Harold Michael Fong

The case involved an employee who sued his employer, a contractor performing maintenance work at a military base under a federal contract, claiming he was entitled to additional wages under the Davis-Bacon Act rather than the Service Contract Act based on a Department of Labor investigation. The plaintiff sought damages for unpaid wages that the DOL had allegedly determined were due. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The core reasoning was that the Davis-Bacon Act does not create a private right of action allowing individual employees to sue contractors directly for alleged wage violations.

labor & employment

This case involves plaintiff Stephanie Bragalone's claims against her employer Shell and related entities after she was not selected for the executive housekeeper position at a Hawaii resort in 1991, which went to a younger employee. Bragalone alleged age discrimination under federal and state law, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from her employment as assistant executive housekeeper and interactions with resort management. The court denied summary judgment on the age discrimination and retaliation claims against the primary defendants, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding pretext and discriminatory animus, but granted summary judgment to the Joint Venture on all claims and dismissed the emotional distress claim. It also granted the motion to toll backpay as of February 1992 and denied the motion to strike as moot. The rulings were based on application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and analysis of the evidence presented in the affidavits and depositions.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves plaintiffs Henry Kersting and associated corporations seeking reconsideration of prior court orders in a tax dispute with the United States, specifically challenging the denial of motions to disclose alleged government invasion of attorney-client privilege through an IRS informant (Luis DeCastro), to exclude evidence from a 1981 search warrant and grand jury materials used for civil purposes, to strike certain affidavits, and to compel witness appearances. The court denied all motions for reconsideration and related requests. It reasoned that plaintiffs had long known of the relevant issues without acting diligently, that DeCastro's statements were consistent and not fraudulent, that no new evidence or manifest legal error justified reconsideration under applicable standards, and that the court lacked jurisdiction or basis to compel further testimony or issue orders to show cause against the government.

taxesprocedure

In Sunn v. City & County of Honolulu, a street musician who performed for tips on public sidewalks in Waikiki was arrested nine times under a city ordinance banning the sale or offer for sale of services in that area; he was acquitted in each case because courts found the ordinance inapplicable to his conduct. After the individual officers received qualified immunity on the plaintiff's federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it could not be liable and that probable cause existed for the arrests. The district court denied the motion, holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude the City maintained a policy or custom of disregarding state court interpretations of the ordinance, which could amount to deliberate indifference in supervision or training. The court noted that repeated enforcement despite acquittals raised triable issues of municipal liability under § 1983.

civil rightscriminal law

This case concerns Rodolfo Monroy Baria, a native of the Philippines, who obtained lawful permanent resident status through a marriage to a U.S. citizen that the Immigration and Naturalization Service later determined was a sham entered solely to gain immigration benefits. The district court reclassified and granted the government's motion to consider the administrative record as one for summary judgment, after Baria filed an untimely response. The court affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to rescind Baria's adjustment of status under section 246 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The ruling rested on the finding that the BIA's determination of fraud was supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, including the sequence of Baria's divorce, remarriage, and separation, along with testimony and documentary evidence from his second wife.

immigration

This case concerns a dispute over underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under an Allstate auto insurance policy issued to the defendant's mother. The defendant, injured as a passenger in a 1986 single-car accident, settled his tort claim against the driver and later sought UIM coverage from Allstate in 1992, after the last no-fault payment in 1988. The court was asked to determine the applicable statute of limitations for the UIM claim. It held that the two-year limitations period under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 294-36 governs UIM claims as additional no-fault coverage, rather than the six-year contract statute, and that the period began running from the date of the last no-fault payment. Because the claim was filed more than two years after that date, the court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion.

