Martin Leach-Cross Feldman

This case involves offshore drilling companies challenging federal regulations that require Development Operations Coordination Documents (DOCDs) and drilling permits for development and production activities in the western Gulf of Mexico outside areas adjacent to Florida, following the 2010 BP oil spill. The plaintiffs contended that these requirements exceeded the agency's authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as similar plans and permits were statutorily limited to the Florida Gulf or exploration activities. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the government's motion in part and denied it in part on Counts V and VI. The core reasoning applied the Chevron test and APA standards to conclude that the long-standing regulations were within the Department of the Interior's broad statutory authority, as DOCDs differ substantively and procedurally from DPPs and permit requirements are authorized for development drilling.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

This case is a federal civil rights action brought by subtenants of a Bourbon Street property in New Orleans against their lessors and related entities, alleging a conspiracy with state actors to evict them after they installed a mechanical bull as part of their entertainment operations, which violated the terms of their sublease and prompted a state-court eviction ruling requiring its removal. The defendants moved to dismiss the federal suit or, alternatively, to have the court abstain or stay proceedings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction over claims seeking to overturn the state-court judgment and that Colorado River abstention factors supported staying or dismissing certain parallel claims arising from the same facts.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

This case involves Ensco Offshore Co. challenging delays by the Department of the Interior and BOEMRE in processing five specific deepwater drilling permit applications in the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and subsequent moratoriums. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to compel agency action on permits that had been pending for four to nine months, far exceeding the pre-spill average of two weeks. The court granted the injunction, ordering BOEMRE to act on the applications within thirty days, after finding that the plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on claims of unreasonable agency delay under applicable standards, irreparable harm from stalled operations and lost contracts, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored relief to restore regulatory normalcy.

business & regulatoryenvironment

This case involves a breach of contract dispute between Gulf Coast Facilities Management, L.L.C. and BG LNG Services, L.L.C. over an oral agreement for property management services at a port facility in Louisiana, including negotiating subleases and collecting rent in exchange for a 10 percent commission. Gulf Coast claimed it was entitled to ongoing commissions even after BG terminated the relationship, while BG sought to avoid payment. The court granted BG's motion for summary judgment and denied Gulf Coast's partial summary judgment motion. The core reasoning was that Gulf Coast and its principals lacked the required Louisiana real estate broker license to perform the services at issue, rendering the agreement an absolute nullity under state law that could not be enforced.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerns a challenge by offshore oil and gas service companies to a six-month moratorium on deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, imposed by the Secretary of the Interior following the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that the moratorium was issued contrary to law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and related regulations. The court granted the motion, finding that the Secretary's memorandum and supporting report failed to adequately explain or justify the blanket suspension of operations, including by misrepresenting expert consensus on the need for a broad moratorium and not addressing required factors such as irreparable harm or implementation timelines under 30 C.F.R. 250.172. The decision turned on the administrative record showing that the moratorium exceeded the scope supported by the evidence and expert input reviewed.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

