Get above the noise
Log in for answers tailored to you — saved chats, your topics, and the full IJR suite.
Born 1923 · Baltimore, MD
Dunbar v. Orbital Sciences Corp. Group Disability Plan
District Court, D. Maryland · 2003-03-18 · cited 5×
In Dunbar v. Orbital Sciences Corp. Group Disability Plan, plaintiff Roscoe Dunbar sued his employer's disability plan and insurer Liberty Life under ERISA after his claims for short-term and long-term disability benefits were denied. Dunbar alleged total disability due to conditions including Hepatitis C, narcolepsy, and cognitive impairments that prevented him from performing his job as a scientist. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motion in part, and remanded the case to Liberty Life for further review of the claim, applying a modified abuse of discretion standard to the plan administrator's decision. The core reasoning was that the administrator failed to adequately consider all medical evidence, particularly reports on cognitive impairments, in denying the benefits.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Bailey v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland
District Court, D. Maryland · 2003-03-14 · cited 3×
In Bailey v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland, a Caucasian male police lieutenant over age 46 sued the county under Title VII and the ADEA, alleging he was denied a promotion to captain due to his race, sex, and age. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that the county's selection process, which ranked candidates objectively and promoted the highest-scoring applicant after interviews, was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons without evidence of pretext. The eligibility list was created using a scoring system that placed the plaintiff seventh, while the promoted candidate, an African-American female, ranked first, and no evidence showed improper consideration of race, sex, or age.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Gregory v. Otac, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2003-02-19 · cited 9×
In Gregory v. Otac, Inc., a disabled plaintiff who uses a walker sued the current and former owners of a Hardee’s restaurant under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Maryland negligence law after he fell while descending a curb in the parking lot instead of using an available ramp from a handicapped space. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the three ADA counts, concluding that the restaurant had provided compliant accessible parking and a continuous path of travel via the ramp, and that the plaintiff had been aware of but deliberately bypassed the ramp both entering and leaving the premises. The court dismissed the state-law negligence claim without prejudice, declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction once the federal claims were resolved on summary judgment before trial.
civil rightsproceduretorts & liability
Nazelrod v. GARRETT COUNTY SANITARY DISTRICT, INC.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2003-01-15 · cited 1×
The Nazelrods sued Garrett County Sanitary District, Inc. after water from municipal lines flooded their business properties, alleging inverse condemnation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), procedural and substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II and III), and several Maryland common-law claims including trespass and negligence (Counts IV-VII). The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the three federal counts, finding no evidence that the Sanitary District caused a compensable taking or violated due process rights, as leaks were either not from its lines or were promptly addressed without depriving plaintiffs of property or process. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and dismissed the remaining state-law counts without prejudice.
propertycivil rightsproceduretorts & liability
LaSalle Bank National Ass'n v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-12-09 · cited 18×
This case involved a dispute over a 1997 Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement in which Lehman Brothers sold a portfolio of commercial mortgages, including a $9 million loan secured by New Jersey industrial property with a history of environmental contamination, to First Union for securitization in a trust for which LaSalle Bank served as trustee. LaSalle sued Lehman for breach of contract, seeking specific performance and damages after discovering that Lehman had made false representations and warranties about the loan's environmental compliance and related documents. The court granted LaSalle's motion for summary judgment and denied Lehman's, holding that Lehman breached multiple warranties regarding the property's environmental status and failed to cure the breach or repurchase the loan as required by the agreement. The core reasoning focused on the plain language of the contract warranties, the inadequacy of prior environmental reports to disclose contamination risks, and Lehman's obligations to the trust and certificateholders, without addressing statute of limitations defenses on the facts presented.
