The case involved a kosher deli and its owners challenging New York Agriculture and Markets Law provisions that require sellers of kosher food to label it as such and disclose information about their kosher certifier, claiming violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as well as vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the statutes form a neutral labeling and disclosure regime with a secular purpose that neither advances nor inhibits religion and avoids excessive government entanglement with religious matters. The court further concluded that the laws give adequate notice to those regulated and do not create a risk of arbitrary enforcement, so they are not unconstitutionally vague.
religious libertybusiness & regulatorycivil rights
This case arose after Fannie Mae sued Olympia Mortgage Corporation for breach of contract, prompting Olympia (later in receivership) to file cross-claims against the relatives of its former president for allegedly fraudulent transfers made while Olympia was insolvent. The Donner Relatives moved for summary judgment to dismiss the cross-claims under New York Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 (constructive fraud) and 276 (actual fraud), while Olympia cross-moved for summary judgment on the § 273 claim. The court denied the Donner Relatives’ motion and granted Olympia’s, finding the transfers lacked fair consideration because the relatives provided no services to Olympia and the payments were not part of the president’s documented compensation. It awarded Olympia specific damages against each relative plus prejudgment interest calculated from reasonable intermediate dates based on the timing of the transfers.
In United States v. Apazidis, the defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of making false statements to a federally insured credit union to obtain a loan under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and of twenty counts of engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 involving criminally derived property under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, based on the use of loan proceeds. The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, and also sought a reduction in the $800,000 forfeiture amount. The court denied the motion, explaining that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government and that a rational jury could find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the loan documents and related testimony from the government's case-in-chief. The court further held that the jury's forfeiture finding was supported and that the defendant's own testimony, if considered, would not alter the outcome.