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United States v. Sawyer
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-05-25 · cited 4×
The case involved a defendant charged with possession and distribution of child pornography after an FBI agent downloaded files from his computer using a peer-to-peer program called GigaTribe. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from that download and a subsequent search warrant, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation because the agent accessed his shared files without a warrant. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the owner of another GigaTribe account had validly consented to the agent's use of that account, which had been granted access to the defendant's shared folder, providing effective third-party consent for the search.
criminal lawprocedure
Roche v. Hartz
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-03-07 · cited 3×
This case involves a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, where father Adrian Roche sought the return of his two children from the United States to Australia, claiming their mother Cynthia Hartz wrongfully removed them by extending a temporary visit. After a bench trial, the court denied the petition, finding that the children had become settled in their new environment in the US. The core reasoning centered on the children's acclimation to the United States over more than two years, including enrollment in school, medical services, and community activities, which outweighed any initial intent for a temporary stay, consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent focusing on the child's perspective rather than parental intentions.
family law
Turner v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-03-04 · cited 7×
This case is a putative class action brought by Ohio homeowners against the law firm Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, alleging that the firm violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Ohio consumer protection laws by filing mortgage foreclosure suits on behalf of clients who lacked standing, using unauthorized assignments of mortgages from MERS, and submitting false affidavits to courts. The plaintiffs described specific instances involving the named plaintiffs where foreclosure actions were dismissed for lack of standing. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), allowing certain FDCPA claims to proceed based on allegations of false representations and unfair debt collection practices while dismissing others.
business & regulatoryproperty
Kouns v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-01-19 · cited 2×
This ERISA case involves Pamella Kouns, who received long-term disability benefits from Hartford Life and Accident Insurance after a 2006 eye injury that caused double and blurred vision, preventing her from working as a customer sales representative. Hartford terminated the benefits in 2009 after an optometrist's report indicated her vision could be corrected and she could perform other jobs, but Kouns appealed with additional medical evidence from her physicians showing ongoing visual impairments. The court reviewed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record and the insurer's counterclaim, applying the policy's definition of disability that requires inability to engage in any qualified occupation. It granted Kouns's motion in full while granting in part and denying in part Hartford's motion, based on the medical documentation and the plan's terms.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Jewell Coke Co., Lp v. Arcelormittal USA, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-12-27 · cited 3×
In this contract dispute, ArcelorMittal USA filed a counterclaim against Jewell Coke alleging fraudulent inducement in connection with a guaranty agreement that ArcelorMittal USA entered to allow one of its subsidiaries to withdraw from a long-term coke supply contract with Jewell. The guaranty was executed in 2007 amid the sale of another facility, and ArcelorMittal USA claimed Jewell knew of but failed to disclose an error in the contract's pricing formula that resulted in overpayments. Jewell moved to dismiss the counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, holding that the counterclaim adequately alleged the elements of fraudulent inducement, including a duty to disclose the pricing mistake and resulting damages, in compliance with the heightened pleading standards of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
United States v. Ciccolini
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-11-11
The case involved Defendant Samuel R. Ciccolini, an ordained Catholic priest who directed a charity, who pled guilty to one count of structuring cash deposits to evade bank reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) and one count of filing a false income tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) after underreporting income by over $945,000 and owing $292,136 in taxes. The court issued a sentencing memorandum explaining its imposition of a term of imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a $200 special assessment. The core reasoning applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the offense conduct of evading reporting and tax laws, the defendant's history and characteristics such as his role in the charity and later repayment of embezzled funds, the need for deterrence and just punishment, and the guidelines range while rejecting certain enhancements like abuse of trust because the direct victim was the government.
criminal lawtaxes
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Crawford
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-10-29 · cited 4×
This case involves Columbia Gas Transmission seeking to condemn easements and leasehold rights on neighboring properties in Ohio to protect its natural gas storage field under the Natural Gas Act after obtaining a FERC certificate. The court granted partial summary judgment to Columbia Gas against the property owners, determining they had waived objections to the condemnation authority, but denied summary judgment against the corporate lessees operating production wells due to factual disputes over whether the company adequately attempted but failed to acquire the interests by contract as required by statute. The decision leaves only the issue of just compensation for trial where summary judgment was granted and focuses on the statutory prerequisites for eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act.
propertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
ArcelorMittal Cleveland, Inc. v. JEWELL COKE COMPANY, LP
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-09-21 · cited 9×
In this contract dispute, steel producers ArcelorMittal sued coke supplier Jewell Coke seeking reformation or rescission of a long-term supply agreement, alleging that a scrivener's error inverted the pricing multiplier in the formula linking Jewell coke prices to those under a related Haverhill agreement, causing over $100 million in claimed overpayments. The defendant moved to dismiss the mutual-mistake and unilateral-mistake claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court denied the motion, concluding that the complaint adequately pleaded the parties' contrary intent, that an illustration exchanged during negotiations supported the alleged mistake, and that statute-of-limitations and risk-allocation issues presented factual questions not resolvable on the pleadings.
