Stanley Thomas Anderson

This case concerns a commercial dispute between Carbon Processing and Reclamation (CPR) and Valero Marketing & Supply Co. over alleged agreements for the purchase of petroleum slurry byproduct from Valero's Memphis refinery, including negotiations for a one-year evergreen contract and related three-year barge leases. CPR asserted claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act based on meetings, writings, and representations about slurry volume and contract duration. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and granted them in part and denied them in part, holding that some contract-formation and estoppel issues presented triable questions of fact while dismissing other claims due to insufficient evidence of reliance, causation, or statutory applicability.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the conviction of defendant Romilus Caraway for one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), based in part on testimony from government witness Ms. Latasha Johnson. After trial, the government discovered and disclosed an undisclosed grand jury transcript of Johnson's testimony, which defense counsel had requested under the Jencks Act but was not provided during trial. Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of this newly discovered evidence, arguing it contained inconsistent statements that could have been used for impeachment. The court granted the motion, ruling that the nondisclosure, though inadvertent, was prejudicial error under the Jencks Act because the transcript's inconsistencies deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

criminal lawprocedure

This ERISA case involved a dispute between Electric Energy, Inc. (EEI), the fiduciary of a self-funded employee health plan, and covered person Jack Lambert over reimbursement of medical benefits. Lambert was injured in a 2005 car accident; the Plan paid over $124,000 in benefits, and Lambert later received a $650,000 settlement from third parties. EEI sought to recover the full amount paid under the Plan’s explicit reimbursement and subrogation clause, which applied regardless of whether the settlement made Lambert whole and without deducting attorney fees. The court granted EEI’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the unambiguous Plan terms required full reimbursement from the settlement proceeds and that ERISA authorized enforcement of those terms.

healthcarelabor & employment

This case was an appeal from a bankruptcy court order granting Telesis Community Credit Union's motion to lift the automatic stay in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of debtor 460 Tennessee Street, LLC. The central dispute concerned whether the debtor's assignment of rents from its leased commercial property to Telesis, secured by a deed of trust and promissory note, constituted an absolute assignment or only a security interest in the rental revenues. The bankruptcy court determined it was an absolute assignment after finding that the loan documents used clear, unambiguous language describing the assignment as absolute, irrevocable, and unconditional, granted the debtor only a revocable license to collect rents, and aligned with factors from prior precedent such as In re Kingsport Ventures. On appeal, the district court applied de novo review to the legal conclusions and considered the debtor's claims of ambiguity arising from similar language appearing in both documents, while noting the standard of review limited reversal absent clear error.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Williams v. Hooah Security Services, LLC, security guard employees sued their employer and its owner for unpaid minimum wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging both individual and enterprise coverage. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the plaintiffs could not establish the required interstate commerce connections since operations were local to Shelby County, Tennessee. The court denied the motion, reasoning that FLSA coverage requirements constitute elements of the plaintiffs' claims rather than prerequisites for federal jurisdiction, following Supreme Court precedent in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. The court declined to convert the motion to one for summary judgment and proceeded under Rule 12(b)(1) standards but found jurisdiction proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

In Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, GP, a kitchen mechanic at the hotel who is Russian Orthodox Christian sued his employer after it denied his request to swap shifts so he could observe Orthodox Easter in 2008. The dispute centered on whether the hotel had a duty under Title VII to accommodate the plaintiff's religious practices by allowing a colleague to cover his Sunday shift despite a conflicting late-night contractor project that the colleague was scheduled to supervise. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a reasonable accommodation was possible without undue hardship and whether the employer had engaged in an interactive process, while dismissing other aspects of the claims where no such facts were shown.

labor & employmentreligious libertycivil rights

In Smith v. Shelby County, TN, plaintiff Brandon Smith alleged that Shelby County deputies used excessive force against him while experiencing a seizure following a 911 medical call, asserting § 1983 claims for constitutional violations against the deputies, the county, and the sheriff for failure to train or supervise, along with state-law negligence and assault claims under the GTLA. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in full. It held that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because the force used was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, including prior domestic violence reports at the residence, the plaintiff's resistance, and his holding a pregnant woman in a headlock. Claims against the county and sheriff were dismissed for lack of an underlying constitutional violation and because respondeat superior liability does not apply under § 1983, while the state-law claims were barred by GTLA immunity for intentional acts and civil rights violations or failed for lack of proximate cause.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Winston v. Cargill, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that her former employer discriminated against her on the basis of race under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by requiring her to work in asbestos-contaminated areas and by failing to rehire her in 2007 due to her race and/or in retaliation for protected activity. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to comply with local rules in disputing the defendant's facts, leading the court to adopt those facts as undisputed, and that there was no credible evidence of direct discrimination or a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Trotter v. Cargill, Inc., the plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race discrimination and retaliation after an earlier severance of a joint complaint. The court had previously dismissed the retaliation claim on a motion to dismiss. It now grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the race discrimination claim, finding no direct evidence of discrimination and that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework or to present specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial as required by Rule 56. The court also noted the absence of evidence supporting a hostile work environment claim based on the authenticated record.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involves a dispute between Carbon Processing and Reclamation (CPR) and Valero Marketing & Supply over alleged agreements for the purchase and removal of No. 6 Fuel Oil, a petroleum byproduct from Valero's Memphis refinery. CPR asserted claims for fraud in the inducement, promissory fraud, promissory and equitable estoppel, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, and conversion, based on spot sales, negotiations for a long-term supply arrangement, and Valero's alleged promises regarding delivery terms and barge procurement amid storage constraints. The court granted in part and denied in part Valero's motion to dismiss the amended complaint, applying Tennessee law to evaluate the sufficiency of the pleadings. It dismissed certain claims, such as promissory estoppel, due to inadequate allegations of reasonable reliance and the statute of frauds, while allowing others, including aspects of breach of contract potentially arising from the parties' course of conduct under UCC provisions, to proceed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Hicks v. Concorde Career College, plaintiff John K. Hicks, an admissions representative terminated in December 2008 after removing confidential company documents, sued his former employer alleging racial discrimination in pay and classification, retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, and a racially hostile work environment. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court reasoned that Hicks failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment or retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework because his comparators had verifiable prior experience that justified higher starting salaries, he did not meet performance goals, and no evidence linked his termination to protected activity rather than the policy violation. The court also found insufficient evidence of severe or pervasive racial harassment or that any such conduct was based on race.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Tina Clarke, who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2005 and later brought claims against her former employer UPS for age and disability discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, Section 1981, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The court granted UPS's motion to dismiss after adopting in part the magistrate judge's report, holding that Clarke lacked standing as the bankruptcy trustee was the real party in interest and that judicial estoppel barred the suit. The core reasoning centered on the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that debtors continuously disclose all assets, including potential legal claims, and Clarke's failure to amend her schedules after filing the lawsuit, which the court found inconsistent with her position in the bankruptcy proceeding.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