proceduretorts & liability

In Kealoha v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., plaintiffs alleged they were injured by a Vitek Proplast TMJ implant that incorporated PTFE raw material supplied by DuPont to the now-bankrupt manufacturer Vitek; they asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation, while also suing Dow Corning. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants. Dow's motion was unopposed because it had terminated its marketing agreement with Vitek before the implant was sold. DuPont prevailed because, as a bulk supplier of an inert industrial material to a sophisticated, FDA-regulated purchaser that substantially altered the product and assumed responsibility via waiver, it owed no legal duty to the ultimate consumers under Hawaii tort law.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved Hawaii Electric Light Company (HELCO) seeking summary judgment against two unions, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, for allegedly engaging in unlawful secondary picketing at a power plant construction site. The dispute arose when HELCO used a reserved gate system to separate access for non-union contractors from union workers, but the unions picketed neutral gates, which HELCO claimed violated the National Labor Relations Act by targeting neutral employers. The court granted HELCO's motion in part, finding the unions liable for secondary picketing starting from specific dates in 1992 because the reserved gates were properly established and maintained, with only minor isolated breaches. It denied summary judgment on the exact amount of damages, however, due to unresolved factual disputes over the extent of HELCO's claimed losses from the picketing. The Electricians' cross-motion for summary judgment was also denied.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case is a wrongful death action brought by Mary Rose Wheelock after her husband David died in a 1991 paragliding accident at Kualoa Ranch when the lines on his equipment broke at altitude. The court considered Kualoa Ranch's motion to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction (due to California citizenship of the plaintiff, decedent, and defendant Sport Kites, Inc.), the plaintiff's counter-motion to drop the non-diverse defendant, and a joined motion for summary judgment based on a pre-activity release of liability signed by David. The court ruled that Sport Kites could be dismissed to preserve jurisdiction because it was not an indispensable party under Rule 19 and the remaining defendants would not be prejudiced, as they could still seek apportionment of fault or indemnification. On the summary judgment motion, the court analyzed the signed release and concluded that it validly barred claims based on ordinary negligence and express assumption of risk but left open potential liability for gross negligence due to ambiguity in the contract language.

proceduretorts & liability

This case arose from the 1989 breakaway and grounding of the Exxon Houston from a single point mooring (SPM) owned by the HIRI defendants, leading to claims for damages including to the SPM itself. HIRI sued manufacturers and sellers of SPM components under negligence and strict products liability theories. The court granted the defendants' motions for partial summary judgment, holding that HIRI could not recover in tort for damage to the SPM. The reasoning applied the economic loss doctrine from East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., treating the entire SPM as the product that was the object of the parties' bargain rather than "other property," thereby barring tort recovery for its damage.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by Small Landowners of Oahu to the constitutionality of Honolulu Ordinance 91-95, which authorized the City to use eminent domain to acquire leased fee interests in land under condominiums and resell them to the condominium owners at fair market value, aiming to address a shortage of fee simple residential land. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the U.S. and Hawaii constitutions. The decision relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which upheld a similar lease-to-fee conversion statute as a valid exercise of eminent domain for a public purpose. The court found the ordinance rationally related to correcting concentrated land ownership and did not violate due process, equal protection, or other constitutional provisions, while noting that compliance with city charter procedures was not ripe for review in a facial challenge.

property

This case involves a state prisoner who assisted another inmate by serving legal process on a prison staff member and was subsequently suspended from his prison job, placed in disciplinary segregation, and subjected to other restrictions, prompting him to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights, due process violations, conspiracy, and denial of court access. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge's recommendation de novo and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment only on the claim that the librarian violated the plaintiff's rights by restricting his law library access, while denying summary judgment on all other counts and remanding certain issues. The core reasoning was that an inmate's assistance in litigation through service of process is a form of protected expression and association under the First Amendment that survives reasonable prison restrictions, so the retaliation and related claims could not be resolved in the defendants' favor on the existing record.

civil rightsfree speechcriminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over an individual disability income insurance policy issued by Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company to Sherry Gasaway. After Gasaway submitted a claim for benefits citing fibrositis and related symptoms, NML investigated and discovered multiple material omissions and misrepresentations in her application regarding prior medical conditions, treatments for mental health issues, prescription drug use, and receipt of prior disability payments. NML filed a counterclaim seeking rescission of the policy. The court granted NML's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, finding that the misrepresentations were fraudulent, increased the insurer's risk, and justified rescission within the policy's contestable period, thereby disposing of Gasaway's claims for benefits.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved citizen suits by environmental groups against the City and County of Honolulu alleging ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act at the Honouliuli wastewater treatment plant. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment finding liability for 52 illegal bypasses, 52 failures to report them, and daily violations of secondary treatment requirements since 1988. After trial, the court determined there were 9,870 secondary treatment violations between 1988 and 1992. It ordered the city to pay civil penalties, upgrade the plant to secondary treatment by specified deadlines, implement interim measures, and fund environmental monitoring, while entering declaratory relief confirming the violations and plaintiffs' prevailing party status. The reasoning was based on the plant's documented failure to meet NPDES permit limits and statutory requirements, supported by evidence of effluent discharges and operational records.