business & regulatory
Girgis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-08-20 · cited 15×
The case involved Ohio plaintiffs suing mortgage originators and servicers Countrywide and Bank of America over loans secured by two Florida properties, alleging predatory practices such as improper late fees, force-placed insurance, and abusive collection tactics. Plaintiffs asserted claims under federal statutes including HOEPA, TILA, RESPA, FDCPA, and FCRA, plus Ohio-law claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and other torts. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing most claims because the complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations or failed heightened pleading requirements such as Rule 9(b), while allowing the RESPA Section 6, breach of contract, good-faith-and-fair-dealing, and civil-conspiracy counts to proceed on the basis of adequately pleaded facts.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Reaser v. United States
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-08-16 · cited 2×
In Reaser v. United States, plaintiffs sought a refund of a $261,398.25 cash bond they posted with the IRS to release federal tax liens on Ohio real estate that they claimed had been sold before the liens attached, along with damages for improper collection actions; the IRS had treated the parties as alter egos and the bond as payment of the underlying 1996-1997 tax liability. The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies under discharge procedures and lack of standing. The court denied dismissal of the refund claim, holding that the IRS's use of a release form (Form 668(Z)) rather than a discharge meant the plaintiffs only needed to follow the broader refund claim rules in §§ 6325(a), 7422(a), 6511(a), and 6532(a)(1), which they satisfied. It granted dismissal of the damages claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 for failure to meet the specific administrative claim requirements and denied the standing challenge because the IRS's alter-ego treatment gave all plaintiffs a redressable injury.
taxesprocedure
Lininger v. Welch
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-06-24
The case involves Raymond Todd Lininger’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 26-year Ohio state prison sentence for convictions on kidnapping, robbery, and assault charges. The court decided to deny the petition after the magistrate judge recommended denial. Lininger contended that resentencing him under the Ohio Supreme Court’s intervening decision in State v. Foster—which removed requirements for judicial findings to impose greater-than-minimum or consecutive sentences—violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses when applied retroactively. The court reasoned that Foster did not change the statutory sentencing range, so Lininger had fair warning of the potential penalties, and that ex post facto restrictions apply primarily to legislative rather than judicial actions.
criminal lawprocedure
Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. v. Jones
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-04-29
This case involved a counterclaim defendant, Morgan & Pottinger, seeking to appeal a district court's order remanding a case removed under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) back to state court. The court denied the motion to certify an interlocutory appeal, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) generally bars review of remand orders and that CAFA's provision in § 1453(c)(1) permits direct appeal to the court of appeals without district court certification. The court also denied a stay of the remand pending appeal after finding that none of the four relevant factors—likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, harm to other parties, or public interest—supported granting one, citing the statute's expedited review timeline and precedent interpreting CAFA's removal rules. The decision rested on the plain language of the removal statutes and uniform case law holding that counterclaim defendants cannot remove under CAFA.
procedure
MOONSCOOP SAS v. American Greetings Corp.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-04-27 · cited 1×
This breach of contract case centered on agreements for the sale of intellectual property rights to the Strawberry Shortcake and Care Bears characters among MoonScoop SAS, American Greetings Corp., and Cookie Jar Entertainment, Inc. MoonScoop alleged that American Greetings failed to transfer the rights as required and sought to enforce related obligations, while American Greetings contended that MoonScoop had not closed the transaction by the contractual deadline of June 7, 2009; Cookie Jar raised cross-claims of interference with its own rights to the properties. The court granted American Greetings summary judgment against MoonScoop, granted MoonScoop summary judgment against Cookie Jar, and granted in part and denied in part MoonScoop's motion against American Greetings, reasoning from the specific closing deadlines, matching rights provisions, and indemnification clauses in the 2008 Letter Agreement, MoonScoop Term Sheet, and related documents.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability
Snap-On Business Solutions Inc. v. O'Neil & Associates, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-04-16 · cited 12×
In this case, Snap-on Business Solutions sued competitor O'Neil & Associates for computer trespass under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and copyright infringement, alleging that O'Neil unlawfully accessed Snap-on's servers in 2009 and copied a searchable parts database that Snap-on had created for client Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift using Mitsubishi's raw data and Snap-on's proprietary linking and organization methods. O'Neil moved for summary judgment, contending that Mitsubishi owned the underlying data, had authorized access under prior license and hosting agreements, and that the copied material did not qualify for copyright protection. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that contractual provisions on data ownership and authorized access defeated some claims while genuine factual disputes remained on others, including the originality of Snap-on's compilation and the scope of any exceeded authorization.
criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryproperty
Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. v. Jones
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-03-29 · cited 4×
In this case, Capital One Bank sued Karen Jones in state court for unpaid credit card debt, after which Jones filed a class action counterclaim against both Capital One and its law firm Morgan & Pottinger alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and state law for attempting to collect time-barred consumer debts. Morgan & Pottinger removed the action to federal court, relying on the Class Action Fairness Act and the general removal statute. The court granted Jones's motion to remand to state court, reasoning that neither statute permits removal by a counterclaim defendant who was not an original plaintiff because the term "defendant" must be read narrowly under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent to refer only to parties against whom the original complaint asserted claims.
procedurefederal power
American General Financial Services v. Griffin
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-02-17 · cited 3×
In this case, a financial services company filed a state court collection action against a borrower seeking repayment on loans, and the borrower responded with a class action counterclaim alleging failures to refund unearned credit insurance premiums, resulting in usury and Truth in Lending Act violations. Newly added corporate defendants removed the matter to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, claiming minimal diversity, over 100 class members, and more than $5 million in controversy. The court granted the borrower's motion to remand, concluding that counterclaim defendants and third-party defendants lack authority to remove under either the general removal statute or CAFA's provisions. The decision rested on strict construction of removal jurisdiction and precedents holding that only original defendants may initiate removal.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Goodell v. Williams
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-01-20 · cited 1×
In Goodell v. Williams, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging an Ohio trial court's imposition of a longer aggregate prison sentence after remand from a successful appeal of his original convictions for rape, aggravated burglary, and felonious assault. The district court declined to adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation and conditionally granted the petition, finding that the presumption of vindictiveness from North Carolina v. Pearce applied to the resentencing even though a different judge presided. The court reasoned that clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires this presumption when a harsher sentence is imposed without new facts or information not presented at the original sentencing, and the state had not rebutted it.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Frisby v. Keith D. Weiner & Associates Co., LPA
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-11-17 · cited 22×
In this case, former employee Kelly Frisby sued her employer, a law firm, and related defendants for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Ohio wage laws, along with claims for inadequate record-keeping and unpaid wages; the employer filed a counterclaim seeking repayment on a promissory note. The defendants moved to strike an allegation about one defendant's wife and to dismiss the record-keeping counts, while the plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion to strike, granted in part the motion to dismiss by eliminating the record-keeping counts because neither federal nor Ohio law creates a private right of action for such violations, and denied the motion to dismiss the counterclaim after concluding that the claim formed part of the same case or controversy as the wage claims and that supplemental jurisdiction was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
labor & employment
Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-06-01 · cited 6×
This case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit brought by Jose and Carmen Rodriguez, operators of an auto body and towing business, and Karen Palmer, the seller of the business assets, against the City of Cleveland and several police officers. The claims arose from a July 2006 warrantless police inspection at the business premises prompted by an anonymous tip about a stolen dump truck, leading to Rodriguez's arrest for receiving stolen property and criminal tools, seizure of vehicles and equipment, and subsequent criminal proceedings. The court granted partial summary judgment to the Rodriguez plaintiffs on certain claims, denied Palmer's motion for partial summary judgment, and granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on Palmer's Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim, her malicious prosecution and illegal attachment claims, and several of the Rodriguez plaintiffs' state-law claims including malicious conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and loss of consortium. The core reasoning centered on the sufficiency of probable cause from the anonymous informant, the validity of the warrantless inspection under city ordinances, qualified immunity for officers, and the plaintiffs' property interests and standing to challenge the seizures and prosecutions.
civil rightscriminal lawprocedureproperty
Cleveland Housing Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-03-26 · cited 2×
Cleveland Housing Renewal Project sued Deutsche Bank entities and the City of Cleveland in state court, alleging that 25 vacant foreclosed properties owned by the banks constituted a public nuisance under Ohio Revised Code section 3767.41 and common-law nuisance principles, seeking declarations, abatement orders, and injunctions against transfers. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. The court determined that CHRP had Article III and prudential standing, that diversity jurisdiction existed because the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 and the City of Cleveland did not require realignment as a plaintiff, and that the amount-in-controversy requirement could be satisfied from either party's viewpoint. Nevertheless, the court held that Burford abstention was warranted due to the case's involvement in important matters of local public concern and Ohio's expressed preference for specialized state housing courts, leading to remand to state court.
propertyproceduretorts & liability