In Parks v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, the plaintiff Lisa Parks sought to prevent the foreclosure of her home and recover damages, claiming violations of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), breach of contract, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing after her loan modification application was denied. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing no private right of action under HAMP and no enforceable contract. The court granted the motions to dismiss, reasoning that HAMP does not create a private right of action, borrowers are not third-party beneficiaries, and the modification application did not constitute an independent contract.
This case concerned third-party claims by Paragon Commercial Bank and a bankruptcy trustee to assets forfeited by defendant Justin French after his guilty plea to wire fraud and money laundering charges, where the government obtained a $7 million forfeiture judgment including substitute assets. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed both petitions with prejudice. Paragon, as a general unsecured creditor, lacked standing because it had no specific legal interest in the forfeited property and the forfeiture did not encompass French's entire estate. The trustee also lacked standing because the relation-back doctrine under 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) vested title in the United States at the time of the criminal acts in 2005, prior to creation of the bankruptcy estate in 2011, leaving the trustee with no interest superior to the government's.
In Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, the plaintiff, a fortune teller, challenged the county's zoning ordinance, business license tax ordinance, and fortune teller permit ordinance, alleging that they violated her rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, and equal protection under the Constitution as well as protections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The county moved to dismiss the as-applied claims as unripe and both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the claims ripe for review, but granted the county's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion. The core reasoning centered on the conclusion that the ordinances were valid regulatory measures that did not infringe on the plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights, with RLUIPA applying only to land-use regulations and the zoning provisions being content-neutral and not overbroad.
This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in a dispute between buyers Thomas and Katherine Hubbard and seller Stony Point Land, Inc., over a 2006 real estate purchase agreement for a lot in a planned subdivision. The Hubbards sought to cancel the contract citing failures to deliver a required property owners' association disclosure packet under Virginia law and alleged breach, while Stony Point counterclaimed for specific performance. The bankruptcy court, building on prior state court rulings, found in Stony Point's favor on the remaining claims after determining that the Hubbards had waived certain defenses like abandonment and that Stony Point's efforts to remarket the property were only to mitigate damages rather than abandon the contract. On appeal, the district court reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, then affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings dismissing the Hubbards' breach claim and upholding Stony Point's position. The core reasoning centered on procedural waivers, the absence of contract abandonment, and Stony Point's readiness to perform.
The case involved Calvary Christian Center challenging the City of Fredericksburg's denial of a special use permit needed to lease church space to a private day school for disabled children. The church sought a preliminary injunction to allow the school to operate, claiming violations of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, RLUIPA, and First Amendment. The court denied the injunction, finding that the church failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, that equities favored it, or that it served the public interest, particularly given the city's zoning interests and alternative facilities available.
In Parham v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., the plaintiff sought to rescind her 2008 home mortgage refinancing under the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) after default and foreclosure, claiming the lender under-disclosed the finance charge by excluding an allegedly unreasonable $400 title search fee and seeking statutory damages plus attorney's fees. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, citing insufficient allegations of an unreasonable fee and lack of apparent violations on the loan documents for the assignee. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege the fee exceeded market rates in a way that violated TILA disclosure rules and that statutory damages were unavailable against Fannie Mae. The court further ordered release of the lis pendens filed against the property.