The case concerned royalty payments owed to F.B.T. Productions under recording agreements with Aftermath Records for Eminem's master recordings, specifically whether permanent digital downloads and mastertones should be compensated at the lower rate for "records sold" or the higher 50% of net receipts rate for "masters licensed" to third parties. Plaintiffs sought summary judgment applying the higher rate across the board, while defendants argued most distributions qualified as records sold and moved for partial summary judgment on contract interpretation issues. The court denied plaintiffs' motion in full and granted defendants' motion in part, holding that certain albums constituted side projects subject to the masters licensed provision, that "net receipts" means gross licensing revenue minus mechanical royalties and distribution fees, and that new medium and container charge deductions do not apply to the licensed masters clause. Core reasoning rested on the plain language of the 1998, 2003, and related agreements defining records versus licensed masters and specifying allowable deductions.
The case concerns a consolidated CERCLA and RCRA action filed by the City of Rialto against Whittaker Corporation and others alleging perchlorate and TCE contamination of groundwater and soil stemming from historical military, fireworks, and explosives activities at the former Rialto Ammunition Storage Point. Whittaker moved for partial summary judgment on Rialto’s RCRA claim for injunctive relief, arguing that the EPA was already diligently prosecuting related actions, that any court-ordered relief would be duplicative of existing orders, and that Rialto’s RCRA notice was inadequate or rendered stale by delay. The court denied the motion, holding that Whittaker had not carried its burden to demonstrate EPA diligence as to the relevant western plume, that RCRA authorizes broader injunctive relief than existing administrative measures, and that the 2003 notice remained valid with no lack of diligence or prejudice supporting a laches defense.
This case involves eight homeless individuals living in Los Angeles's Skid Row who sued the City, claiming that LAPD and other officials seized and immediately destroyed their personal property left temporarily unattended in public spaces, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state law provisions on property and due process. After previously issuing a temporary restraining order, the district court grants plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court concludes that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because the property was not abandoned, the seizures were unreasonable, and no pre-deprivation notice or hearing was provided; it further finds irreparable harm, that the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiffs' favor, and that the public interest supports injunctive relief.
This case is a shareholder derivative action by Bidz.com shareholders against the company and its directors and officers, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, insider selling, waste, and unjust enrichment based on the board's alleged failure to oversee or stop practices including shill bidding, inflated appraisals, inaccurate product descriptions, and sales of counterfeit items, which led to misleading statements and a stock price drop after public reports. The court granted the nominal defendant's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1, rendering the individual defendants' motion moot. The core reasoning was that plaintiffs neither made a pre-suit demand on the board nor pleaded particularized facts showing demand futility, as general allegations of board knowledge, audit committee membership, or bad faith were insufficient to overcome the presumption that directors acted faithfully.
In this bankruptcy appeal, debtor Kang Jin Hwang defaulted on a mortgage note secured by real property and filed a Chapter 7 petition that triggered an automatic stay blocking foreclosure. IndyMac Bank, which held the note and had been assigned the deed of trust, moved for relief from the stay to proceed against the property; after the FDIC later substituted in, the bankruptcy court denied the motion. It ruled that IndyMac was not the real party in interest under Rule 17 and that the note's unidentified owner had to be joined under Rule 19. The district court reversed, concluding that IndyMac, as the note's physical holder entitled to enforce it under California law, was the real party in interest and that the owner was not a necessary party under Rule 19 because its interests would not be impaired by its absence from the motion. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the motion.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Brian McGee, who was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder and attempted murder and sentenced to life without parole. The petition claimed that the prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky and related state law by using peremptory challenges to exclude African-American prospective jurors on the basis of race. After reviewing the state court record de novo under AEDPA standards, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings that the prosecutor's stated reasons for the strikes were pretextual and inconsistent with the treatment of similarly situated non-African-American jurors. The court therefore granted the petition and ordered the state to release McGee unless it grants him a new trial within 120 days.