business & regulatorypropertyenvironment
Mutual Ben. Group v. Wise M. Bolt Co., Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-10-16 · cited 9×
This case involves an insurance coverage dispute in which Mutual Benefit Group sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insureds, Wise M. Bolt Company and Stanley E. Bolt, against claims brought by homeowners for alleged faulty construction of a house. The Bolt parties moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the commercial general liability policy covered property damage caused by an occurrence under Maryland law, while Mutual Benefit cross-moved for summary judgment asserting exclusions applied. The court granted the Bolt parties' partial summary judgment motion, denied Mutual Benefit's motion, and ordered the insurer to provide a defense in the underlying state court action, reasoning that the duty to defend is triggered when any claims potentially fall within policy coverage for accidental property damage. It denied the motion to dismiss, stayed further proceedings on the duty to indemnify pending resolution of the state case, and deferred attorneys' fees issues.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Thomas v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-10-07 · cited 3×
The case involved plaintiff Lou Thomas, a former loan officer at Chase Manhattan Bank, who sought long-term disability benefits under his employer's ERISA-governed plan insured by defendant Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston after health issues including diabetes, heart disease, and vascular problems prevented him from working. Liberty Life initially approved benefits for the first 24 months but denied further coverage after an internal review and independent medical evaluation concluded Thomas could perform his occupation or similar work. Thomas filed suit asserting an ERISA claim for benefits after his state-law claims were dismissed. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, holding that the denial resulted from a deliberate, principled process based on substantial evidence including peer reviews and conflicting physician opinions, and was therefore reasonable and not an abuse of discretion under ERISA.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Sterling Acceptance Corp. v. Tommark, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-09-30 · cited 13×
This case involved a trademark dispute in which Sterling Acceptance Corporation, a Maryland company providing marine lending services, sued Tommark, Inc., a Massachusetts competitor doing business as Sterling Associates, for federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and Maryland common law unfair competition. Both parties used marks incorporating the word "Sterling" and advertised similar services nationally, including through websites. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, after considering discovery materials and holding a hearing. It concluded as a matter of law that the defendant's use of its mark was not likely to cause confusion among consumers of the parties' services, and that the plaintiff had not shown entitlement to damages or injunctive relief.
business & regulatory
Hanson Ex Rel. Hanson v. Smith
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-08-09 · cited 16×
The case involved parents of a child with learning disabilities suing the Anne Arundel County Board of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Rehabilitation Act, challenging an administrative decision that approved a change in the child's educational placement from a private special education school to a new public program known as the Learning Academy for the 2001-02 school year. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, affirming the administrative law judge's ruling that the proposed public placement was appropriate. The core reasoning was that evidence showed the Learning Academy could provide the necessary educational benefits, including appropriate mainstreaming opportunities, while complying with the IDEA's requirements for the least restrictive environment, and that the school board had properly considered the child's needs during the IEP development process.
civil rights
Colkitt v. Reliance Insurance (In Re EquiMed, Inc.)
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-08-01
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in the Chapter 7 proceeding of EquiMed, Inc., concerning escrow funds tied to a directors and officers liability insurance policy issued by Reliance Insurance. The district court reviewed whether those funds, deposited in connection with a coverage dispute and a related rescission action, should be transferred to Reliance's liquidator following the insurer's insolvency. The court affirmed the order in part, directing transfer of $100,000, but reversed in part as to the remaining $363,535.75, ruling that this amount should remain in escrow until a Pennsylvania state court determines the proper venue for adjudicating the appellants' claims against Reliance. The core reasoning focused on principles of comity, jurisdictional propriety, and the need to preserve the funds in the court best positioned to resolve the underlying coverage issues amid ongoing state proceedings.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Jordan v. Washington Mutual Bank
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-07-30 · cited 5×
The case involves homeowners Monica and Louis Jordan suing Washington Mutual Bank and First Horizon Home Loan Corporation over their mortgage loan, alleging improper early interest rate increases, unauthorized finder's fees, erroneous credit reporting damaging their credit, and related state and federal claims under statutes like the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Maryland commercial laws. Defendant First Horizon moved to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing Count VIII against First Horizon because plaintiffs could not rely on the relevant Maryland interest rate statute against that defendant, but denied dismissal of Count IX, finding the complaint's allegations of an agency relationship between First Horizon and the broker sufficient under notice pleading standards to state a claim for violation of the finder's fee statute. The court also rejected the joinder argument and ordered First Horizon to answer Count IX.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Jones v. Reichert Jung, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-07-26 · cited 1×
In Jones v. Reichert Jung, Inc., plaintiff Louvinia Jones sued the manufacturer of a Frigocut 2800 cryostat machine for personal injuries she allegedly sustained from operating it at Johns Hopkins Hospital, claiming breach of warranties of merchantability and fitness, and negligence in design and manufacture, including failure to warn. The court granted the defendant's motion to preclude the plaintiff's proposed expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The reasoning was that the plaintiff's experts were not qualified to testify that the machine was defective, and without such expert testimony, there was no evidence of defects or negligence to support the claims under Maryland law.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Harris v. Maryland House of Correction
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-07-19 · cited 8×
Veleta Harris, a former correctional officer at the Maryland House of Correction, sued her employer under Title VII and the ADEA, claiming her 1999 termination resulted from unlawful discrimination based on race, national origin, and age. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on collateral estoppel from prior state administrative and judicial rulings that upheld the termination solely for misconduct, such as attempting to pass a personal letter to an inmate and destroying evidence, which established a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the firing and precluded any finding of discriminatory animus.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Boyle
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-05-23 · cited 4×
The case involved the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the City of Takoma Park suing former police department employees Boyle and Pauley, along with companies MDT, Datalux, and IMCI, over alleged misuse of public positions to obtain personal commissions on technology procurement contracts for a police automation project funded partly by a federal grant. Plaintiffs asserted two federal RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d) plus nine state-law claims including fraud, breach of contract, and conversion. The court granted defendants' motions to dismiss, ruling that Counts I and II failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint did not adequately allege racketeering activity, an enterprise, or cognizable injury to the plaintiffs' business or property, and that the remaining state claims should be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) after the federal claims were eliminated.
criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Tecart Industries, Inc. v. National Graphics, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-05-15 · cited 3×
TecArt sued National Graphics for breach of contract and specific performance, alleging that a March 29, 2001 document was a binding agreement for TecArt to purchase National Graphics' Backlit Sign Division. After a bench trial on liability issues, the court determined that the document was only a letter of intent, not an enforceable contract, because it contemplated the later execution of a formal asset purchase agreement that was never completed and because the evidence showed the parties intended it merely to express future intentions. The court therefore entered judgment for National Graphics on both counts of the complaint.
business & regulatory
Chyu v. Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-04-30 · cited 1×
In this case, a Korean female part-time employee of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming she was discharged from her contract position due to her race and national origin after a supervisor interrupted her presentation on women's health issues to a group of seniors. The court converted the defendant's motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment after reviewing exhibits and found no opposition filed by the pro se plaintiff. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or show that the employer's stated legitimate reasons for termination—poor performance and misrepresenting herself as a doctor—were pretextual, with no evidence of discriminatory animus in the record.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure
Jamil v. White
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-03-28 · cited 3×
In Jamil v. White, a Pakistani and Asian-Pacific Islander employee of the U.S. Army sued the Secretary of the Army under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming he was denied a promotion to GS-13 positions based on his race and national origin after ranking seventh in a scored interview and resume process. The plaintiff, who had advanced degrees and prior GS-12 experience, alleged discriminatory intent, including by referencing other unsuccessful Asian-Pacific Islander applicants, but the court reviewed the selection panel's uniform questioning and averaged scoring system. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the employer articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for non-selection based on lower combined scores and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing those reasons were pretextual.
labor & employmentcivil rights
In Re USEC Securities Litigation
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-03-25 · cited 14×
This case is a consolidated securities class action brought by shareholders who purchased USEC common stock during the period surrounding its 1998 IPO, alleging violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 against the company, its officers, and the underwriters. The plaintiffs claimed that the registration statement and prospectus were materially false and misleading because they overstated the viability of USEC's core business model, particularly the development and commercial deployment of AVLIS enrichment technology, while downplaying known risks and uncertainties. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that the prospectus adequately disclosed the speculative nature of the AVLIS project and related risks under the bespeaks-caution doctrine and that the alleged misrepresentations were not actionable.
business & regulatory
In Re the Complaint of Salty Sons Sports Fishing, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-03-19 · cited 3×
This case involves vessel owners who filed a complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability under the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act for injuries sustained by a passenger in an explosion aboard their boat in 1999. The injured claimant and his spouse moved for summary judgment, arguing that the owners' filing was untimely because it came more than six months after written notices of the claim. The court denied the motion, holding that the notices were insufficient to start the statutory clock since they did not quantify damages in a way that would alert the owners that claims might exceed the vessel's value. The decision turned on the requirement under 46 U.S.C. App. § 185 that proper written notice of a potentially exceeding claim must precede the six-month filing deadline for the limitation action.
proceduretorts & liability
Lasalle Bank National Ass'n v. Lehman Bros. Holdings
District Court, D. Maryland · 2002-03-07 · cited 2×
This case involves LaSalle Bank, as trustee of a mortgage trust, suing Lehman Brothers Holdings for breach of a 1997 Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, claiming that Lehman violated representations and warranties concerning an environmentally contaminated property and a defaulting borrower, and seeking specific performance or damages. Lehman moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were time-barred under Maryland's three-year statute of limitations because the alleged breaches occurred when the contract was signed in November 1997. The court denied the motion without prejudice, holding that material factual disputes exist about when the claims accrued—particularly under the discovery rule or following notice and the contractual 90-day cure period—such that the limitations issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law before discovery.
business & regulatoryprocedure