a public reprimand plus one-year suspension, but the Bar sought disbarment. The court adopted the referee's findings and conclusions but held that the gravity of the ethical breaches warranted disbarment instead.
criminal lawprocedure
Am Fi Inv. Corp. v. Kinney
Supreme Court of Florida · 1978-06-08 · cited 10×
The case involved special laws (Chapters 76-368 and 76-371) directing Escambia County to refund ad valorem taxes, plus penalties and interest, paid by leaseholders on Santa Rosa Island for 1972 through 1974. The trial court granted summary judgment holding the laws unconstitutional, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the acts created an indirect exemption from ad valorem taxes not authorized by the constitution and provided refunds of taxes lawfully paid, in violation of Article VII, Section 3 (on tax exemptions) and Article III, Section 11(a)(8) (barring special laws on refunds of legally paid money). It relied on prior decisions finding that the leasehold interests served no public purpose and that all private property must bear its share of the tax burden absent specific constitutional exceptions.
taxesproperty