Abe Fortas

The case concerned whether a state prisoner pursuing federal habeas corpus relief could use interrogatories under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 to obtain discovery about an informant's reliability in challenging a search and seizure. The Supreme Court held that Rule 33 does not apply to habeas proceedings and that 28 U.S.C. § 2246 authorizes interrogatories only in narrow circumstances not present here. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that district courts possess authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to employ suitable discovery tools, including interrogatories, when a petition presents a prima facie case and additional facts are needed to decide the matter as law and justice require. The decision reversed the Ninth Circuit's prohibition on such discovery and remanded for reconsideration by the district court.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

In Foster v. California, the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery based on an eyewitness identification obtained through a series of police lineups and confrontations. The Supreme Court held that the identification procedures violated the defendant's due process rights because they were unnecessarily suggestive and likely to lead to mistaken identification. Specifically, the first lineup featured the petitioner as the only tall man in a leather jacket similar to the robber's, followed by a one-on-one confrontation, and then a second lineup where he was the sole repeat participant, making the identification virtually inevitable. The Court reversed the conviction, applying the totality of the circumstances test from prior cases like Stovall v. Denno.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Johnson v. Avery, a Tennessee prisoner serving a life sentence challenged a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from assisting each other with legal writs or other legal matters, after he was placed in disciplinary confinement for violating it. The Supreme Court held the regulation invalid because it effectively barred access to federal habeas corpus for illiterate or indigent prisoners. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental constitutional right that states may not obstruct through prison rules, even when those rules aim to maintain discipline and limit unauthorized legal practice, unless adequate alternative assistance is provided.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, several students were suspended from public schools for wearing black armbands to express opposition to the Vietnam War, pursuant to a newly adopted school policy prohibiting such symbols. The Supreme Court ruled that the suspensions violated the students' First Amendment rights, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the armbands represented protected symbolic speech akin to pure speech, that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, and that the school could not prohibit the expression absent a showing that it would cause material and substantial interference with school discipline or operations.

free speechcivil rights

This case concerned petitioners affiliated with a white supremacist group who held a rally in Princess Anne, Maryland, and planned to hold another, after which local officials obtained an ex parte restraining order from a state court without notice to petitioners, barring rallies likely to disturb citizens for 10 days and later extended for 10 months. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the 10-day order but reversed the longer injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the case was not moot given the petitioners' ongoing activities and held that the ex parte orders constituted unconstitutional prior restraints on speech, as they were issued without notice or an opportunity for an adversary hearing to address the claimed dangers. The Court emphasized that temporary restraints on First Amendment rights require procedural safeguards to prevent suppression of expression based solely on one party's presentation.

free speech

This case involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that made it illegal for public school teachers to teach the theory of evolution or use textbooks that did so. A high school biology teacher sought a declaration that the law was unconstitutional after a new textbook including evolution was adopted. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was enacted to promote a particular religious viewpoint by suppressing the teaching of evolution, rather than serving a secular educational purpose.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case concerned Alabama's imposition of a transient photographer license tax on a North Carolina corporation that sent photographers to temporary setups in J.C. Penney stores in eight Alabama cities to take pictures of children, with film later developed in North Carolina. The company challenged the assessments in state court as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the tax, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reasoned that the tax applied to the separable local activity of providing photographic services within the state, rather than to interstate solicitation, delivery, or processing, and therefore did not impermissibly burden commerce. It distinguished prior cases involving taxes on minimal interstate contacts and noted that the activity's local character was reinforced by its integration with in-state retail operations.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a New York City patrolman who was subpoenaed before a grand jury investigating police corruption and was fired under the city charter after refusing to sign a waiver of immunity regarding his testimony, claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that the officer could not be dismissed solely for refusing to waive this constitutional protection. The core reasoning was that, unlike situations where an employee is compelled to answer specific questions about official duties (which may be permissible under Garrity v. New Jersey if immunity applies), discharging him for not relinquishing the privilege itself violates the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a New York corporation that had contracted with a public housing authority under agreements containing a clause disqualifying the firm for five years if any officer refused to waive immunity before a grand jury, as required by state Public Authorities Law § 2601. After the corporation's president was subpoenaed and declined to sign a waiver in a bid-rigging investigation, the authority terminated the contracts and imposed the disqualification, even though the president had resigned his positions beforehand. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the action, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is personal to individuals and unavailable to corporations, so the corporation could not challenge the statute or contract clause on that ground. It also declined to disturb the state court's finding that the resignation was a sham designed to evade the disqualification.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved 15 New York City sanitation department employees who were dismissed after refusing to testify or sign waivers of immunity during an official investigation into fee collection irregularities at city facilities, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court dismissed their constitutional challenge, and the Second Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the employees could not be fired solely for invoking their right against self-incrimination or refusing to waive immunity, as the proceedings forced a choice between constitutional protections and continued employment rather than seeking only a direct accounting of official duties. The decision relied on precedents like Garrity v. New Jersey and Gardner v. Broderick, emphasizing that compelled testimony under threat of job loss could not be used for criminal prosecution and that public employees retain full constitutional rights.

criminal lawcivil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a petitioner who was convicted in New York state court of burglary and grand larceny and sought federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that illegally obtained evidence had been used against him at trial. After filing his federal petition while in custody, the petitioner was unconditionally released upon expiration of his sentence before the case reached final adjudication. The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot, overruling Parker v. Ellis, because the conviction imposed ongoing collateral consequences such as disqualification from certain businesses, union office, voting, and jury service. The Court reasoned that the federal habeas corpus statute requires custody only at the time the application is filed, after which jurisdiction is not defeated by subsequent release, allowing adjudication of the merits.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case concerns a 1953 district court ruling finding that United Shoe Machinery Corp. violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the shoe machinery market, leading to a decree with restrictions and conditions aimed at fostering workable competition rather than dissolution. The decree allowed for a 1965 review to evaluate its effects, after which the Government petitioned for additional relief including dividing the company into competing entities, asserting that dominance persisted. The district court denied the petition, relying on the Swift & Co. standard limiting modifications to cases of grievous wrong from unforeseen conditions. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that Swift permits modification when decree purposes like eliminating monopoly have not been achieved, and remanded for further proceedings on appropriate relief.

