In this bankruptcy appeal, Richard Van Dyn Hoven sought to discharge under Chapter 7 a portion of a personal guarantee debt owed to the Bank of Kaukauna, which arose when the bank covered overdrafts in his company's checking account to pay $101,432.91 in payroll taxes to the IRS and Wisconsin Department of Revenue between October 2009 and April 2010. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding the debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) and (14A). The district court reversed, holding that the exceptions did not apply. The court reasoned that those provisions target situations where a debtor deliberately substitutes dischargeable debt for nondischargeable tax liability, but here the bank knowingly extended credit to the business for ongoing operations amid its financial decline, with no evidence that Van Dyn Hoven incurred the overdrafts specifically to pay taxes or that the bank was an unwitting creditor. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
The EEOC sued Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, alleging that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by disclosing an employee's confidential medical information about his migraine condition to a reference-checking agency. The court granted summary judgment to Thrivent, ruling that the disclosure did not violate the ADA's confidentiality requirements under section 102(d)(4) because the information was not obtained through a medical inquiry. The employee had voluntarily provided details about his migraines in an email responding to a request for an explanation of his unexcused absence from work. The court found that the employer's inquiry sought only a reason for the absence and was not likely to elicit disability-related information, making the disclosure voluntary rather than compelled.
The case involves Elliot Don Ray's federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds. After the Seventh Circuit reversed an initial dismissal and remanded for consideration of timeliness, the district court addressed the state's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations and Ray's cross-motion for summary judgment. Ray argued that his state post-conviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 was timely filed under the prison mailbox rule when he delivered it to prison officials in 2004, which would have tolled the federal limitations period. The court denied both motions, finding the existing record insufficient to resolve factual disputes over the filing date and ordering an evidentiary hearing to assess credibility and prison procedures.
The case involved the Village of Hobart imposing storm water runoff fees on land within its boundaries that the United States held in trust for the Oneida Tribe of Indians, which the Tribe challenged through the Bureau of Indian Affairs as an improper tax. After the BIA regional director ruled for the Tribe and ordered the Village to cease collection efforts, the Village filed a third-party complaint against the United States alleging liability under the Clean Water Act's Section 313 and seeking APA review of the BIA decision plus a challenge to a federal regulation exempting trust land from local property rules. The court granted the United States' motion to dismiss, concluding that sovereign immunity barred the claims because the Village lacked authority to impose the fees on trust land and that the APA claims were not ripe absent final agency action.
Wells Fargo Bank, acting as trustee for bondholders, sued the Sokaogon Chippewa Community and its wholly owned gaming enterprise over a 2006 bond transaction in which the Tribe borrowed over $19 million, agreeing to repay the debt with interest and to pledge casino revenues as security. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, arguing that the Tribe's waivers of sovereign immunity were invalid because the agreements lacked required federal approvals under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and 25 U.S.C. § 81. The court denied the motion, holding that it had jurisdiction because the waivers were valid and enforceable. It reasoned that the bond documents and related resolutions were not management contracts under IGRA and did not encumber Indian lands under § 81, as the pledged property was fee land rather than trust land and the negative pledge did not grant exclusive control to a third party.
Plaintiff Ricky Cavanaugh sued his former employer, Oshkosh Corporation, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, claiming he faced disparate treatment and was terminated due to his age while working as a cab assembler and union steward. The court considered Oshkosh's motion for summary judgment, which asserted that Cavanaugh failed to show he met the company's legitimate expectations or that similarly situated younger employees received better treatment. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact because Cavanaugh's refusal to stop taking notes and return to work despite repeated supervisor instructions constituted insubordination justifying termination, his cited comparators were not similarly situated or substantially younger, and the policy changes regarding chairs and movement were not adverse employment actions. The decision rested on the absence of evidence supporting a prima facie case of discrimination under the applicable legal standards for summary judgment.