Susan Graber

The case concerned whether Manuel Alejandro Rangel-Zuazo, convicted of an offense committed at age 13 or 14 but tried and sentenced as an adult after turning 18, had a removable “conviction” under the immigration laws and whether he could seek a waiver of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed his removal order, treating the adult conviction as triggering deportation and denying eligibility for former INA § 212(c) relief under the “comparability” test. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. It held that the INA’s definition of conviction covers an adult adjudication regardless of the offender’s age at the time of the offense, that this classification satisfies rational-basis review, and that uniformity with state-court determinations supported the BIA’s conclusion on removability. However, because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Judulang v. Holder invalidated the comparability requirement, the court remanded for reconsideration of the waiver claim under the correct legal standard.

immigrationcriminal law

The case involved Maria Matilde Carrillo de Palacios, a Mexican citizen who had been deported in 1984 and later reentered the United States without permission in 1992 and 1997. She sought adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under INA section 245(i), but the Board of Immigration Appeals denied her application, finding her inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) due to her prior removal and unlawful reentries. The Ninth Circuit denied her petition for review, holding that the BIA correctly determined she was inadmissible because she had been ordered removed and then entered or attempted to reenter without admission. The court further held that she did not qualify for the statutory exception to inadmissibility, which requires an alien to remain outside the United States for more than ten years before returning; she had returned after only about five years.

immigration

The case involved a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision finding Maria Matilde Carrillo de Palacios ineligible for adjustment of status under INA section 245(i) because she was inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) due to more than one year of unlawful presence followed by reentry without admission. The court denied the petition, holding that the one-year unlawful presence period need not have occurred after the 1997 effective date of IIRIRA and that Carrillo de Palacios did not qualify for the ten-year absence exception in section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) because she returned to the United States after only five years abroad. The core reasoning was that the statutory text and policy of deterring repeat immigration violations require an alien to remain outside the United States for more than ten years before seeking the exception, which she failed to do.

immigration

In United States v. Eriksen, the defendants, officers and trustees of Lunde Electric Company, were convicted by a jury of two counts of embezzlement or conversion of employee 401(k) contributions under 18 U.S.C. § 664 and one count of making false statements in ERISA plan documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1027, after using withheld deferrals to pay company operating expenses instead of remitting them to the plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence of the defendants' knowledge and involvement, based on their roles as trustees, repeated notifications about the missing funds, their signing of false valuation reports, and their use of those reports to complete inaccurate Form 5500 filings that concealed the plan's underfunding.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

The case involved plaintiffs challenging the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) refusal to close Little Canyon Mountain in Oregon to off-road vehicle use, claiming violations of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and related regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the BLM, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the BLM was not required to close the area absent a finding of "considerable adverse effects" on specified resources under 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2(a), and that the agency's denial of the petition was not arbitrary or capricious because it rationally determined the regulatory thresholds were not met and was actively monitoring the area.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Rey Jimenez-Juarez's conviction under Washington Revised Code section 9A.44.089 for third-degree child molestation qualified as a crime of child abuse under federal immigration law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), rendering him removable. The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, had been ordered removed by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals on that ground, among others. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the issue de novo, applying the categorical approach to compare the elements of the state statute with the BIA's definition of a crime of child abuse. It held that the Washington offense satisfied both the mens rea (intentional act) and actus reus (maltreatment impairing a child's well-being) requirements of that definition. The court therefore denied the petition for review.

immigrationcriminal law

The case concerned whether Wapato Heritage, as successor to a lessee, had properly exercised an option to renew a 25-year ground lease on Moses Allotment No. 8, a parcel of Native American land held in trust by the United States and administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, ruling that the renewal notice requirements had not been met. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lease terms were unambiguous and defined the individual landowners (not the BIA or Secretary) as the lessor. The court reasoned that the lease required written notice of renewal to both the Secretary/BIA and the landowners via certified mail, but Wapato and its predecessor had failed to notify the landowners directly. Because the BIA was not the lessor and had no authority to accept notice on the landowners' behalf, the option was not effectively exercised and the lease expired at the end of its original term.

propertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between David Lahoti and Vericheck, Inc. over Lahoti's registration and use of the domain name vericheck.com. Vericheck claimed that the domain infringed its VERICHECK trademark and violated the Lanham Act, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and Washington common law. On appeal after remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings that the VERICHECK mark is suggestive and thus distinctive and protectable, that Lahoti acted in bad faith, and that he had violated the various federal and state claims. The court upheld the award of injunctive relief, statutory damages, and attorneys' fees to Vericheck, concluding that the district court had properly applied the remand instructions and that its determinations were not clearly erroneous.

business & regulatory

The case involved Maria Lopez-Birrueta's petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of special-rule cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. She sought relief on the ground that her children had been battered by their lawful permanent resident father, including repeated strikes with a stick that caused red welts. An immigration judge found the mistreatment insufficient to qualify as battery or extreme cruelty under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A), and the BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that the physical abuse described met the statutory definition of battery, granted the petition, and remanded for consideration of the remaining eligibility requirements.

immigration

The case concerned a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order removing Manuel Alejandro Rangel-Zuazo under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on an aggravated felony conviction for an offense committed when he was thirteen or fourteen. The court denied the petition, agreeing with the BIA that the conviction counted under the INA's definition because the petitioner was charged and convicted as an adult after reaching the age of majority, even though the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act did not apply. The court further held that the petitioner was ineligible for a former INA § 212(c) waiver due to the lack of a comparable ground of inadmissibility and found no equal protection violation or retroactivity problem, as the distinction between adult and juvenile adjudications rested on a rational basis and followed established precedent.

immigrationcriminal law

The case involved Ronald Craig Potter appealing his conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), claiming the statute violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling that the Second Amendment protects only the lawful possession and use of firearms. The court reasoned that, as established in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, the right does not extend to unlawful activities such as drug trafficking, and thus the statute is constitutional.

criminal lawgunsfederal power