Gregory Kent Frizzell

The case Braun v. St. Pius X Parish involved a non-Catholic Episcopalian fifth-grade teacher at a Catholic school whose one-year contract was not renewed after approximately 20 years of service when she was 63 years old. Braun sued the parish, school, and principal for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Oklahoma public policy (Burk tort), as well as religious discrimination under Title VII. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's. On the religious discrimination claim, the court held that Section 702(a) of Title VII exempts religious educational institutions from liability for employment decisions based on religion, regardless of whether the employee's duties were religious or secular. On the age claims, the court found no genuine issue of material fact, applying the same-actor inference and concluding that documented parental complaints about Braun's performance supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for non-renewal.

labor & employmentcivil rightsreligious liberty

This case involved a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by the EEOC on behalf of Samantha Elauf, a Muslim applicant not hired by Abercrombie & Fitch because her headscarf violated the company's Look Policy prohibiting headwear for sales employees. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on liability, focusing on whether the EEOC established a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim and whether Abercrombie showed undue hardship. The court determined that Abercrombie had notice of Elauf's religious practice from her interview, that no interactive accommodation process occurred, and that the company failed to demonstrate undue hardship from allowing the headscarf. It therefore granted the EEOC's motion on liability while denying Abercrombie's cross-motion.

labor & employmentreligious libertycivil rights

This case is a business dispute between CTI Services LLC (Citadel), which develops pipeline repair products, and Energy Maintenance Services Group I, LLC (EMS) concerning competing composite wrap systems, with claims including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of trade secrets, and violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. EMS moved for partial summary judgment on multiple grounds, including the statute of frauds due to the absence of a signed distributorship agreement, lack of standing for plaintiff Roger Walker, displacement of common-law claims by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and plaintiffs' ineligibility as consumers under the OCPA. The court granted the motion in part, holding that Walker lacked standing on non-trademark claims, common-law misappropriation was displaced by the OUTSA, fiduciary-duty claims based on trade secrets were displaced, and the OCPA claim failed because plaintiffs were not consumers; it denied the motion on statute-of-frauds grounds for fiduciary duties and deemed other issues moot.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case is a False Claims Act qui tam action brought by the personal representative of a former Boeing employee's estate against Boeing, alleging the company submitted false claims to the U.S. Air Force by breaching a contractor logistics support contract requirement to use only FAA-certified parts in maintaining E-4 aircraft. Boeing moved for summary judgment on grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the allegations were based on publicly disclosed information from a prior government investigation and the relator was not an original source under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The court analyzed whether the earlier investigation by the U.S. Attorney constituted a qualifying public disclosure, whether the claims were based upon it, and related issues of original source status, while noting that certain claims remained pending for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the denial of long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan provided by ONEOK, Inc. to employee Thomas Arnold, who had applied for benefits in 2004 after becoming disabled. The plan defined total disability differently for the first 24 months (inability to perform any job within the company) versus afterward (inability to perform any occupation qualifying for Social Security disability benefits), and it tied later eligibility to SSA determinations, but ONEOK terminated benefits after Arnold's initial SSA denial. The court reviewed the denial under an arbitrary and capricious standard due to the plan's grant of interpretive discretion to the administrator and held that the denial was arbitrary and capricious because the administrator improperly applied the SSA standard to the initial 24-month period. It ordered retroactive reinstatement of benefits for that period and remanded the post-24-month eligibility issue to the plan committee.

