The case concerned David Kent Fitch's appeal of his 262-month prison sentence following jury convictions on multiple counts of bank fraud, fraudulent use of access devices, and money laundering. The district court had departed upward from the 41-51 month Sentencing Guidelines range after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Fitch murdered his wife and used her death to commit the offenses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could rely on uncharged conduct proven by clear and convincing evidence to support a substantial departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1, and that the record contained sufficient evidence of the murder and its connection to the fraud scheme.
In this case, Monte L. Haney, an African American convicted in state court of aggravated mayhem and other crimes, filed a federal habeas petition alleging that the prosecutor violated Batson v. Kentucky by using peremptory challenges to remove African American jurors from the venire. Haney had not objected to any of the strikes during voir dire or raised the issue on direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner may not raise a Batson claim in habeas if the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial, because such an objection is required to allow the trial court to remedy any discrimination and to preserve a record for review. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, aligning with other circuits in treating a timely objection as a prerequisite to a Batson challenge.
The case involved Alex Fayer, an advantage gambler, who contacted the Nevada Gaming Control Board after casinos refused to pay his winnings and then admitted to Agent Vaughn that he had possessed and used false identification documents in the name of James McLynn to gamble. Fayer was arrested for violating NRS § 205.465, though the charges were later dismissed, leading him to sue Vaughn, the Board, and the Mirage Casino-Hotel for false arrest, false imprisonment, conspiracy, battery, and premises liability under state and federal law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Fayer's admissions provided probable cause for the arrest, rendering the claims implausible.
The case concerned a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor who financed the purchase of a new vehicle by rolling negative equity from a trade-in loan into the new loan secured by the new car. The bankruptcy court and BAP allowed the debtor to bifurcate the loan under 11 U.S.C. § 506, treating the negative equity portion as unsecured debt rather than part of the purchase-money security interest protected by the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a)(*). The panel affirmed, holding that negative equity financing did not qualify as a purchase-money obligation under applicable state law and thus fell outside the anti-bifurcation provision. The decision created a circuit split with eight other circuits that had interpreted the same statute to include negative equity within the protected security interest.
The case involved a dispute between Strikepoint Trading, LLC and Optioneer, LLC against Aimee Sabolyk and Global Asset Advisors, LLC, concerning allegations of trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract, resulting in a permanent injunction and a jury verdict. The defendants appealed the district court's decisions. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot after the plaintiffs' counsel represented that no violations of the injunction had occurred, no further damages would be sought, and attorney fees would only be pursued against one defendant in limited circumstances, leading the appellants' counsel to agree the matter was moot.
The case In re Penrod involved a dispute in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding over whether a creditor, AmeriCredit Financial Services, held a purchase money security interest in the negative equity from a debtor's trade-in vehicle when financing a new car purchase. The debtor, Marlene Penrod, proposed to treat part of the creditor's claim as unsecured because it related to negative equity on her prior vehicle. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ruling that the creditor did not have a purchase money security interest in the negative equity portion of the loan. The court reasoned that negative equity represents old obligations rather than new value provided for the collateral, consistent with the definition of purchase money security interests under the Bankruptcy Code, which limits such interests to the price of the new merchandise or value enabling its acquisition.
Ta Chong Bank sued Hitachi after Hitachi paid CyberHome directly for DVD players instead of remitting payment to the Bank under factoring agreements that assigned CyberHome's accounts receivable to the Bank. After CyberHome filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court ruled that the accounts receivable were property of the bankruptcy estate, and the Bank did not appeal that determination. The district court dismissed the Bank's state-law claims against Hitachi, concluding they were barred by res judicata because they rested on the same interest in the receivables already adjudicated in bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were based solely on the Bank's interest in property the bankruptcy court had already determined belonged to the estate.
The case involved Nelson Anthoine, a program analyst at the public entity North Central Counties Consortium (NCCC), who met privately with the chairman of NCCC's governing board to report that his supervisor had falsely claimed NCCC was current on required data reporting under the Workforce Investment Act; Anthoine was soon disciplined and terminated. He sued NCCC and two supervisors in federal district court, alleging First Amendment retaliation for protected speech, gender discrimination, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the First Amendment claim, holding that Anthoine raised triable issues because his statements to the board chairman were not made pursuant to his official duties under Garcetti v. Ceballos and could support an inference of retaliation, but it affirmed summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim for lack of specific and substantial evidence of pretext or animus and on the wrongful termination claim because California law bars such claims against public entities.
The case was a consolidated securities fraud class action brought by Metzler Investment GMBH and other investors against Corinthian Colleges, Inc., and certain officers under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs alleged that Corinthian engaged in widespread fraudulent practices to inflate federal Title IV funding eligibility and enrollment figures, made misleading public statements about its growth and compliance, and failed to disclose DOE and California Attorney General investigations into recruiter compensation and other practices. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice, holding that the allegations failed to satisfy the PSLRA's heightened pleading standards. The court reasoned that the complaint did not identify any specific false or misleading statements tied to the investigations or practices, that scienter allegations were insufficient even when viewed holistically, and that stock sales under predetermined 10b5-1 plans further undermined any inference of fraudulent intent.
This case was a putative class action securities fraud suit brought by lead plaintiff Metzler Investment against Corinthian Colleges and certain officers, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The complaint claimed that Corinthian engaged in various fraudulent practices to inflate federal Title IV funding and student enrollment figures, violated GAAP in revenue recognition, and thereby artificially inflated its stock price during the class period. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, holding that the allegations failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, particularly with respect to falsity, scienter, and loss causation.
The case concerned a small U.S. corporation's petition to extend an L-1A visa for its Brazilian president and CEO, who had been transferred from a related Brazilian company to operate the U.S. affiliate. USCIS denied the extension, finding insufficient evidence that the executive was employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity or that the company was doing business as required. The Administrative Appeals Office upheld the denial, the district court granted summary judgment to the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the agency had not abused its discretion because the submitted organizational chart, payroll records, and duty descriptions showed the executive supervised only one qualifying professional employee and did not establish that his activities were primarily managerial under the statutory definition.
The case involved Ramon Sanchez Fernandez, who was convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy charges based on evidence from wiretap orders obtained during an investigation of a narcotics operation. Fernandez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the government failed to minimize interceptions after the target adopted a new alias, and also challenged the denial of safety valve relief at sentencing due to firearms found in his home. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the wiretap orders authorized the interceptions because investigators recognized the alias as the same person and acted in good faith, and that the firearms were connected to the drug conspiracy, precluding safety valve relief.
The case involved Daniel Sandoval-Luna's petition for review of his removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, where an Immigration Judge denied a continuance to pursue potential adjustment of status under new regulations and pretermitted his application for cancellation of removal due to lack of a qualifying relative. Sandoval-Luna argued that the denial violated due process and that the qualifying relative requirement for cancellation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) infringed equal protection rights. The court held it had jurisdiction to review both the discretionary denial and the constitutional claims. It denied the petition, reasoning that the Immigration Judge did not abuse discretion after granting one prior continuance with no immediate relief available, that there is no liberty interest in discretionary immigration relief, and that the statutory requirement satisfies rational basis review given Congress's plenary authority over immigration classifications.
The case involved the Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Trust Fund suing employer Herman Flores to recover delinquent pension contributions for electrical workers on a school construction project, pursuant to collective bargaining agreements including a Project Stabilization Agreement and Subscription Agreement. The district court ruled for Flores after finding the term 'covered employees' ambiguous and considering extrinsic evidence that his obligations began only upon referral of union workers in December 2003. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the agreements unambiguously required contributions for all electrical workers on project work regardless of union status, based on definitions by job classification, recognition clauses, and the absence of any condition tying contributions to actual union referrals, with obligations arising upon contract acceptance; it remanded an unresolved claim for post-December contributions.
This case arose from two California state court lawsuits against Raymond Manzarek and Doors Touring, Inc. (DTI) alleging trademark and logo infringement in connection with band tours and merchandise sales, which led to over $3 million in defense costs. Manzarek and DTI sued their insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance, for breach of contract and bad faith after the insurer denied coverage under commercial general liability policies that included advertising injury provisions but also contained a Field of Entertainment Limitation Endorsement. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding no potential for coverage. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the underlying complaints raised at least the potential for coverage under the policies' advertising injury provisions and that the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint without first considering possible amendments or the viability of the claims as pled.