Paul L. Friedman

This case involved Florida condominium owners suing their homeowners' associations, management company, and related parties over allegations of an unauthorized $3.3 million loan taken without a proper membership vote, creation of undisclosed 'ghost' bank accounts, altered records, and improper assessments. Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, sought an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The court denied the motion for injunctive relief, finding no showing of irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits, and also denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. However, the court transferred the entire case to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the Florida-based parties and claims.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involves plaintiffs Krstafer Pinkerton and others suing defendants Debra Reinhardt and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. It also denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and expedited preliminary injunction proceedings. Relying on an opinion issued the same day, the court transferred the case to the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) due to improper venue.

procedure

This case involved U.S. citizen Mona Sadat Sadati, who petitioned for an immigrant visa on behalf of her father, Iranian national Seyed Ghasem Sadati. After his consular interview, the application was refused under INA Section 221(g) and placed in administrative processing, prompting the plaintiffs to sue the Secretary of State and others for unreasonable delay and to seek mandamus or APA relief compelling a final decision. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court held that, consistent with D.C. Circuit precedent in Karimova, such a refusal means the application is officially closed with no further discrete duty for the agency to perform that could be compelled under the Mandamus Act or APA.

immigrationprocedure

This case involved U.S. citizen Farshid Behmardi, who filed a Form I-130 petition for an immigrant visa on behalf of his mother, Sarvar Lorkalantari. After her visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the application was refused under INA Section 221(g) and placed in administrative processing, prompting the plaintiffs to sue the Department of State under the APA and Mandamus Act to compel a final decision on grounds of unreasonable delay. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss the complaint. It held that, under binding D.C. Circuit precedent in Karimova v. Abate, a consular refusal followed by administrative processing does not create a legal duty for the agency to take further action on the application. The court found that the cited statutory and regulatory provisions do not require additional adjudication once a refusal has occurred.

immigration

This case involved six foreign nationals who applied for immigrant visas, completed interviews at consular offices, and had their applications officially refused under INA section 221(g) before being placed in administrative processing. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of Homeland Security and other officials under the Mandamus Act and APA section 706(1), alleging unreasonable delay and seeking an order to compel final adjudication of their applications. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that consular officers have no legal duty to take further action on an already-refused application and that administrative processing is discretionary. The court further concluded that the TRAC factors for assessing unreasonable delay did not support judicial intervention, particularly because ordering expedited review would improperly reorder agency priorities among visa applicants.

immigrationprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs including Hatra Voghouei suing the Secretary of Homeland Security and related defendants via a petition for writ of mandamus along with claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action in full. The court dismissed the case without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. This constitutes a final appealable order.

immigrationprocedure

This case involved the Organic Trade Association's long-running challenge to U.S. Department of Agriculture rules governing organic livestock and poultry production standards under the Organic Foods Production Act, including claims that the agency failed to properly consult the National Organic Standards Board before issuing a Withdrawal Rule that rescinded prior proposed standards. Over nearly nine years, the plaintiff amended its complaint multiple times and the court remanded the matter to the agency twice for further rulemaking. The USDA moved to dismiss the third amended complaint, arguing the claims were moot after the agency issued a new final Organic Livestock and Poultry Standards Rule, while the plaintiff sought leave to file a supplemental complaint challenging the new rule in the existing case. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied leave to supplement, reasoning that any ongoing harm stemmed from the new rule rather than the withdrawn one, that the plaintiff had not shown a continuing policy of non-consultation, and that the proper course was for the plaintiff to file a fresh lawsuit rather than perpetuate this action indefinitely.

business & regulatoryenvironmentprocedure

This case involves defendant Harold Cunningham's multiple motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate or correct his 1997 federal sentence for armed robberies, assaults, and murders, following the D.C. Circuit's 1998 affirmance of his convictions but remand for resentencing on merger issues that has not yet occurred. The court considered whether four later pro se motions filed by Cunningham were timely amendments to his authorized motion challenging a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of Johnson v. United States. The court decided that the motions are timely and may be considered as amendments because Cunningham's judgment of conviction is not yet final. The core reasoning is that the one-year limitations period under § 2255(f) does not begin until finality of the judgment, which requires completion of the pending resentencing, regardless of the reasons for the delay.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns a challenge by the New York Times Company and others to the Department of Defense's physical access restrictions at the Pentagon, specifically an escort requirement and the closure of the Correspondents’ Corridor. The district court had previously issued orders vacating and enjoining enforcement of those restrictions. The defendants then moved for a stay of those orders pending appeal to the D.C. Circuit, or alternatively for a short administrative stay to permit briefing. The court granted a fourteen-day administrative stay but denied the broader request for a stay pending appeal.

free speechprocedure

This case concerns a challenge by The New York Times Company and reporter Julian E. Barnes to policies issued by the Department of Defense governing Pentagon Facilities Alternate Credentials (PFACs) for journalists. The court had previously ruled that certain provisions of the original policy violated the First and Fifth Amendments, vacated those provisions, permanently enjoined their enforcement, and ordered reinstatement of the credentials and access for the plaintiffs and other journalists. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to compel compliance, alleging that the Department issued a new interim policy that effectively denies access by routing PFAC holders through restricted entry points and limiting their ability to conduct reporting. The court found that the Department had not complied with the prior order, as the new policy cut off meaningful access for journalists rather than restoring it, thereby disregarding the constitutional protections for press access to government facilities.