labor & employment

In this ERISA case, plaintiff Barry Schultz sued UnumProvident and related entities alleging underpayment of long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored policy, challenging Unum's calculation of gross benefits and its offsets for Social Security disability payments and a third-party tort settlement. The district court reviewed Unum's benefit determinations under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, taking into account Unum's inherent conflict of interest as both administrator and insurer, and examined whether the policy's definitions of monthly earnings, deductible sources of income, and offsets supported the reductions. The court upheld Unum's decisions, finding they were grounded in reasonable interpretations of the policy language and supported by the administrative record, including the treatment of pre-tax premiums and the recovery of overpayments from ongoing benefits rather than specific settlement funds. It therefore denied Schultz's appeal and affirmed the benefit calculations.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case stems from the financial collapse of Arrow Trucking Co. after it was discovered to have submitted fraudulent invoices under an accounts receivable purchase agreement with plaintiff Transportation Alliance Bank (TAB). TAB sued Arrow's officers and directors, including defendant Carol Pielsticker Bump, asserting claims including breach of a guaranty, breach of fiduciary duties to the company and creditors, fraudulent transfers, and recovery of unlawful dividends. After Arrow filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Bump moved to dismiss four of the claims against her for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claims belonged exclusively to the bankruptcy estate. The court granted the motion, holding that the claims were not personal to TAB but instead constituted property of the estate because they alleged harms to all creditors, thereby depriving TAB of standing.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute between plaintiff Debra Hnath, who resides in Oklahoma, and defendants Daphne Hereford and Rin Tin Tin Inc., a Texas corporation, arising from breeding contracts for two German Shepherd dogs that plaintiff kept and cared for in Oklahoma; plaintiff sought declaratory relief on ownership and possession, reimbursement for expenses, foreclosure of a statutory lien on the dogs, and delivery of museum items purchased from Hereford. Defendant Hereford moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and both defendants moved to dismiss the lien foreclosure count under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The court granted the motions, dismissing Hereford because she had not waived the defense by filing an appearance in state court and had insufficient minimum contacts with Oklahoma, and dismissing Count III because the petition failed to set forth the account of expenses as required by 4 O.S. §§ 193 and 194.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Fleming Building Company sued Columbia Casualty Company in Oklahoma state court for breach of an insurance policy, bad faith, and related claims after the insurer refused to cover defense costs and a settlement in an underlying lawsuit. Columbia Casualty removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, but Fleming moved to remand, citing a service-of-suit clause in the policy. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that the clause constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the insurer's right to remove the action to federal court. It relied on the clause's language requiring submission to any court of competent jurisdiction chosen by the insured and on the weight of authority interpreting similar provisions as waiving removal rights. The court also awarded Fleming costs and attorney fees because the removal lacked an objectively reasonable basis.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit by Wesley Echols against OMNI Medical Group for medical malpractice related to his wife's death and against Bayer companies for products liability claims involving the birth control pill Yasmin, originally filed in Oklahoma state court. Bayer sought to sever the claims against the non-diverse OMNI defendant to establish federal diversity jurisdiction. The court denied the request to sever and granted the motion to remand, reasoning that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 permits severance only sparingly and should not be used to create or extend federal jurisdiction where it did not previously exist under Rule 82, especially given potential prejudice to the plaintiff from splitting related claims across courts and the risk of inconsistent judgments. Because OMNI remained in the suit, complete diversity was lacking, so the case was remanded to state court.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved a union suing an employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel arbitration of six grievances alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements at a refinery. The employer moved for summary judgment, asserting that the grievances were barred by the six-month statute of limitations under NLRA § 10(b) or were otherwise not arbitrable. The court granted summary judgment to the employer on statute of limitations grounds without addressing arbitrability. It reasoned that the limitations period began running when the employer clearly refused to arbitrate each grievance during the grievance process, and the union filed suit more than six months after those refusals for all remaining grievances.

labor & employment

This case involved a union's lawsuit under the Labor Management Relations Act to compel a company to arbitrate nine grievances filed under a collective bargaining agreement at an oil refinery. The grievances concerned management decisions such as eliminating job classifications like Lead Operator and Tester positions and reorganizing operations. The company refused arbitration, arguing that the issues originated under Article 11 of the agreement, which reserves certain managerial rights to the company and explicitly excludes them from arbitration. The court granted the company's motion for summary judgment, holding that the grievances were not arbitrable because they fell within the non-arbitrable management rights provisions, and no other CBA articles were implicated by the company's actions.

labor & employment

This case involved a motion to dismiss claims brought by foster children against Oklahoma state officials under Section 1983 and common law, alleging violations of rights under the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) related to case plans, permanency, safety, health records, and foster care payments. The court granted the motion as to the third cause of action (Section 1983 claim for AACWA violations) and fifth cause of action (third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim), dismissing them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that AACWA provisions, enacted under Congress's spending power, do not unambiguously confer enforceable individual rights as required by Gonzaga University v. Doe and Blessing v. Freestone, since they lack clear rights-creating language and instead focus on state compliance for funding. The third-party beneficiary claim was dismissed as dependent on the same finding of a private right under the statute. The court noted that Section 675 is definitional and does not create rights, and regulations alone cannot establish congressional intent for private enforcement.

civil rightsfamily law

This case is a § 1983 action brought by nine children in Oklahoma foster care, on behalf of themselves and over 10,000 others, alleging that the state Department of Human Services violated their constitutional rights to due process, liberty, privacy, and associational interests, as well as federal child welfare statutes, by failing to provide safe living conditions and adequate monitoring. The plaintiffs named the Governor, members of the Oklahoma Commission for Human Services, and the DHS director as defendants in their official capacities and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Governor Henry moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing lack of standing because he had no connection to enforcement of the challenged policies. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as to the Governor because any alleged injury was not redressable by relief against him, since DHS policies are controlled by the agency director and commission rather than the Governor, and an injunction against him would be meaningless under Ex parte Young and Article III standing requirements.

civil rightsfederal powerfamily lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Anita Graham's claims against the Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development and related state officials for alleged malfeasance, misconduct, and negligence in denying her unemployment compensation benefits after she quit her job at Sears, along with an attempt to assert a federal mail fraud claim. Graham also sought to join certain state officials as plaintiffs. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that a private citizen cannot bring a federal mail fraud action, the defendants are alter egos of the state and thus not citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit against the unconsenting state, and Graham failed to respond to the motion.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power