environment

The case involved Security Pacific Bank Washington seeking to satisfy a judgment against Alan Chang by reaching two real properties held in his revocable living trust, which contained a spendthrift provision barring creditors from accessing the assets. The properties had originally been conveyed to the trust by Chang and his wife as tenants by the entirety, and the defendants argued these could not be reached by Chang's individual creditors. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the bank's, ruling that the spendthrift clause was valid as to these properties because Chang was not their settlor in a manner that would invalidate the protection, given that the bank could not have reached the tenancy-by-the-entirety assets before the trust's creation. The decision relied on Hawaii precedent favoring protection of family-owned property from individual creditors and the absence of any windfall or unfairness to the bank.

propertyprocedure

In Stewart v. Sullivan, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits under Title II, resulting in a district court remand for additional evidence that ultimately led to an award of benefits by the administrative law judge. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after determining that the plaintiff was a prevailing party in a final judgment and that the government's position lacked substantial justification. The court awarded fees for documented attorney and paralegal time at the statutory rate adjusted for inflation but denied any state excise tax on the fees and adjusted compensation for certain ministerial paralegal tasks.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case involves IRS penalties assessed against Kersting for promoting abusive tax shelters under sections 6700 and 6703, with Kersting seeking a refund in Kersting I after partial payment and 33 corporations (alleged alter egos) seeking to enjoin levies in Pacific Paradise. The court denied the government's motion to dismiss Kersting I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the 15% prepayment prerequisite applies annually rather than to an aggregate penalty. For Pacific Paradise, the court denied the motion to dismiss most counts, including constitutional and damage claims under sections 7432 and 7433, but granted dismissal of the punitive damages claim in count nine due to lack of statutory authorization and sovereign immunity. The reasoning centered on following Ninth Circuit precedent from Bond v. United States on statutory interpretation, finding that other claims sufficiently stated facts or raised issues not resolvable on a motion to dismiss, and applying the Anti-Injunction Act and related procedural rules.

taxesfederal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a dispute arising from Borden's termination of its distributorship agreement with Paulson for grocery products in Hawaii, after which Bromar replaced Paulson as Borden's broker; Paulson had previously used Bromar as its own distributor and alleged breaches of confidentiality and non-solicitation provisions in agreements with Bromar, along with claims against Borden including unfair competition and first-refusal rights. The court addressed multiple motions for summary judgment and dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 12(b)(6), applying standards requiring no genuine issues of material fact for judgment as a matter of law and drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party. It granted Bromar's motion in part on breach of contract and unfair competition claims related to solicitation and disclosure but denied it on others, denied Paulson's counter-motions, and granted Borden partial summary judgment on first-refusal claims while denying the rest. The core reasoning focused on the absence or presence of evidence supporting specific contractual breaches or competitive harms, without finding sufficient facts to support all claims at trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Allstate Insurance v. Wyman, Allstate sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits to Concepcion Wyman, who was injured as a passenger in a car accident caused by her husband Michael. The car, owned by Rosa Heavey with no insurance, was covered by an Allstate policy through a relative that applied to Michael, but Hawaii interspousal tort immunity barred Concepcion from recovering against him, prompting her negligent entrustment claim against Heavey and a corresponding uninsured motorist claim against Allstate. The court denied Allstate's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the vehicle was uninsured under Hawaii statutes and the policy because no insurance was applicable to Concepcion, liberally interpreting the remedial uninsured motorist provisions in her favor and distinguishing contrary precedent involving workers' compensation barriers.

torts & liabilityfamily lawbusiness & regulatory

This case is an insurance coverage dispute in which P.W. Stephens sought a defense and indemnification from Mid American under a policy issued for an asbestos removal subcontract at Pearl Harbor, after an employee was injured cutting into an energized cable and sued the United States and Oregon Electric, who then asserted indemnity claims against P.W. Stephens. The parties disagreed on whether the policy provided general liability coverage or was limited to asbestos-related injuries. Applying Hawaii law after a choice-of-law analysis, the court held that the policy's employee exclusion barred coverage for the injury claims, that the incidental contract provision did not override the exclusion, and that the duty to defend was not triggered because the claims fell outside the policy; it therefore granted Mid American's motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied P.W. Stephens' cross-motion.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure