This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in the Chapter 11 proceeding of Demay International, LLC, concerning a dispute between the debtor's largest secured creditor GSL and electrical contractor McCaffety over Proof of Claim 67. The bankruptcy court overruled GSL's objection and directed payment of $337,279 to McCaffety from escrow proceeds of the sale of the debtor's assets, based on McCaffety's asserted mechanic's and materialman's lien under Texas Property Code for electrical equipment installed in the debtor's leased premises. The district court affirmed, finding no error in the lower court's analysis. The core reasoning was that the installed electrical components qualified as "removables" or trade fixtures under Texas law that were subject to a valid mechanic's lien, which attached to the leasehold interest and survived transfer to the sale proceeds even after the lease was rejected in bankruptcy.
Harris County filed a state-court condemnation action seeking a perpetual easement for a public at-grade railroad crossing across Union Pacific's right-of-way as part of a road-extension project serving a proposed development. Union Pacific removed the case to federal court, asserting complete preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, and moved in the alternative to refer factual questions to the Surface Transportation Board; Harris County sought remand. The district court denied remand, holding that the ICCTA preempts the proceeding because the crossing would unreasonably burden or interfere with Union Pacific's use of the track as a train-staging area, distinguishing the facts from routine crossings that have been held not preempted. The court also denied the referral motion.
This case is a class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) alleging unlawful reduction of pension benefits by United Way of the Texas Gulf Coast and its cash balance plan. The court had previously entered final summary judgment for the plaintiffs on December 9, 2010. In this opinion, the court denies the defendants' Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment or for reconsideration or a new trial, finding that the motion rehashes prior arguments without showing manifest error of law or fact, newly discovered evidence, or other grounds for relief, and that the court stands by its earlier orders after review. The court also addresses the plaintiff's Rule 54 motion seeking common-fund attorneys' fees and costs for the full litigation period plus additional fees under ERISA § 502(g) for the period after April 22, 2008, and explains the applicable standards and documentation requirements for such awards.
The case concerns Omni USA's allegations that Parker-Hannifin improperly designed, manufactured, marketed, and serviced defective industrial oil seals used in agricultural irrigation gearboxes, leading to claims for breach of express and implied warranties, breach of contract, violations of the Texas DTPA, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and attorney's fees. Parker moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6), 8, and 9(b), or alternatively for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). The court outlined pleading standards requiring factual allegations to state plausible claims under Rule 8 and heightened particularity for fraud under Rule 9(b), which extends to DTPA claims, fraud by nondisclosure, and intertwined negligent misrepresentation claims based on the same facts.
The case involves a homeowner's lawsuit against his insurer, Nationwide, seeking full payment under a Texas homeowners' policy for extensive property damage caused by Hurricane Ike in 2008. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer's adjuster performed an inadequate inspection and undervalued the claim, leading to claims for violations of the Texas Insurance Code (unfair settlement practices and prompt payment requirements), common law fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court granted the defendant's renewed motion for partial dismissal under Federal Rules 8, 9(b), and 12(b)(6), finding that the amended complaint's allegations of misrepresentation, a pattern of undervaluation, and failure to conduct a reasonable investigation were vague, conclusory, and lacked specific factual support. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to plead with particularity any affirmative misrepresentations or facts showing the insurer's liability had become reasonably clear, and that a bona fide dispute over claim value does not support bad faith or fraud claims.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
The case involved SHS Investment's claims against Nationwide Mutual Insurance for breach of an insurance contract after nonpayment of benefits for property damage from Hurricane Ike, along with extra-contractual claims alleging unfair settlement practices, violations of the Texas Insurance Code and DTPA, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Nationwide moved for partial dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the original and amended complaints failed to meet federal pleading standards. The court reviewed the requirements of Rule 8(a) for plausible claims under Twombly and Iqbal, as well as the heightened particularity standard of Rule 9(b) that applies to fraud-based allegations in statutory claims like those under the Insurance Code and DTPA. It explained that conclusory statements and formulaic recitations of elements are insufficient, and that bad faith claims require factual allegations showing no reasonable basis for denial at the time of the decision, while noting that a bona fide coverage dispute alone does not constitute bad faith.