free speechfederal powercivil rights

This case involves The New York Times Company and its journalists challenging the Department of Defense's enforcement of policies on Pentagon Facility Alternate Credentials (PFACs), including restrictions on media access, escort requirements, and rules against inducement of unauthorized disclosures. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance with its prior March 20, 2026 order, declaring that the DoD violated that order by adopting and applying portions of a March 23, 2026 interim policy. The decision found that these actions continued to impose previously vacated restrictions on routine journalistic activities and failed to reinstate the required PFAC access for specific New York Times reporters. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the listed provisions against the plaintiffs and ordered restoration of access levels matching those provided on March 20, 2026, while retaining jurisdiction to monitor compliance.

free speechcivil rights

This case involves defendant Abdur R. Mahdi's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate six convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. The convictions were based on predicate VICAR offenses including kidnapping, attempted murder, and murder. The court granted the motion after the government conceded that one conviction was invalid. The core reasoning was that the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis rendered the residual clause of § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague, and the remaining elements clause did not cover the charged predicates.

criminal lawguns

This case involves defendant Abdur R. Mahdi's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his federal sentence. The court granted the motion and vacated his convictions on Counts 27-32 for use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, along with the associated 132-year prison term imposed in 2003. The decision rests on Supreme Court rulings in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis that limited the definition of crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The order directs relief based on the reasoning in a separate opinion issued the same day.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In New York Times Company v. Department of Defense, the New York Times and its reporter challenged provisions of a new Pentagon policy governing press credentials (PFACs) required for journalists to access Department of Defense facilities, arguing that the policy violated their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments and was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motion, vacating the challenged provisions of the policy. The court reasoned that the policy's restrictions on press access contravened core First Amendment protections for a free press and informed public, as well as Fifth Amendment requirements, and that vacatur was warranted because the constitutional deficiencies were serious while any disruptive effects of partial vacatur would be minimal, given that prior credentialing rules had long served security interests.

free speechcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by The New York Times Company and its journalists to a Department of Defense policy issued in October 2025 that established rules for Pentagon Facility Alternate Credentials (PFACs) required for media access to the Pentagon. The policy included provisions stating that access was a controlled privilege rather than a right, warning of potential suspension for rule violations, outlining security risk criteria for denial or revocation, and requiring signed acknowledgments. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied it to the defendants, declaring multiple specific provisions of the policy unlawful under the First and Fifth Amendments, vacating those provisions, permanently enjoining their enforcement against the plaintiffs and other NYT-affiliated journalists, and ordering immediate reinstatement of the affected PFACs. The court reasoned that the challenged provisions violated constitutional protections by imposing improper restrictions on press access and lacking adequate procedural safeguards.

free speechcivil rightsfederal power

The case concerned multiple alleged violations of supervised release conditions by defendant Kevin Donohoe, including failures to report to probation, positive drug tests, and a July 2024 arrest for possession of a controlled substance. After detention hearings, reentry progress hearings, and a report and recommendation from the magistrate judge, the district court addressed the pending petitions. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation, finding that Donohoe had violated his supervised release conditions, sentencing him to time served for those violations, and ordering that no further period of supervision was required. This outcome was based on the scheduled expiration of supervision in May 2025, the absence of further offenses since July 2024, and the determination that Donohoe did not appear to be a danger to the community, consistent with the joint recommendation of the parties and Probation Office.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Olema Uru filing suit against Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other defendants seeking a writ of mandamus along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The entire case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

immigrationprocedurefederal power

In Uru v. Rubio, a national of Papua New Guinea residing in the United States on an L-1 nonimmigrant visa challenged the revocation of his visa by the Department of State following an arrest for suspected driving while intoxicated, which resulted in his detention by ICE and placement in removal proceedings. The plaintiff alleged that the revocation was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, ultra vires, and violated due process, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to reinstate his visa or status. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's emergency motion for a temporary restraining order as moot. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act expressly precludes judicial review of visa revocations, and the plaintiff had not raised claims in the manner required to invoke any potential exceptions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

immigrationprocedure

In United States v. Honesty, defendant Kevin Honesty filed a pro se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking a retroactive reduction of his 165-month sentence for armed bank robbery and related firearm offenses, based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 821. The amendment adjusts the calculation of criminal history points by limiting "status" points for defendants who committed offenses while under a prior criminal justice sentence. The court denied the motion, finding that even after recalculating Honesty's criminal history under the amended guidelines—resulting in eight points and Criminal History Category IV—the applicable sentencing range remained unchanged from the original calculation. Because the amendment did not lower the guidelines range, Honesty was ineligible for relief under the applicable policy statement.

criminal lawprocedure

Maziar Rajabi, a dual Iranian-Turkish national, applied for a B-1/B-2 nonimmigrant visa in Istanbul; after an interview his application was refused under INA Section 221(g) and placed in administrative processing. He sued the Secretary of State for mandamus and APA relief, asking the court to order the government to complete adjudication of his visa. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court held that a Section 221(g) refusal followed by administrative processing satisfies the statutory duty to issue or refuse a visa, so no further discrete action is legally required and claims of unreasonable delay cannot proceed. This result followed directly from D.C. Circuit precedent in Karimova v. Abate.

immigrationprocedure