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Judge, District Court, D. Massachusetts · Born 1938 · Evanston, IL
Provanzano v. Parker View Farm, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-12-14 · cited 19×
The case involves a Massachusetts resident suing a Kentucky horse farm owner and a New Hampshire stable owner under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act for unauthorized breeding of his horse, unauthorized fees, and refusal to return property. The court previously denied a motion to dismiss, and upon reconsideration, addressed whether a forum selection clause in the breeding contract required the claims to be litigated in Kentucky. The court enforced the forum selection clause, determining that the plaintiff's claims were closely related to the contract and that judicial economy favored consolidating all claims in Kentucky court, thus denying the motions for reconsideration that sought to keep the case in Massachusetts.
procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory
Eason v. Alexis
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-11-10 · cited 17×
This case arose from the February 2007 arrest of plaintiff Erick Eason by Boston police officers following a 911 call, leading to his claims of assault and battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and related state and federal civil rights violations against the officers, the police commissioner, and the City of Boston. Eason also alleged municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train and supervise. The court denied Eason's motion for partial summary judgment and the defendants' motion to strike, while granting summary judgment to some defendants on certain counts and denying it on others, primarily due to disputed facts about the use of force and probable cause. It granted summary judgment to the commissioner and city on the Monell claim, finding insufficient evidence of a municipal custom or policy of misconduct. The rulings turned on the existence of genuine issues of material fact for trial on surviving claims and the lack of proof linking prior complaints to the alleged violations.
civil rightscriminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure
Rodriguez v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-11-07 · cited 16×
In Rodriguez v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., plaintiffs Ramon and Linda Rodriguez sued Samsung and Axcelis-Korea for negligence and loss of consortium after Rodriguez sustained back injuries from a falling truss while installing equipment on Samsung premises in Korea as an employee of Axcelis-US. Axcelis-Korea, a Korean corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary, moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court allowed the motion and dismissed the claims, finding no specific personal jurisdiction because the injury did not arise from Axcelis-Korea's contacts with Massachusetts, the defendant had not purposefully availed itself of Massachusetts law through its limited contract with the U.S. parent, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable as the events occurred in Korea with witnesses and evidence located there.
proceduretorts & liability
Jagex Limited v. Impulse Software
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-11-02
Jagex Limited, owner of the online game Runescape, sued Impulse Software and the Snellman brothers for copyright and trademark infringement related to cheatbots. The defendants moved for sanctions, alleging that Jagex violated a protective order in this case by obtaining customer information through a subpoena in a separate California lawsuit against cheatbot users. The court denied the motion, distinguishing the situation from prior cases where protective orders were circumvented, noting that the California subpoena was authorized, relevant to that proceeding, and did not violate the protective order limited to this case.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-10-14 · cited 20×
In Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., homeowners sued their mortgage servicer (BAC), the mortgage owner (Fannie Mae), and the foreclosure law firm (OrlansMoran) after their home was sold at auction while a HAMP loan modification application was pending. The plaintiffs asserted claims including negligence, breach of contract, violation of the duty of good faith, FDCPA violations, and unfair practices under Massachusetts Chapter 93A. The court allowed BAC and Fannie Mae's motion to dismiss the contract and good faith claims but denied it as to negligence and the Chapter 93A claim; it granted OrlansMoran's motion to dismiss all claims against it. The core reasoning was that a knowing foreclosure in violation of HAMP guidelines, after repeated notice of the pending modification application, raised a factual issue as to whether the conduct was unfair or deceptive under Chapter 93A, even without separate misrepresentations.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO ASS'N, LTD.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-10-12 · cited 2×
The case involved Fantastic Sams Franchise Corporation seeking a court order to stay an arbitration proceeding initiated by FSRO Association, Ltd., an organization representing regional franchise owners, who alleged breaches of contract and violations of Massachusetts consumer protection law. Fantastic Sams argued that the arbitration violated contractual provisions requiring individual claims and prohibiting class-wide arbitration in most agreements. The court allowed the motion to stay with respect to the 25 contracts that explicitly barred class-wide arbitration and required individual claims only. It denied the motion for the remaining 10 contracts with broad arbitration clauses that did not address class arbitration, holding that questions of contract interpretation and the applicability of class arbitration prohibitions were for the arbitrator to decide under the parties' agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act. The decision rested on the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and that ambiguities regarding the scope of arbitration should be resolved by the arbitrator when the parties so agreed.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Ada Solutions, Inc. v. Engineered Plastics, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-10-07 · cited 14×
This case involves a patent infringement dispute between ADA Solutions and several defendants over replaceable cast-in-place tactile warning systems for sidewalks, based on the '581 patent issued in 2010. The defendants moved to stay the litigation pending an inter partes re-examination of the patent by the PTO, prompted by prior art references including an Australian patent. The court denied the motion to stay. It reasoned that a stay would unduly prejudice the plaintiff due to the parties' direct competition and risk of market share loss, that re-examination would not simplify all disputed issues or defenses, and that although the case was in an early stage, these factors counseled against granting the stay.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Iantosca v. Benistar Admin Services, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-10-05
This case involves plaintiffs seeking to enforce a multimillion-dollar Massachusetts state court judgment from the Cahaly Litigation against various defendants, including Benistar entities, while the government intervened to enforce federal tax liens on any proceeds. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the case was moot due to a separate judgment against Merrill Lynch that overcompensated the plaintiffs. The court denied this motion, reasoning that the Merrill Lynch judgment had not been satisfied and that portions of the liability were independent under Massachusetts law. Defendant Benistar 419 also moved to dismiss the government's complaint in intervention, claiming the underlying tax assessment was invalid, but the court denied this as well, holding that tax assessments carry a presumption of correctness and the motion was premature at the pleading stage.
proceduretaxestorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
United States v. Santiago
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-09-30
This case arose from a federal drug investigation into a heroin distribution conspiracy, leading to charges against multiple defendants including Manuel Santiago under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Several defendants moved to suppress wiretap evidence and derivative items, arguing that the wiretap warrant was defective for failing to adequately describe the communications and facilities, exceeded its scope by intercepting electronic rather than wire communications, and that a vehicle search and statements were obtained unlawfully. The court denied the motions without a hearing, finding that the warrant satisfied the particularity requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(b) and (c) by identifying the target phone and linking categories of communications to narcotics offenses, that the intercepted calls qualified as wire communications, and that the stop, search, and Miranda warnings complied with constitutional standards based on probable cause and consent.
criminal lawprocedure
Ruggieri v. M.I.W. Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-09-27
This case involves a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement where plaintiffs sought to audit defendant MIW Corp.'s payroll records to determine unpaid benefit contributions. After MIW initially refused the audit, plaintiffs filed suit seeking a court order to compel the audit, an injunction, and damages; an audit conducted after the complaint revealed $104,146.11 owed in contributions, interest, and fees. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent asset transfers and for prejudgment attachment of MIW's assets in that amount. The court denied the TRO because plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, as monetary damages would suffice and MIW had made good-faith efforts toward payment. The court granted prejudgment attachment, finding plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits due to MIW's breach of the CBA by not paying the audited amounts and a reasonable likelihood of recovering at least the claimed sum based on the audit evidence.
labor & employmentprocedure
Savings Bank Life Insurance v. Wollin & Madick Insurance
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-09-14
The case involved a breach of contract claim brought by Savings Bank Life Insurance Company against Wollin & Madick Insurance Services and Kenneth Madick in Massachusetts state court. The defendants removed the case to federal court, prompting the plaintiff to move for remand on grounds that the removal was untimely and to seek sanctions. The court allowed the remand because the defendants did not oppose it, but denied the sanctions request due to the plaintiff's failure to file the sanctions motion separately as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Cambridge Place Investment Management, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-19 · cited 5×
Cambridge Place Investment Management, Inc. sued various investment firms and related entities for alleged violations of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act in connection with the sale of mortgage-backed securities. After the defendants removed the case to federal court, the plaintiff moved to remand it to state court. The court found that the assignments of claims to the plaintiff were collusively made to defeat removal and therefore disregarded them, which meant complete diversity of citizenship was lacking because the true parties in interest were foreign entities. The court also declined to apply the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder and adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation that, even if federal question jurisdiction existed due to a relation to bankruptcy proceedings, mandatory or permissive abstention required remand. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to remand.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Reich v. U.S. Department of Energy
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-19 · cited 5×
The case involved a plaintiff seeking disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of an investigation report into allegations of research fraud at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which is operated for the Department of Energy. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Oak Ridge was not a proper defendant, that the report was not an agency record subject to FOIA, and that even if it were, it was exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to protect personal privacy interests. The reasoning centered on the report being prepared for law enforcement purposes regarding misconduct allegations and not reflecting DOE operations, with privacy concerns outweighing any public interest in disclosure.
