This case is a declaratory judgment action in which Royal Surplus Lines Insurance Company and intervening insurers sought a ruling on whether their policies obligated them to cover claims and defense costs from orthopedic bone screw products liability litigation against defendant Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. The court bifurcated and tried first the issue of whether the primary Royal policy was void from inception due to alleged misrepresentations and omissions by SDG during policy procurement regarding pending litigation and defense costs. After a bench trial, the court issued findings of fact detailing the parties, the underlying MDL litigation, policy terms, and negotiation process, along with conclusions that SDG made no material misrepresentations increasing the risk of loss and that the evidence did not support a finding of intent to deceive. The core reasoning focused on the claims-made nature of the policy, the disclosures in the insurance submission about existing cases and expenses, and the absence of evidence showing concealment of material facts that would void coverage under applicable law.
William Carroll sued the United States seeking to block the IRS from collecting a penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) by levy. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant after finding that the IRS had complied with all applicable laws and procedures without abusing its discretion. It denied Carroll's motion for reconsideration because the filing raised no new law or facts and merely repeated prior arguments already deemed meritless. The court awarded the United States $2,425.57 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) and the bad-faith exception to the American rule, noting Carroll's frivolous positions and lack of objection or hardship claim, and directed entry of final judgment while barring further non-appeal filings.
The case involved June Caruso, a former post-doctoral research associate at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, who sued her employer after her termination, asserting claims of retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law and the TPPA, defamation, outrageous conduct, and violations of multiple federal statutes including Title VII, the ADA, the FLSA, the False Claims Act, and others, based on her complaints about alleged patient mistreatment. St. Jude moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion, finding that Caruso failed to meet the legal requirements for her retaliatory discharge claims under the TPPA framework, that she did not establish protected activity or causation for the federal claims, and that there was insufficient evidence to support her other allegations such as defamation or violations of the NLRA and False Claims Act.
In this case, plaintiff Christine Wooley, a former employee in the Madison County Juvenile Court Clerk's office, sued the county and her supervisor Lacy Bond after she was terminated, alleging that her complaints about improper paid leave practices favoring Bond's relatives triggered retaliation. Wooley brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment violations, the Tennessee Constitution, the Public Protection Act and common law for retaliatory discharge, and state law for procurement of breach of contract and tortious interference. The court granted summary judgment to defendants on the claims against Bond individually for retaliatory discharge, the state constitutional free speech claim, the right to petition claim, procurement of breach of contract, and tortious interference, but denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claims against both defendants and the retaliatory discharge claims against the county. The core reasoning was that material factual disputes existed regarding whether Wooley's speech was protected and motivated her termination for the surviving claims, while the dismissed claims failed as a matter of law due to lack of required elements such as an underlying contract or applicable constitutional protections.
William Carroll sued the IRS after it assessed a $500 frivolous return penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) for his 1999 tax return claiming that wages were not taxable income and seeking a refund of withholdings; the IRS then sought to collect the penalty by levy following a collection due process hearing. The appeals officer upheld the levy after finding proper notice and rejecting Carroll's arguments about the validity of the tax code. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the appeals officer did not abuse discretion in balancing collection needs against the taxpayer's claims, and the administrative record supported the determination. The court also granted costs and attorney fees to the United States, finding Carroll's action was maintained in bad faith. No further discovery was permitted because the case was limited to review of the administrative record under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
This case involves plaintiff Linda Carter's claim that the IRS wrongfully levied on a mutual fund account to collect unpaid federal income taxes owed by her former husband, Todd Brooks. The account had been awarded to Carter as her sole property in their 1997 divorce judgment, which also assigned all IRS liabilities to Brooks. Carter sued under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 seeking recovery of the seized funds plus damages. The court granted Carter's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, while denying the government's motion, determining that Brooks had no interest in the account after the divorce and that Carter qualified as a judgment lien creditor with priority over the tax lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6323, though denying consequential damages due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