business & regulatory

The case concerned Missouri's ad valorem tax assessment on the rolling stock of the Norfolk & Western Railway after it leased the Wabash Railroad, using a statutory mileage formula to allocate a portion of the company's total rolling stock value to the state. The railroad challenged the resulting $19.9 million assessment as unconstitutional under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, arguing it taxed property located outside Missouri because the formula did not reflect the actual lower value of rolling stock present in the state. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the mechanical application of the formula produced an assessment so disproportionate to the value of taxable property in Missouri as to constitute an impermissible reach beyond the state's borders. The Court reasoned that while states may use apportionment formulas for interstate enterprises, the formula must have a sufficient relation to opportunities or benefits conferred by the taxing state and cannot tax out-of-state property without a plain connection to value within the state.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether the False Claims Act applies to the submission of false invoices in support of applications for loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation, a federal agency. The Supreme Court held that the Act does reach such applications for loans, reversing the lower courts' dismissal of the action. The Court reasoned that the Act's broad language and history demonstrate an intent to cover any fraudulent claims that could cause financial loss to the Government, including those seeking favorable government action like loans, as distinguished from prior cases involving insurance guarantees where no direct payment occurred.

criminal lawfederal power

The case involved whether the six-year statute of limitations under 26 U.S.C. § 6531 barred prosecution for tax crimes based on returns filed in August 1960, when the indictment was filed in August 1966. The District Court dismissed two counts, holding that the limitations period began on the original May 1960 due date rather than the actual filing dates, even though extensions had been granted. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the period runs from the date the returns were actually filed. The Court reasoned that the reference in § 6531 to the rules of § 6513(a) applies only to early filings or advance payments, not to returns filed during extensions, as confirmed by the statutory text and legislative history.

criminal lawtaxes

The case involved six employees of Fleetwood Trailer Co. who went on an economic strike in August 1964; after the union accepted the employer's contract offer and ended the strike, the workers sought reinstatement but were initially denied because production had been curtailed, and the company later hired six new employees for positions the strikers were qualified to fill before eventually reinstating the original workers. The NLRB found that the employer committed unfair labor practices under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by failing to reinstate the strikers when jobs became available. The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, holding that the strikers' rights were fixed at the date they first applied for reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the strikers remained employees under § 2(3) of the Act and that an employer refusing reinstatement must prove legitimate and substantial business justifications, which Fleetwood had not done because the jobs were later filled by new hires rather than being eliminated for nondiscriminatory reasons.

labor & employment

The case concerned two incidents in 1961 where barges sank in the Mississippi River, allegedly due to negligence by their owners and operators, creating obstructions to navigation and, in one instance, a major public safety hazard from a cargo of liquid chlorine. The United States sought declaratory relief requiring responsible parties to remove the wrecks or reimbursement for the government's own removal costs under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's ruling that the government could assert in personam claims for such relief against the negligent parties, rather than being limited to in rem actions against the vessels or cargo. The core reasoning was that Section 15 of the Act, which prohibits voluntary or careless sinking of vessels, read together with precedent like United States v. Republic Steel Corp., authorizes the United States to enforce removal obligations or recover expenses from those at fault.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryenvironmenttorts & liability

The case concerned challenges to Interstate Commerce Commission orders approving the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads and requiring inclusion of certain other railroads, including the New Haven, in the merged Penn-Central system or the Norfolk & Western system. These transactions implemented the long-standing congressional policy, expressed in the Transportation Acts of 1920 and 1940, of consolidating the nation's railroads into a limited number of systems through voluntary mergers reviewed by the ICC under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court described the dominant market positions of the Pennsylvania and New York Central lines, the competitive overlaps between them, and the conditions imposed to protect smaller railroads and ensure the transactions were just and reasonable. It affirmed the Commission's orders as consistent with statutory authority and the public interest in railroad reorganization.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to issue rules requiring railroads that offer trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC or "piggyback") service to the public under open tariffs to also provide that service on equal terms to motor and water common and contract carriers, and permitting those carriers to use TOFC in performing their own authorized transportation. A three-judge district court invalidated the ICC's Rules 2 and 3 from its Ex parte 230 proceeding, holding that the Commission lacked power to compel such access and that motor and water carriers could use TOFC only with railroad consent. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the ICC possessed statutory authority to promulgate the rules. Its core reasoning was that TOFC service is inherently bimodal, combining rail and motor transportation, and that the Interstate Commerce Act's provisions on open tariffs and common-carrier obligations do not permit railroads to discriminate against other carriers or allow the rigid modal compartmentalization adopted by the district court.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned a consulting agreement between Prima Paint Corp. and Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. that included a broad arbitration clause, following Prima Paint's purchase of the respondent's paint business. Prima Paint sued in federal court to rescind the agreement, claiming it was induced by fraud because Flood & Conklin misrepresented its solvency and ability to perform, while the respondent moved to stay the suit and compel arbitration. The Supreme Court held that the fraud-in-the-inducement claim must be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court. The core reasoning was that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, the arbitration clause is separable from the rest of the contract, so challenges to the contract's validity (as opposed to the arbitration provision specifically) are for the arbitrator when the clause is broad and the parties did not intend otherwise.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power