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Giroir v. Mbank Dallas, N.A.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1987-11-25 · cited 10×
The case involved plaintiff C.J. Giroir, Jr., who obtained an irrevocable letter of credit and executed a promissory note to MBank Dallas, pledging collateral including Worthen Bank stock; FirstSouth assumed Giroir's obligations under an agreement that also pledged its assets as security, but after FirstSouth's insolvency, the FSLIC as receiver repudiated a related commitment, leading MBank to pay on the letter of credit and later transfer the note and collateral to the FSLIC. Giroir sued MBank for breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the transfer of collateral was improper because the debt had been discharged and the collateral should have been returned to him. The court denied MBank's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and improper venue, holding that the claims arose under the letter of credit and security agreements subject to enforceable choice-of-forum clauses designating Texas courts, and therefore transferred the case to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.
business & regulatoryprocedureproperty
Hall v. Lowery
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1982-08-25 · cited 2×
In Hall v. Lowery, former employees Patricia Ann Hall and Regina Kaye James sued Robert Lynn Lowery and Richard B. Adkisson of the Arkansas Judicial Department, alleging violations of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming their termination as Data Auditors II was due to their sex or lack of political ties to the Chief Justice. The court, after a bench trial, dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the discharges were motivated by sex discrimination or political affiliation. The reasoning centered on the lack of substantial evidence linking the decisions to discriminatory motives, with the Executive Secretary handling personnel matters independently and the Chief Justice having minimal involvement, while performance and operational needs explained the staffing changes.
civil rightslabor & employment
Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1981-11-25 · cited 6×
This case concerns an award of attorneys' fees following a finding that Westinghouse Electric Corp. violated Title VII by disqualifying plaintiff Christine Vaughn from a sealex operator position in part due to her race. The court determined that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to compensation for services rendered before the initial judgment, on appeal, and in opposing certiorari, rejecting the defendant's timeliness objections because the judgment was vacated and remanded. The court calculated reasonable fees based on hours worked and prevailing rates, while also addressing ongoing back pay entitlements until reinstatement, emphasizing that the results achieved advance important public policies under Title VII despite the modest monetary recovery for the plaintiff.
civil rightslabor & employment
Hansen v. Harris
District Court, W.D. Arkansas · 1981-02-17 · cited 7×
This case concerns Ruth Hansen's lawsuit under the Social Security Act seeking judicial review of the Secretary's denial of a waiver of recoupment for overpayments of child's insurance benefits made to her daughter Norma Jean after she turned 18 and stopped being a full-time student. The overpayments totaled $1,758.40, and the Secretary sought to recover them by deducting $48 per month from benefits payable to Hansen on behalf of her other minor daughter. Although Hansen was found without fault, the agency determined that recoupment would not defeat the purpose of Title II because it would not deprive her of income needed for ordinary living expenses. After reviewing the record of Hansen's income, health issues, expenses, and limited assets, the court concluded that the evidence showed she needed substantially all her benefits for necessities and reversed the Appeals Council decision with directions to grant the waiver.
healthcareprocedurefederal power
Newton v. Kroger Co.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1980-10-29 · cited 8×
This case involved a motion by defendant Kroger Company to dismiss a cross-claim filed by co-defendant Retail Clerks Union in an underlying employment discrimination lawsuit brought by plaintiff Newton under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, alleging racial discrimination in employment practices. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that it had ancillary jurisdiction over the cross-claim arising from the same circumstances as the original action, that the union had standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of its members but not damages, and that the union's allegations of race discrimination (limited to the Pine Bluff area and plaintiff's EEOC charge) were sufficient to state a claim under § 1981. The court dismissed any sex discrimination claims in the cross-claim as beyond the scope of the original EEOC charge and granted the union leave to amend its answer to properly assert the cross-claim. Core reasoning centered on precedents regarding standing for organizations, the scope of EEOC charges, pleading standards, and the requirements for proving discriminatory intent under § 1981.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Taylor v. Jones
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1980-08-08 · cited 16×
Taylor v. Jones concerns claims of racial discrimination in employment decisions within the Arkansas National Guard, specifically whether the plaintiff's non-renewal from her recruiter position was racially motivated. Following a partial new trial, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the discrimination issues and appropriate equitable relief. The court determined that racial harassment and prejudice had been pervasive in the Guard, that the plaintiff was the prevailing party entitled to counsel fees, and that affirmative relief would be included in a final decree. The opinion also addressed the hybrid state-federal nature of the National Guard and interim injunctive relief pending appeal. Core reasoning relied on evidence of long-continued discriminatory practices and the need for corrective measures under applicable federal regulations.
civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power
Phifer v. Union Carbide Corp.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1980-07-07 · cited 10×
Walter Phifer sued his former employer Union Carbide Corporation and several of its officers, as well as the plant's architects, for injuries he allegedly suffered from daily exposure to toxic chemicals including carbon disulfide, sulfuric acid, and hydrogen sulfide while working as a plant chemist. He claimed the defendants intentionally and negligently failed to warn him of the dangers, provide protective equipment, or ensure adequate ventilation. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against Union Carbide and its officers for failure to state a claim, holding that Arkansas workers' compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's allegations, even if true, did not demonstrate the specific, deliberate intent to injure needed to fall within the narrow exception to the exclusivity rule, citing Griffin v. George’s, Inc. as controlling precedent.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure
Taylor v. Jones
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1980-05-08 · cited 6×
In Taylor v. Jones, a black former employee of the Arkansas National Guard brought an individual Title VII action alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race, claiming she was transferred from a recruiter position to the mail room and effectively forced to resign due to a discriminatory work environment. The court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case through evidence of the department's prior history of racial discrimination, stark statistical underrepresentation of black employees (about 2% versus 16%+ in the population), their confinement to lower-level jobs, and a pervasive atmosphere of racial slurs and hostility that the employer failed to address. No nondiscriminatory explanation was provided for the transfer, leading the court to conclude the plaintiff was constructively discharged because of her race. The court therefore granted injunctive relief with limited modifications to accommodate national defense needs and allow certain hiring patterns. The case was treated as an individual action rather than a class action, with jurisdiction based on federal civil rights statutes.
civil rightslabor & employment
Campbell v. Ramsay
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1980-02-13 · cited 9×
Caroline S. Campbell, a mathematics instructor at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, sued the university under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her non-reappointment resulted from sex discrimination. The university explained the decision as based solely on her lack of a Ph.D., part of a department-wide effort to require terminal degrees for all faculty to improve academic standards. Although Campbell established a prima facie case of disparate treatment through evidence of hiring patterns, salary disparities, and a remark by the department head, the court found the university articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and that she did not prove it was pretextual. The court therefore dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the Ph.D. requirement was applied consistently and without discriminatory motive.
civil rightslabor & employment
Stanhope v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Inc.
District Court, W.D. Arkansas · 1980-01-29 · cited 11×
This case involved a plaintiff who sued Ford Motor Credit in Arkansas state court for damages after his pickup truck was repossessed, alleging improper seizure by Ford's agent. Ford removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, then asserted that an independent contractor, Thornton & Associates, had performed the repossession. The plaintiff amended the complaint to add Thornton as a defendant, which destroyed complete diversity since both the plaintiff and Thornton were Arkansas citizens. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under the complete diversity requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and remanded the case to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that the plaintiff's addition of Thornton was not an attempt to defeat jurisdiction and that remand was more efficient than dismissal.
procedurefederal power
Barham v. Welch
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-11-08 · cited 4×
This case involved Dr. Jim Barham, former superintendent of a school district, who sued board members for reinstatement, back pay, and damages after his discharge, primarily alleging violations of his First Amendment rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with a state contract claim. The court dismissed the First Amendment claim as a matter of law and noted the contract claim was abandoned, but held that the discharge deprived Barham of property without due process because two board members had prejudged the matter and would not have changed their decision based on any evidence presented at the hearing. Reinstatement was denied due to the contract's expiration, but back pay was awarded as equitable relief, and after a jury mistrial on other damages claims, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, reaffirmed the due process violation, and granted Barham back pay, attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. The core reasoning rested on the board members' testimony indicating actual bias, which rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair under due process standards requiring an impartial tribunal.
civil rightsprocedure
Taylor v. Teletype Corp.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-11-02 · cited 6×
This case involved claims by black employees against Teletype Corporation for racial discrimination in demotions and layoffs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After prior findings of discrimination, the court addressed remedies including injunctive relief and individual awards. It ordered a permanent injunction barring the company from any future racial discrimination in employment terms and conditions. The court reinstated plaintiff Tommie Taylor to a 910-level public relations position with back pay and benefits, reasoning that such relief was required to make victims whole following proven unlawful demotions, while declining more specific criteria for future demotions due to lack of ongoing impact and respect for union agreements. It also established a claims process for other black employees demoted between February 1974 and December 1976.
civil rightslabor & employment
Rogers v. Britton
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-09-27 · cited 13×
This habeas corpus case involves a challenge to a life imprisonment sentence imposed after a jury convicted the petitioner of first-degree rape. The court had previously upheld the conviction but deferred on the sentence's constitutionality under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pending state court review. After the Arkansas Supreme Court denied relief, the federal district court addressed the issue and held that the lack of any standards or guidelines for the jury's sentencing discretion violated due process, particularly given the facts of the case including the petitioner's age, lack of prior record, and absence of permanent harm to the victim beyond the rape itself. The court granted relief by vacating the sentence while allowing the state to retry the punishment phase within 90 days under constitutional procedures.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Thompson v. Harris
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-09-21 · cited 3×
In Thompson v. Harris, the plaintiff sought review of the denial of her third application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging inability to work due to conditions including loss of one kidney, arthritis, and related pain and symptoms. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's final decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court denied both motions and remanded the case to the Secretary, holding that the Administrative Law Judge's analysis was deficient because it rejected the claim based solely on the lack of objective medical proof of disabling severity without adequately considering the plaintiff's subjective pain and symptoms. The court explained that precedent requires full evaluation of both objective and subjective evidence to permit proper judicial review of the administrative findings.
healthcarefederal powerprocedure
Taylor v. Teletype Corp.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-08-29 · cited 8×
This Title VII case concerned claims by black employees at Teletype Corporation's Little Rock plant that they were demoted on the basis of race. Building on findings from the related Hoard litigation that established a history of discriminatory hiring and promotion practices through at least the early 1970s, the court certified a class of black employees demoted since February 1974 and addressed 16 individual claims of discriminatory demotion. The court evaluated evidence of ongoing racial bias in employment decisions, the company's affirmative action efforts, and the specific circumstances of each demotion, including reductions in force and compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. It concluded that some demotions violated Title VII while others did not, and it directed further briefing on remedies such as reinstatement and back pay.
civil rightslabor & employment
Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-06-12 · cited 6×
This case involved claims by three black employees against Westinghouse Electric Corporation for racial discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, after class certification was denied and union claims were settled. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and found that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case through statistical evidence of underrepresentation of black workers in supervisory roles, slow integration after the Act's effective date, and hiring patterns that depressed black hires relative to applicant pools. After trial, the court dismissed the claims of former employees Marion Gee and Glenda Crutcher with prejudice but awarded current employee Christine Vaughn backpay plus the right to bid on a sealex machine operator position and enjoined the company from future race-based discrimination in hiring, discharge, or job assignments.
civil rightslabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Strayhorn v. Califano
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-06-06 · cited 4×
This case involves a claim for social security disability benefits by Kermit Strayhorn, who alleged inability to work due to a 1975 back injury with associated pain and possible mental health components noted in medical reports. The district court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's motion to remand for additional administrative proceedings. The court reasoned that the administrative law judge failed to consider evidence of a possible mental or psychosomatic impairment, either alone or combined with physical issues, and did not develop a complete record by ordering a psychiatric examination, especially since the claimant appeared without counsel.
healthcareprocedure
Toddy v. Arkansas Valley Dredging Co.
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-05-23 · cited 5×
This case involved a Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claim by plaintiff Willie Toddy, a welder employed by Arkansas Valley Dredging Co. on dredging vessels, who was injured when he slipped and fell while boarding a skiff from a steep, muddy riverbank. The court found the defendant liable on both theories because it failed to provide any safe means of ingress or egress to the vessel, such as steps, a handrail, or boarding equipment, creating a foreseeable risk of exactly the kind of fall that occurred; the vessel was therefore unseaworthy and the employer negligent. The court rejected the defense of contributory negligence, finding that Toddy's method of lowering himself into the boat was reasonable given the conditions created by the employer. It awarded damages after determining that the 1974 fall caused a permanent impairment, calculating lost earnings based on a 30% reduction in earning capacity plus $10,000 for pain and suffering and $15,000 for permanent physical impairment.
torts & liabilitylabor & employment
Money v. Califano
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-05-11 · cited 3×
This case involves a challenge to a Social Security Administration decision on disability benefits for plaintiff Billy Money, who suffered a work-related back injury in 1975 leading to ongoing pain, mobility issues, and an inability to perform prior maintenance work. The Secretary determined Money was disabled only from February 15, 1976, to May 17, 1977, based primarily on one physician's report indicating the end of temporary disability and a 25% permanent impairment. The court reversed that portion of the decision, holding it was not supported by substantial evidence when the full record was considered, including multiple medical opinions on pain and limitations, the plaintiff's and his wife's testimony about constant pain and daily functioning, and the vocational expert's assessment that severe restrictions would preclude even light or sedentary jobs.
federal powerhealthcare
Schales v. United States
District Court, E.D. Arkansas · 1979-04-25 · cited 2×
This case was a wrongful-death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by the administratrix of Jacob Schales's estate against the United States for alleged negligence by employees at the VA Hospital in Little Rock. The plaintiff claimed that doctors failed to adequately evaluate and treat Schales's symptoms of possible myocardial infarction, including by not repeating an EKG or enzyme tests and not consulting a cardiologist before discharging him on December 24, 1975. The court found the United States liable after a bench trial, concluding that these omissions breached the standard of medical care in the community and were the proximate cause of Schales's death from an acute heart attack on December 27. Damages were awarded in the amount of $78,475.05 after offsets for funeral expenses and other items.
torts & liabilityhealthcare