Joel Martin Flaum

In United States v. Bradley Cox, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the Northern District of Indiana on charges of sextortion under 18 U.S.C. § 875, coercing minors into sexually explicit conduct under § 2251, and receiving child pornography under § 2252A, based on a scheme in which he used fake Facebook accounts to blackmail victims—including two minors—into providing explicit images by threatening to release hacked photos. Cox appealed, raising Fourth Amendment challenges to a warrantless search of his work computer, Fifth Amendment claims regarding the lack of Miranda warnings during two interviews, Sixth Amendment objections to evidentiary rulings, and an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions in full. It upheld the searches and statements as constitutionally permissible and concluded that the government presented ample evidence—including Cox’s multiple confessions, forensic links between his devices, commute patterns, and the extortion phone number, plus eyewitness identification—to allow a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even though other individuals may have had some access to the accounts.

criminal lawprocedure

Elizabeth Huston, a subscriber to Good Housekeeping magazine, filed a putative class action against Hearst Communications alleging that the company violated the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) by offering to sell and selling mailing lists that included her name, address, and other personal details to data brokers for targeted advertising. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under IRPA, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that IRPA requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant publicly used or held out the plaintiff’s identity for a commercial purpose, such as in connection with selling a product. It concluded that Huston’s identity was not used or held out by Hearst to sell the mailing lists themselves, to promote magazine subscriptions, or in any other manner covered by the statute’s definition of commercial purpose. As a result, the complaint failed to allege the necessary elements of an IRPA violation.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

Rock Hemp Corp. sued Adam Dunn and two other individuals in Wisconsin state court over allegedly defective hemp seeds purchased from their business, CBDINC, asserting claims for fraud, misrepresentation, and warranty breaches under a contract containing a binding arbitration clause. After Rock Hemp disclosed in discovery that it sought $250,000 in damages, the defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss for failure to arbitrate; the district court denied Rock Hemp’s motion to remand, granted dismissal, and later denied reconsideration. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 because the initial complaints did not unambiguously state an amount exceeding the jurisdictional threshold, the claims fell within the arbitration clause, and the Rule 60(b) motion improperly introduced new arguments and evidence not previously presented.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this appeal, Anthony Lomax challenged the district court’s handling of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to contest a prior Indiana cocaine conviction that had triggered a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841, as well as the court’s determination that his 2004 attempted murder conviction qualified as a crime of violence supporting career-offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The district court had granted Lomax relief on the § 841 issue by finding him actually innocent of the enhancement, vacated his original 400-month sentence, and resentenced him to 300 months without that enhancement, but it did so without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-assistance claim and retained the career-offender designation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that no evidentiary hearing was required because the record already supported granting relief on actual-innocence grounds, and that the attempted-murder conviction remained a crime of violence under Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, which treats inchoate offenses as qualifying and was unaffected by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned Roman Lloyd, who faced federal charges for credit union robbery and transporting stolen money after a 2019 incident in Illinois. Delays in transporting him for a court-ordered mental competency evaluation caused more than seventy nonexcludable days to pass, violating the Speedy Trial Act; the district court dismissed the original indictment but exercised its discretion to do so without prejudice, allowing the government to promptly refile the same charges. Lloyd then pleaded guilty while reserving the right to appeal the without-prejudice ruling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court had properly considered the statutory factors—including the seriousness of the offenses, the circumstances of the delay (such as systemic issues with evaluations and transport), and the impact on the administration of justice—without abusing its discretion in opting for dismissal without prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

Nathaniel Clay and John Knox were convicted in 2010 of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin and received sentences of 320 and 255 months, respectively. After Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act, which retroactively lowered penalties for certain crack cocaine offenses, the defendants moved under § 404(b) for reduced sentences. The district court first ruled them ineligible because their offenses also involved heroin, then alternatively held that even if eligible it would decline to reduce the sentences after weighing the § 3553(a) factors and other information. On appeal the government conceded eligibility, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the district court’s discretionary refusal to grant relief was not an abuse of discretion because it had thoroughly considered the relevant statutory and case-specific factors.