This case involved property owners suing the City of Memphis for flooding on their apartment complex land caused by an adjacent concrete drainage ditch and channel. The ditch had been built primarily by private developers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the city later assuming maintenance after annexation but not redesigning or reconstructing most of it; plaintiffs alleged the city's failure to upgrade the system to handle increased runoff from upstream development caused backups through low inlets onto their property. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment under Tennessee law, finding no genuine dispute of material fact on liability. The court reasoned that municipalities are not liable for drainage issues they did not create or for failing to improve pre-existing private systems to newer standards, especially where the property's low elevation and inlets contributed to the problem and the city had made no warranty against flooding.

propertytorts & liability

This case involves a personal injury claim arising from a jet ski accident on Greer’s Ferry Lake in Arkansas, where plaintiff Jamin Fleming was thrown from the watercraft while riding with defendant Robert Stifolter and suffered head injuries. Fleming sued jet ski owner James Williams, alleging negligent entrustment for allowing Stifolter to operate the jet ski. The court granted Williams’ motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The core reasoning was that Williams had no reason to know or believe Stifolter was incompetent or inexperienced with jet skis, as required under Arkansas negligent entrustment law based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 308 and 390, and that Stifolter’s use was for personal pleasure rather than any business purpose of Williams.

torts & liability

The case involved defendant Billy Johnson, who was indicted on charges including murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) after allegedly arranging the murder of his mother and later receiving life insurance proceeds via mail to pay the hitman. Johnson moved to dismiss Count Three, arguing that the indictment failed to state an offense because the interstate mailings occurred after the murder and thus could not have furthered or facilitated it as the statute requires. The court denied the motion, holding that the federal murder-for-hire statute contains no temporal requirement that the use of the mails or other interstate facility must precede the murder. The court reasoned that the post-murder mailings were part of the charged scheme and that analogies to the Travel Act or mail fraud statutes did not apply, as the murder-for-hire provision focuses on intent rather than strict sequencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Johnson, the defendant moved to dismiss the conspiracy count in his indictment for murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), arguing that it failed to allege an overt act as a required element of the offense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the indictment was sufficient because the statute does not require proof of an overt act for conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire. The court reasoned that, consistent with Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedents on similar conspiracy statutes that omit any overt act requirement, such an element should not be read into the statute when it is not explicitly stated.

criminal law

In Speck v. City of Memphis, former employee Patricia Speck sued the City of Memphis under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging age-based discrimination, a hostile work environment that forced her resignation, and retaliation for protected activities. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Speck failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, as she did not demonstrate she was replaced by a substantially younger employee or that similarly situated younger workers received better treatment. Her hostile work environment claim lacked evidence of severe or pervasive age-based harassment, and her retaliation claim failed because no protected activity occurred before the alleged adverse actions.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Triplett v. Shelby County Government, plaintiff Johnny Triplett, a Shelby County corrections employee who also worked full-time for the VA, sued the county after his termination for violating its secondary employment policy limiting outside work to twenty hours per week. He alleged race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, plus claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, stemming from a Loudermill hearing and subsequent Civil Service Merit Board review that resulted in a suspension and probation instead of termination. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Triplett had not established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework and that his other claims failed as a matter of law due to insufficient evidence of improper motive or constitutional violations.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by Juli Lewis against Norfolk Southern Railway Company after her mother, Darlene Lewis, was killed while attempting to cross between parked train cars on the defendant's tracks in Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged negligence, claiming the train began moving without warning, causing the decedent to fall underneath a boxcar. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff and decedent were trespassers on the property and thus owed only a limited duty of care under Tennessee law to avoid intentional, willful, or reckless injury. The court determined there was no evidence that the railroad acted recklessly, as it had no knowledge of the individuals crossing at that time, and concluded that the well-worn path exception did not apply to impose a higher duty.

torts & liability

The case involved Kenneth and Patricia Woodward suing the City of Paris, Tennessee, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming the city discriminated against them by denying a zoning variance to build a carport that would help Mrs. Woodward, who has Multiple Sclerosis and uses a motorized chair, access her vehicles without getting wet. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment. The reasoning was that the plaintiffs failed to show discrimination solely because of the disability, as the city denied the variance due to the carport violating the 15-foot side yard zoning requirement, a decision that would apply equally to any similar property regardless of the owner's disability. The court noted that the ADA does not require cities to grant variances or permits that they would not grant for non-disabled individuals.

civil rightsproperty