federal powerprocedure
SKANDHA v. Savoie
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-18
In this case, a prisoner at MCI-Norfolk sued two maintenance instructors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they turned off the heat in his unit in retaliation for his complaints, violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and committing assault and battery under state law, along with regulatory violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of physical injury under the PLRA, insufficient evidence of objectively serious conditions or personal involvement, and no private right of action. The court granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact on any count: records indicated proper temperatures, no physical injury was alleged to support damages, the alleged cold did not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, no due process deprivation occurred from grievance handling, and assault and battery requires physical touching which was absent. The plaintiff's motion to view his cell was denied as moot.
civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability
Ciampi v. United States
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-16
The case involved petitioner Ciampi, who had been convicted after trial on a gambling charge and later pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering and to assault with a dangerous weapon; he had expressly waived any statute of limitations defense. Years later, Ciampi filed successive motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and (6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his 36-month sentence on the assault count, arguing that the superseding information was filed outside the five-year limitations period of 18 U.S.C. § 3282 and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The court denied the motions, holding that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that can be waived rather than a jurisdictional bar, that Ciampi had validly waived it in his plea agreement, and that the § 2255 motion was independently time-barred under the one-year limitations period of § 2255(f).
criminal lawprocedure
Duguay v. Spencer
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-10
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Timothy Duguay challenging his 1997 Massachusetts state court conviction for first-degree murder on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court had previously denied the petition after reviewing the trial record and an affidavit from defense counsel, and also denied reconsideration. In this order, the court grants a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance claims and related issues, finding that reasonable jurists could debate the denial because the claims required close, fact-specific analysis of the record.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Rigaud
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-08
In this case, defendant Carlin Rigaud, sentenced in December 2008 to 120 months incarceration after pleading guilty to multiple counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and conspiracy, moved to review and amend his sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which raised the quantities of cocaine base needed to trigger mandatory minimum sentences and prompted corresponding amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines effective November 1, 2010. The court denied the motion, ruling that the FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants whose unlawful conduct occurred before August 3, 2010. The court reasoned that Rigaud's sentencing predated both the FSA's enactment and the guideline amendments, distinguishing his situation from a prior First Circuit decision where sentencing occurred after November 1, 2010, and thus found no basis to apply the new provisions.
criminal law
Kenney v. Peake
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-04
The case involved plaintiff Mary Kenney's claims against the Department of Veterans Affairs and employee Margaret Henderson after she was not hired for a Registered Nurse position in 2008, despite prior VA employment and a reinstated nursing license on probation; she alleged disability discrimination based on her anxiety and depression under the Rehabilitation Act (treated as such despite the ADA pleading) and intentional interference with contractual relations. The court treated the defendants' motion as one for summary judgment and granted it in full, dismissing both claims. It reasoned that the discrimination claim failed because Kenney did not contact an EEO counselor within the required 45 days to exhaust administrative remedies and because the VA offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring her—such as her probationary license status, prior criminal conviction, and voluntary resignation—that were not shown to be pretextual. The tort claim was dismissed because the FTCA bars claims for interference with contractual rights, Kenney had not filed a required administrative complaint, and there was no evidence Henderson acted outside the scope of her employment.
labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability
Iantosca v. Benistar Administrative Services, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-08-01
This case involves plaintiffs' efforts to enforce a multimillion-dollar Massachusetts state court judgment against the defendants through ongoing discovery in federal court. After prior orders requiring depositions by March 31, 2011, plaintiffs moved to compel compliance and defendants sought a protective order, leading the court to allow the motion to compel, set a July 31, 2011 deadline for depositions in Massachusetts or Connecticut, deny the protective order, and impose $7,000 in sanctions on defendants for fees and costs. Upon reconsideration sought by defendant Daniel Carpenter, the court granted a protective order staying all further discovery from him until the conclusion of his related federal criminal case, while directing other non-compliant deponents to appear and show cause regarding contempt and allowing remaining discovery to proceed under the scheduling order.
procedure
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tambone
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 2011-07-15
This case involved an SEC enforcement action against executives James Tambone and Robert Hussey alleging securities fraud through misleading mutual fund prospectuses that prohibited market timing while permitting preferred customers to engage in the practice from 1998 to 2003. The district court had previously dismissed the complaint for failing to meet pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) and for not attributing false statements to the defendants, a ruling partially upheld en banc by the First Circuit on the Rule 10b-5 claim. In this memorandum, the court denied defendant Hussey's motion for summary judgment on the remaining Section 17(a) and aiding-and-abetting claims, reasoning that factual issues on liability and remedies required further discovery and trial rather than resolution at this stage.
business & regulatory