criminal law

Rickie Foy was convicted after a bench trial of conspiring to commit bank theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(b) for joining others in a daytime attempt to break open a Bank of America ATM in Chicago using tools such as hammers and crowbars, an effort recorded on the machine’s surveillance camera but ultimately unsuccessful. On appeal, Foy argued that the government was required to prove intent to steal more than $1,000, that the evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy, and that the district court erred at sentencing by treating the civil unrest following George Floyd’s death as an aggravating factor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, reasoning that § 2113(b) does not require proof of the monetary threshold for a conspiracy conviction under the indictment’s allegations, that the video footage of coordinated tool-sharing and efforts supplied adequate evidence of an agreement, and that the sentencing court’s reference to the surrounding events was factually supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Johnson, defendants Willie Johnson and Anessa Fierro were charged under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), for using gasoline and a bat to damage buildings during riots in Madison, Wisconsin, following the 2020 shooting of Jacob Blake. They moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute facially exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. The district court denied the motion, and after the defendants entered conditional guilty pleas, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held the statute constitutional because its jurisdictional element—requiring that the damaged property be “used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting” it—limits its reach to conduct with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as interpreted by Supreme Court precedents including United States v. Jones and consistent with the framework of United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and Gonzales v. Raich.

criminal lawfederal power

Nathaniel Clay and John Knox were convicted in 2010 of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin and received sentences of 320 and 255 months, respectively. After Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act to reduce penalties for certain crack cocaine offenses and make them retroactive, the defendants moved for sentence reductions under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. The district court denied the motions, first ruling the defendants ineligible because their offenses also involved heroin (whose penalties were unchanged) and alternatively holding that it would not exercise its discretion to reduce the sentences even if eligibility existed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the government’s concession of eligibility but concluding that the district court’s discretionary denial was not an abuse of discretion because it had thoroughly weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including the defendants’ rehabilitation efforts, criminal history, offense seriousness, community impact, deterrence needs, and the unchanged ten-year minimums tied to the heroin quantities.

criminal law

In Anthony Smith v. City of Janesville, Black-owned towing company Flying A.J.’s sued the City of Janesville after the police department removed it from its no-preference tow list, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for prior complaints against police under federal civil rights statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Smith failed to present sufficient evidence that race or protected complaints motivated the removal. The court reasoned that the department had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision, including the company's unresponsiveness to police communications, failure to properly notify a customer during a tow, and a complaint involving potential theft of property, which were documented and not shown to be pretextual.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatory

Suzanne Parker, a part-time receptionist with multiple sclerosis and sciatica, sued her employer Brooks Life Science under the ADA, alleging that her termination was retaliation for requesting time off as a reasonable accommodation for medical treatment. The district court granted summary judgment to Brooks, finding insufficient evidence of a causal connection between Parker’s accommodation request and her firing. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable juror could infer retaliation because the record showed Parker was terminated for repeatedly violating the company’s paid time off policy despite prior coaching, and statements suggesting otherwise came from a non-decisionmaker uninvolved in the process. Contemporaneous emails from supervisors confirmed the policy violations as the stated reason, with no reference to the accommodation request, and the issues predated the request by several months.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Ricky Thurston was convicted of felony rape in Indiana after DNA from cigarette butts at the crime scene matched him. In this federal habeas appeal, he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to a DNA report that referenced a “sperm fraction” from another rape case involving him (IP06051889), which he claimed improperly suggested a propensity to commit such crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, concluding that the Indiana Court of Appeals had reasonably applied Strickland v. Washington when it found the isolated reference too vague to support a forbidden inference and insufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict. The opinion emphasized that the mention was never explained or highlighted at trial, that the jury received limiting instructions, and that corroborating evidence such as the victim’s documented injuries supported the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Christopher Blitch v. United States, the petitioner appealed the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to reopen the judgment on his earlier 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition, which challenged his sentence from a conviction in an ATF undercover “stash house” sting operation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The court held that Blitch’s motion, which claimed the district court had overlooked his argument based on Mathis v. United States regarding a prior conviction’s use for a sentencing enhancement, was properly treated as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion alleging mistake rather than a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Because the motion was filed more than a year after the denial of the § 2255 petition, it was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1), and the underlying claim could have been raised on direct appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose after Jonathon Tubby was fatally shot by Green Bay police officer Erik O’Brien in a jail sally port while being booked on outstanding warrants; Tubby had refused to exit the squad car, concealed a hand under his shirt in a manner officers interpreted as hiding a gun, ignored commands, and appeared to attempt escape, prompting use of pepper spray followed by gunfire after officers heard a sound they believed was a gunshot. Tubby’s estate sued the involved officers, the City of Green Bay, Brown County, and related agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force, failure to intervene, and a state-created danger, along with related state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that O’Brien’s use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable officer could have believed Tubby was armed and posed an imminent threat, and that qualified immunity independently barred liability. The court further ruled that the state-created danger doctrine was inapplicable, as it addresses only harms inflicted by private actors rather than by law enforcement officers themselves. With no viable federal claims remaining, the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims was upheld.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involves third-party claims in ancillary forfeiture proceedings following Joseph Furando’s guilty plea to fraud-related offenses, in which the government sought forfeiture of assets including real property in New Jersey, vehicles, and bank accounts. Christine Furando and affiliated LLCs petitioned under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) asserting innocent-owner interests in the property, but the district court denied the petition nearly three years later on the same day it granted the government’s motion for an interlocutory sale of the real estate. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of the § 853(n) petition and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the sale order. The court reasoned that the district court had not properly adjudicated the claimants’ petition but had adequately exercised its discretion under Supplemental Rule G(7) by incorporating the government’s arguments regarding property deterioration, unpaid taxes, and maintenance burdens.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

