Richard Allen Griffin

In Elizabeth Ferguson v. MetLife Investors USA Insurance Company, the dispute centered on Brighthouse Life Insurance Company’s rescission of a $1 million life insurance policy it had issued to Ewanda Ferguson after discovering material misrepresentations in her 2020 reinstatement application about her driving record, including two operating-while-impaired convictions and a license revocation. Brighthouse denied the death benefit to the named beneficiary, Ewanda’s daughter Elizabeth Ferguson, who then sued for breach of contract and argued she was an innocent third party entitled to equitable balancing under Michigan law before rescission. The district court granted summary judgment to Brighthouse, ordering rescission, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Michigan’s third-party beneficiary statute gives Ferguson the same rights and limitations as the original insured, so she stood in Ewanda’s shoes with no right to equitable balancing; the policy’s terms expressly allowed rescission for material misrepresentations, and the distinct “innocent third party” balancing rule from auto-insurance cases did not apply.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Steven Tilden Fellmy, police stopped the defendant's silver Mustang after receiving an anonymous tip about drug trafficking and observing traffic violations, then used a drug-sniffing dog named Tyra to examine the vehicle after Fellmy refused consent to a search. Tyra jumped onto the car door and alerted to drugs through an open window, leading officers to discover methamphetamine and heroin inside. The district court denied Fellmy's motion to suppress the evidence, and a jury convicted him of methamphetamine trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the traffic stop was justified, officers could lawfully order Fellmy out of the car, and the dog sniff did not constitute an unreasonable search because officers did not encourage or facilitate the dog's contact with the vehicle. The court rejected the argument that the dog's paws on the door or nose through the window transformed the open-air sniff into an unlawful trespass requiring probable cause.

criminal law

T.E. sued Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield after the insurer initially covered but then denied further payment for his minor son's long-term residential mental-health treatment at Elevations, asserting the treatment was no longer medically necessary under the plan's MCG guidelines. The district court granted summary judgment to Anthem on both the ERISA claim that the denial was arbitrary and capricious and the claim that the denial violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. The Sixth Circuit held that Anthem's coverage decision was arbitrary and capricious under ERISA because the record showed the insurer failed to properly apply its own continued-stay criteria to C.E.'s documented symptoms and treatment needs. On the Parity Act claim, however, the court found T.E. offered no evidence comparing Anthem's application of treatment limitations for mental-health care versus medical or surgical care, so that claim failed as a matter of law. The court therefore affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions for Anthem to reassess the coverage request.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned HRT Enterprises’ claim that the City of Detroit effected a de facto taking of its industrial property near Coleman A. Young Airport by failing to acquire it or mitigate conditions that rendered the land unusable after 2008, following earlier state-court litigation in which a jury rejected HRT’s inverse-condemnation claim. The district court held that res judicata did not bar the federal suit, ruled as a matter of law that a taking had occurred, and, after two jury trials on damages, entered judgment for HRT in the amount of approximately $1.97 million. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the federal action was ripe, that the prior state-court judgments did not preclude the claim because they rested on different facts and on the since-overruled Williamson County exhaustion requirement, and that the City’s conduct constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.

propertyprocedure

In HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit, HRT prevailed on a federal takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after years of state-court and bankruptcy proceedings, and then sought attorney fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court awarded fees but ruled it lacked discretion to compensate work performed in the related state-court and bankruptcy matters and also granted expert witness fees. On cross-appeals, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by treating fees from those separate proceedings as categorically unavailable and by awarding expert fees under § 1988(c), which by its plain terms applies only to actions enforcing §§ 1981 or 1981a, not § 1983. The court therefore vacated the fee award and remanded for recalculation consistent with its interpretation of the statute.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

In United States v. Neal Harris, Kelly and Neal Harris were convicted by a jury of multiple counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 after submitting numerous fraudulent applications to the federal COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan program administered by the SBA, through which they obtained over $300,000 for purported businesses that had little or no actual revenue, employees, or operations. On appeal, the Harrises challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions, the procedural and substantive reasonableness of their sentences, and Kelly additionally raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial evidence—including the submission of false information about revenues, employee counts, and industry sectors to secure approvals—permitted a rational jury to find the defendants knowingly made material misrepresentations. The court also upheld the sentences as reasonable, concluding that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion, and rejected the ineffective-assistance claim as unsupported by the record and better suited for collateral review.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

Brigitte Hendershot sued two Michigan state officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state’s policy under the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of returning her unclaimed funds (between $200 and $600) without interest effects an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that Hendershot lacked Article III standing because Michigan law grants no property right to interest earned on presumptively abandoned property. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Hendershot has standing because she possesses a cognizable property interest in both the principal and any interest that accrues while the funds are in state custody, thereby satisfying the requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. The court remanded for further proceedings, explaining that the existing record does not indicate whether the accounts were interest-bearing or provide other details needed to decide the merits of the takings claim.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Gene Curtis Roper, the defendant, a convicted sex offender with multiple prior failures to register, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) after moving from Nevada to Tennessee without updating his registration. The district court sentenced him to 30 months in prison and a 20-year term of supervised release—above the Sentencing Guidelines’ five-year recommendation but below the statutory maximum of lifetime supervision—citing his criminal history, repeated noncompliance, mental health issues, need for treatment, and risks to public safety. Roper appealed, arguing that the district court improperly relied on his mental illness to justify the length of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the supervised-release term was within statutory limits and substantively reasonable because the district court appropriately weighed multiple § 3553(a) factors, including Roper’s history of violations and the benefits of extended oversight for both him and the public.

criminal law

Elizabeth Cristales-de Linares, a native of El Salvador and former salon owner, and her two daughters entered the United States illegally in 2016 after a visitor visa was denied. They applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, asserting fear of future harm from presumed gang members who had extorted payments from her business and later threatened her when payments stopped; the claims rested on two proposed particular social groups—“Salvadoran women” and “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals.” An immigration judge denied relief, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the proposed groups were not cognizable, any feared harm lacked a nexus to a protected ground, internal relocation within El Salvador was reasonable, and the record did not compel a finding that she would likely face government-acquiesced torture.

immigration

Terra Wargo sued MJR Partridge Creek Digital Cinema 14, her former employer, alleging sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation under federal and Michigan law. She claimed her new general manager sent her unwanted personal texts, followed her in his car, and blocked a door during an argument after she complained about his management style, and that the company fired her for reporting the issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the theater. The court held that the manager’s conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment and was not shown to be based on sex, that Wargo suffered no adverse action tied to her sex, and that her retaliation claim failed because she forfeited key arguments and could not establish causation between any protected activity and her termination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

William Hartson pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine after police found nearly eight kilograms of the drug in luggage he and a companion checked on a flight from California to Ohio. Before sentencing, he sought a safety-valve reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to avoid the 120-month mandatory minimum, arguing that his guilty plea and statement accepting responsibility for knowing drugs were involved satisfied the statute’s requirement to provide all information to the government. The district court denied the reduction and imposed the mandatory term. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, explaining that § 3553(f)(5) imposes an affirmative duty to disclose all relevant details by sentencing—more than a plea or acceptance of responsibility—and that Hartson had provided no such information, declined multiple opportunities to do so, and could not excuse the requirement based on safety concerns.

criminal law

In this case, defendant Arisknight Arkin-Everett Winfree pleaded no contest to kidnapping, coercion and enticement, attempted coercion and enticement, and two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor after he lured two young women to his home under false pretenses of au pair employment and then sexually assaulted one of them while recording the acts. The district court imposed a life sentence, which Winfree appealed as substantively unreasonable and in violation of the Eighth Amendment, arguing that recidivism rates for sex offenders decline with age and that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these points below. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that it fell within the Guidelines range and statutory maximum for the offenses, that Winfree had not shown gross disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment, and that similar challenges to life sentences for kidnapping and related sex crimes had been rejected. The court also declined to address the ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, noting that such claims ordinarily require factual development best pursued in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

Linda DeVooght, a police dispatcher for the City of Warren, Michigan, filed a federal lawsuit alleging sex discrimination based on a department policy that required female dispatchers—but not male ones—to perform searches on female arrestees. Eleven days later, the department opened an Internal Affairs investigation into her conduct after a complaint about her discussing the lawsuit with colleagues; the investigation expanded, uncovered other policy violations by DeVooght and fellow plaintiffs, and resulted in her termination. She then sued the City and Police Commissioner William Dwyer, claiming the investigation and firing were unlawful retaliation for her protected First Amendment activity of filing the discrimination suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Dwyer, holding that the right to sue without retaliation is clearly established and that an adverse action violates the First Amendment if protected activity was a motivating factor, even alongside other misconduct. The court dismissed the defendants’ factual causation arguments for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over related state-law claims.

civil rightsfree speech

In United States v. Stanford Ray Coleman, the defendant appealed his resentencing following a conviction for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone in rural Appalachian communities, where the district court had initially imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 340 months based on his career-offender status, extensive recidivism history, and lack of mitigating evidence. Coleman argued on four procedural grounds that the court erred in its resentencing calculation and that the original judge’s comments demonstrated bias warranting reassignment to a different judge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the resentencing, holding that the district court correctly calculated and applied the new Guidelines range, properly accounted for Coleman’s intervening rehabilitative conduct and personal characteristics, and showed no inability to set aside prior views. The court also rejected the reassignment request, finding that the district judge had already demonstrated fairness by granting habeas relief and reducing the sentence when circumstances changed. It remanded solely for consideration of Sentencing Amendment 821.

