This case concerned Terrance Burnett's claims for short-term disability (STD) and long-term disability (LTD) benefits under Raytheon Company's self-funded ERISA plans, administered by MetLife, after his benefits were terminated following a back injury. The court found that MetLife abused its discretion in denying STD benefits beyond March 13, 2008, entitling Burnett to the full 10-week maximum benefit period from February 15 through April 25, 2008. It also ruled that Burnett was not required to exhaust administrative remedies for LTD benefits because doing so would have been futile, and the administrative record showed he met the plan's definition of full disability from April 26 through July 1, 2008, though the record was insufficient to determine eligibility beyond that date. The court therefore remanded the LTD claim to MetLife to calculate the amount and duration of benefits after July 1. The decisions rested on the plans' grant of discretionary authority to MetLife, review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and the objective medical evidence in the record establishing Burnett's inability to perform his job duties.
This case is a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act alleging that Campbell-Ewald Co. sent unauthorized text message advertisements for the U.S. Navy to the plaintiff's cell phone and others without consent. After the defendant made an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment and settlement offer that it claimed fully satisfied the plaintiff's individual claims, it moved to dismiss the case as moot and opposed class certification. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that an unaccepted offer does not extinguish the claims and that class certification issues could still proceed, granted the plaintiff's motion to strike certain evidence submitted by the defendant, and deferred the class certification ruling until after the parties conduct class discovery.
The case involves a dispute over long-term disability insurance benefits under a policy purchased in 1980 by plaintiff, an ophthalmologic surgeon, following a 1995 skiing accident that caused spinal injuries requiring surgery in 1996 and ongoing impairments limiting fine motor activities. Plaintiff submitted a 1997 claim for total disability benefits, which the policy defines differently for accidents (lifetime payments if commencing before age 65) versus sickness (payments only to age 65 or a minimum of 24 months), and defendants paid total disability benefits for over a decade before attempting to reclassify the claim. The court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on breach of contract and equitable estoppel. The core reasoning is that the undisputed facts showed defendants had actual notice of the accident-based total disability claim from the outset, paid benefits consistent with that classification without timely notifying plaintiff of or resolving any accident/sickness issue, and were therefore estopped from later denying coverage on that basis.
This case involves mentally disabled non-citizens in immigration removal proceedings who filed a class action complaint alleging violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Due Process Clause, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, seeking competency evaluations, appointed counsel, and bond hearings while in detention. The district court addressed their motion for a preliminary injunction after procedural history that included habeas petitions, amended complaints adding plaintiffs, and a temporary restraining order. The court granted the motion in part, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on claims that they were entitled to reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act for their mental disabilities in the immigration process. The reasoning focused on statutory and constitutional protections requiring evaluations and representation to ensure meaningful participation in proceedings, while rejecting authority under the Criminal Justice Act to appoint counsel for administrative immigration matters.
The case involved a dispute between Progeny Ventures and Western Union over alleged obligations from a 1994 letter agreement and 1995 amendment, where Progeny was to recruit banks as agents for Western Union's money transfer services, particularly First Bank of Nigeria. Progeny claimed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and sought declaratory relief when Western Union entered new agreements with the bank after prior ones expired. The court granted Western Union's motion for summary judgment, finding that the agreements explicitly limited Western Union's obligations to a specific timeframe ending August 16, 1995, after which it had no further liability to Progeny regarding listed banks, and Plaintiff failed to establish any ongoing contractual duty or basis for the other claims.
In this case, Interplay Entertainment Corp. sued TopWare Interactive, Inc. for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and unfair competition under California law, alleging that TopWare's planned release of a fantasy-themed chess video game titled 'Battle v. Chess' infringed Interplay's registered 'Battle Chess' mark for similar games. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted Interplay's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining TopWare from advertising, selling, or distributing games using the 'Battle Chess' mark or similar designations like 'Battle v. Chess,' and from related promotional activities. The court found that Interplay was likely to succeed on the merits due to its valid trademark registration, continuous use, and the likelihood of consumer confusion from the similar marks and game concepts; that Interplay would suffer irreparable harm without relief; that the balance of hardships favored Interplay; and that the injunction served the public interest in protecting trademarks from confusion. The injunction took effect upon posting of a $15,000 bond and applied to TopWare and related parties.