In United States v. James Vorley, two former Deutsche Bank precious metals traders, James Vorley and Cedric Chanu, were convicted of wire fraud for placing large “spoofing” orders on the CME Group’s electronic trading platform (Globex) for gold, silver, and palladium futures contracts that they intended to cancel before execution. The government alleged these orders were designed to create a false impression of market supply or demand to induce other traders to react in ways that benefited the defendants’ smaller genuine orders on the opposite side. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the defendants challenged whether such manual spoofing could constitute wire fraud and raised several trial-related issues, including Speedy Trial Act violations. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that placing orders with the intent to cancel them before they are filled can amount to a deceptive scheme under the wire fraud statute because it misleads market participants about genuine trading interest.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case arose after an infant died from bedding asphyxia while napping at Kellie Glick’s home daycare, prompting a wrongful-death suit by the child’s estate against Glick; Liberty Mutual then sought a declaratory judgment that its homeowners policy imposed no duty to defend or indemnify Glick. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the insurer. The policy’s Section II business exclusion and separate home-day-care endorsement barred coverage for bodily injury arising from a compensated daycare enterprise, and Glick’s regular $25-per-day childcare services plainly qualified. Because the underlying claim fell outside the policy’s scope, the insurer had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify. The court held that the unambiguous policy language controlled, rendering any separate two-part “business pursuit” test from prior Illinois cases inapplicable.

propertytorts & liability

James Lumpkin was convicted in Wisconsin state court of drug offenses, including two counts of possession with intent to deliver, after police found him with multiple drugs packaged in small bags and over $1,100 in cash. He sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately cross-examine key prosecution witness Stacey Suiter, whose testimony was inconsistent, and that the state appellate court unreasonably applied the prejudice standard from Strickland v. Washington in rejecting his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition without deciding whether counsel’s performance was deficient. It held that the state court’s no-prejudice finding was reasonable because, even if Suiter’s testimony had been entirely discredited, the remaining evidence—including the quantity and packaging of the drugs, expert testimony on street-level distribution, a recorded jail call, text messages, and testimony from another witness—overwhelmingly supported the intent-to-deliver convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

David Major pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin and fentanyl and to two counts of distributing those drugs, and he was sentenced to 240 months in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court made erroneous factual findings that inflated his Sentencing Guidelines range and that designating him a career offender based on his prior convictions overstated his criminal history and produced an unreasonable sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court committed no clear error in its factual findings and did not abuse its discretion in applying the career-offender guideline or in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable and that the district judge adequately explained the sentence by reference to Major’s prior drug and kidnapping convictions, his leadership role, the fentanyl-laced product he distributed, and his role in a user’s death.

criminal law

In United States v. Lajuan Fitzpatrick, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and of murder resulting from the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, arising from his participation in a botched armed home invasion robbery targeting a marijuana dealer that resulted in the fatal shooting of an uninvolved bystander. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Fitzpatrick challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the reasonableness of his sentence. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the trial evidence adequate to support the jury's verdict, and upheld the sentence as reasonable under the sentencing factors, noting that it did not constitute a de facto life sentence beyond the defendant's projected lifespan and that differences from co-conspirators' sentences were justified by their cooperation with authorities.

criminal lawguns