criminal lawprocedure

Zachary Martin sued Polaris Inc. and related companies in federal court after suffering a severe arm injury in a rollover accident while riding as a passenger in a modified Polaris RZR off-road vehicle owned by a friend; he alleged strict products liability, breach of warranties, and negligent misrepresentation, claiming the vehicle's design and safety features were defective. After a six-day jury trial, the jury found for Polaris on all claims, and Martin appealed three of the district court's evidentiary rulings. The Sixth Circuit reviewed those rulings for abuse of discretion and affirmed, holding that the district court had not relied on clearly erroneous facts, misapplied the law, or made any clear mistake. In particular, the court analyzed one challenged ruling on an untimely expert disclosure under the five-factor test from Howe v. City of Akron and concluded that any violation was harmless because the testimony was not a surprise, did not disrupt trial, and caused no prejudice. The appeals court therefore upheld the judgment in Polaris's favor.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In United States v. William Suggs, IV, law enforcement executing a search warrant at the defendant’s home in connection with a gang violence investigation found a firearm in a safe, leading to his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession; Suggs, who had multiple prior felony convictions, conditionally pleaded guilty after the district court denied his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds and was sentenced to 45 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the sentence. The court held that, under precedents including New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, and United States v. Williams, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional as applied to dangerous felons, and Suggs qualified as dangerous because his criminal record and conduct—including successive firearms violations, retrofitting a rifle, loaning a gun to a gang member, and participating in gang activity—demonstrated a risk of physical violence. The court further found the below-guidelines sentence substantively reasonable because the district court properly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including mitigating circumstances such as Suggs’s youth and acceptance of responsibility against the seriousness of his offenses.

gunscriminal law

The case concerned Amir Karim Beigali’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). Beigali, who had a prior 1997 § 924(c) conviction and later received a mandatory consecutive 25-year term for a second § 924(c) conviction in 2009, argued that the First Step Act’s change to the “stacking” provision, combined with Sentencing Guidelines Amendments 814 and 821, created an “unusually long sentence” and other extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial. It held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred reconsideration of whether Beigali’s prior conviction was “final” for stacking purposes, that he would still face the same 25-year mandatory term today, that Amendment 814’s relevant policy statement is invalid, and that Amendment 821 would not alter the statutory minimum sentence he received.

criminal lawguns

In United States v. Evans, Kenneth Evans pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and appealed his 57-month sentence, arguing that his prior Ohio conviction for aggravated robbery under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.01(A)(1) should not count as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines and thus should not have increased his advisory range from 24–30 months to 46–57 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that the Ohio offense, when predicated on theft, matches the Guidelines’ enumerated “extortion” offense because it requires the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon to obtain property and any flight must occur immediately afterward, with no realistic probability of broader application.

gunscriminal law

The case concerned Cumberland River Coal Company’s challenge to an award of federal black-lung benefits to former miner Carlos Sturgill under the Black Lung Benefits Act. After working more than twenty-five years in underground coal mines, Sturgill filed a second claim in 2018 and presented new medical evidence; an administrative law judge found him totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and awarded benefits, a decision later affirmed by the Benefits Review Board. The Sixth Circuit denied Cumberland’s petition for review, holding that the ALJ’s factual finding of total disability was supported by substantial evidence. The court reasoned that the ALJ reasonably credited the opinion of one physician over the conflicting opinions of two others after assessing the experts’ consideration of Sturgill’s symptoms and test results. It also upheld the ALJ’s choice to begin benefits in the month the claim was filed, given the contradictory medical evidence on the precise onset date.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

Chemical Solvents sued its insurers, Greenwich and Illinois National, claiming bad-faith handling of a 2014 bodily-injury lawsuit after the insurers settled the case for $2.9 million within policy limits. The settlement was structured so that $2.7 million was billed through Chemical Solvents’s separate captive-insurance arrangement with Alembic, resulting in a large debit to its redemption account. The district court granted the insurers summary judgment on the bad-faith claim without allowing further discovery, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under controlling Ohio precedent, a bad-faith claim cannot stand without an underlying breach of contract, and the insurers’ settlement within policy limits was expressly permitted by the policies. Because no additional discovery could alter this legal conclusion, denial of the Rule 56(d) motion was also upheld.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability