In Napier v. Humana Marketpoint, Inc., the plaintiff sued her former employer in Texas state court for age discrimination under state law, seeking back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees without specifying a dollar amount, as required by Texas procedural rules. After the defendant answered and the plaintiff later amended her petition to allege a maximum of $1.367 million in damages, the defendant removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds 76 days after receiving the original petition. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). It reasoned that the original petition affirmatively revealed on its face that the amount in controversy exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold—through the combination of the types of damages requested—triggering the 30-day removal clock immediately upon service, rather than only upon the later amended petition.
In this case, investors who lost money in the Stanford International Bank Ponzi scheme sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that SEC officials, including former enforcement director Spencer Barasch, negligently failed to investigate or stop the fraud despite early warnings, engaged in conflicts of interest, and inadequately supervised the matter, causing roughly $18.7 million in damages. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It held that the claims fell within the FTCA's discretionary function exception, which preserves sovereign immunity for actions involving the SEC's discretionary decisions on enforcement priorities, investigations, and regulatory responses. The court reasoned that such choices inherently involve policy considerations protected by the exception, regardless of allegations about ethics violations or inadequate performance. The dismissal was without prejudice.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedurefederal power
This case arose from the SEC's securities fraud action against R. Allen Stanford and related entities, leading a court-appointed receiver to sue various Democratic and Republican political committees to recover about $1.6 million in contributions made with Ponzi scheme proceeds over eight years. The receiver claimed these were fraudulent transfers under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) because the committees provided no reasonably equivalent value in exchange. The political committees moved to dismiss, arguing the suit was untimely under TUFTA's statute of repose and preempted by federal campaign finance laws (FECA and BCRA), while the Republican committees also sought summary judgment on those defenses. The court denied the motions to dismiss and the Republican committees' summary judgment motion, granted the receiver's summary judgment motion, and held that the contributions qualified as fraudulent transfers from an insolvent Ponzi scheme, that equitable tolling applied to timeliness, and that federal election laws did not preempt the state-law claims.
This case involves a court-appointed receiver in an SEC securities fraud action against R. Allen Stanford and related entities, seeking documents from nonparty Swiss bank SG Suisse regarding Stanford accounts. The receiver requested to proceed with discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but SG Suisse objected, citing Swiss financial privacy laws that could impose criminal penalties for disclosure and arguing for use of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad. The court denied the request to use the Federal Rules and directed the receiver to first pursue discovery through the Convention's procedures, finding them reasonable under the circumstances due to principles of international comity, the optional nature of the Convention for obtaining evidence abroad, and the need to respect foreign sovereign interests in privacy laws. The court noted that if the Convention method proves unfruitful, the receiver could renew the request for documents considered part of the receivership estate.
This case involves a trademark dispute between Cottonwood Financial Ltd., a U.S. operator of 'CASH STORE' payday lending centers in multiple states including Texas, and The Cash Store Financial Services, Inc. (CSFS), a Canadian company using the similar name 'The Cash Store' for its lending services and listed on the NYSE. Cottonwood sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, plus trademark dilution under Texas law, alleging that CSFS's U.S. investment activities and name use caused confusion and diluted its marks. The court held that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims but that Cottonwood failed to state claims under the Lanham Act, while granting a preliminary injunction based on a substantial likelihood of success on the Texas dilution claim and enjoining CSFS from certain uses of the marks in connection with its U.S. activities. The reasoning centered on the strength of Cottonwood's marks, the similarity of the names and services, CSFS's U.S. solicitation efforts, and the risk of dilution under Texas law, while finding insufficient grounds for federal Lanham Act relief.
This case involves a plaintiff who sued Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), Deutsche Bank, and Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) after removal from state to federal court. The court ordered the plaintiff to show cause for failing to serve the defendants within 120 days under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The plaintiff claimed service on MERS and WaMu via the Texas Secretary of State under the long-arm statute, but records showed direct mailing to MERS's agent instead of proper service through the Secretary, WaMu was in FDIC receivership making the FDIC the proper party (who was never served), and Deutsche Bank received no service at all. The magistrate judge found no good cause for the failures and recommended dismissal without prejudice, which the district judge adopted as the court's order.