In United States v. Ginn, Darrell Ginn pleaded guilty to drug distribution charges, leading to a preliminary forfeiture order for a Cadillac Escalade and $1,035 in cash. Ashley Cummings and Marsha Ginn filed third-party petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) asserting ownership interests in the property, but neither petition was signed under penalty of perjury nor provided details on the time or circumstances of acquisition. The government moved to dismiss the petitions for failing to meet statutory requirements and for insufficiently stating a claim. The court granted the motions, holding that the petitions lacked standing and failed to state a claim because they did not comply with the signing requirement or provide adequate factual support for the asserted interests.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case concerns a drydock owned by Southern Scrap that broke free from its moorings and partially sank in the Industrial Canal during Hurricane Katrina, after which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers arranged for its emergency removal as a navigation hazard. The United States sued to recover the removal costs under the Wreck Act (33 U.S.C. § 409), while Southern Scrap initiated a limitation proceeding under the Limitation of Liability Act and asserted counterclaims alleging negligence by the Corps related to the MRGO and the storm response. The court granted summary judgment on liability to the United States, denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss or stay the counterclaims (staying those based on MRGO construction and operation due to sovereign immunity and ongoing related litigation), and granted in part and denied in part the motion regarding actual wreck removal costs. The core reasoning addressed the applicability of the Wreck Act to the vessel owner, distinctions between recoupment and setoff for counterclaims against the government, and the procedural need to sever unrelated claims pending resolution of other proceedings.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case is a trademark declaratory judgment action in which Louisiana resident Daniel Sinclair, who registered the TERMINATOR mark for products including condoms and beverages, sued French company StudioCanal after it sent a cease-and-desist letter asserting superior rights in its TERMINATOR movie franchise marks and threatening litigation. Sinclair sought a declaration that his use of the mark did not infringe StudioCanal's rights and invoked federal question, diversity, and supplemental jurisdiction. The court granted StudioCanal's motion to dismiss, finding it lacked both subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and denied Sinclair's request for jurisdictional discovery. The core reasoning was that a cease-and-desist letter alone does not create sufficient contacts or purposeful availment by the foreign defendant in Louisiana, and no licensees or other activities tied StudioCanal to the forum.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a homeowner suing Allstate for inadequate adjustment of his Hurricane Katrina property damage claim and related bad faith allegations, filed after the policy's one-year contractual limitations period had run. The court granted Allstate's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the suit as time-barred. The core reasoning was that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 596, which allows class actions to suspend prescription, applies only to statutory liberative prescription periods and not to contractual limitations periods in insurance policies, which the court treated as distinct and non-suspendable by class actions.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves an EEOC lawsuit against Saks Fifth Avenue (Sfaila, LLC) alleging that the company discriminated against employee Marlene Babin, a makeup artist with ulcerative colitis, by terminating her after she took multiple approved medical leaves for surgeries and returned with a broken wrist. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment from the EEOC, which argued that Saks provided shifting and false reasons for the firing, and from the defendant, which contended the termination was based on legitimate policies like a 30-day waiting period after extended leave. The court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasons for termination, Babin's ability to perform her job, and whether the stated policies were applied consistently or pretextually. Core reasoning centered on evidence that Babin had remaining leave available, had worked with her injury prior to firing, and that internal communications suggested dissatisfaction with her medical absences as potential indicators of discrimination under federal employment law.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned a patent dispute over a chess-like board game using lasers and mirrors, where Innovention Toys accused MGA Entertainment and retailers of infringing U.S. Patent No. 7,264,242 with their competing Laser Battle game. The court granted Innovention's motion for summary judgment on infringement, denied MGA's cross-motion on non-infringement, granted Innovention's motion upholding validity, and denied MGA's motion asserting invalidity. The decision followed a prior Markman hearing that construed disputed claim terms, then compared the accused product's features to the patent claims while finding that prior art references like Laser Chess did not anticipate the invention or render it obvious to a skilled artisan. All issues of remedies were reserved for trial.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a cargo damage claim by Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp. and its insurer against the vessel M/V FU AN CHENG and its owner Xiamen Ocean Shipping Company after baked carbon anodes shipped from China to New Orleans arrived damaged. Xiamen moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(3) based on a forum selection clause in the bill of lading that required disputes to be settled in the flag-state of the ship or another mutually agreed place. The court granted the motion, holding the clause mandatory and enforceable under federal law because it used "shall" to limit available forums and applied to all disputes arising under or in connection with the bill of lading. The clause bound Xiamen even though it was not named in the bill, as the plaintiffs' claims were tied to the contract of carriage and could not be severed into separate tort claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a dispute over insurance claims for wind and flood damage to a New Orleans home from Hurricane Katrina under homeowners and flood policies issued by State Farm. The plaintiffs sought additional payments beyond initial adjustments, including under Coverage A for dwelling damage, Coverage B for personal property, and Coverage C for loss of use, along with bad faith penalties, after mediation attempts failed and they filed suit. The court granted State Farm's motions for partial summary judgment on all contested issues. It held that Louisiana's Valued Policy Law did not apply because the total loss was not caused solely by a covered peril, that the bad faith claims failed due to lack of evidence that State Farm was arbitrary and capricious, and that the remaining claims failed because the plaintiffs breached post-loss duties by suing before reinspection, could not distinguish wind from flood damage, relied on speculation or conclusory evidence for contents and habitability, and had already received payments exceeding proven covered losses.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned First Amendment challenges by Public Citizen, Inc. and several Louisiana lawyers to new state rules restricting lawyer advertising, including bans on references to past results, promises of outcomes, non-client portrayals without disclaimers, depictions of judges or juries, and certain nicknames or mottos, as well as requirements for prominent disclaimers. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and partially granted and denied the cross-motions for summary judgment, holding that some rules (such as the prohibition on judge portrayals) were constitutional while others (including broad bans on result references and overly burdensome disclaimer mandates) failed scrutiny as not narrowly tailored to advance the state's interest in preventing misleading communications. The court's reasoning applied the Central Hudson test for commercial speech, finding that Louisiana had a substantial interest supported by surveys and committee review but that several rules were either overbroad, not directly advancing that interest, or more restrictive than necessary based on the evidentiary record.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a personal injury lawsuit filed by Larry Viator against Dauterive Contractors and others arising from an incident on a barge in 1997. After settlements and third-party demands, including claims against an insurer Steamship Mutual, the case was removed from state court to federal court based on an arbitration clause in the insurance policy under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. The court denied the motion to remand the case to state court and granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the Convention provides broad removal jurisdiction that does not require consent from all parties and preempts certain state laws regarding arbitration in insurance contracts.

proceduretorts & liability

This case challenged the Tangipahoa Parish School Board's practice of opening its public meetings with prayers, often delivered by local clergy and invoking Christian themes, as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The district court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. It held that the legislative prayer exception from Marsh v. Chambers applies to the School Board as a deliberative public body, even though students sometimes attend and participate in meetings. The court reasoned that students are not required to attend Board meetings, distinguishing this from school-sponsored prayer cases, but found that factual disputes over whether the prayers proselytize or exploit religion require a trial.

religious liberty

This case involves a class action breach of contract claim by Auto Refinance Source, Inc. (ARSI), as assignee of a vehicle retail installment contract, against HSBC entities for allegedly charging precomputed interest instead of the simple interest specified in the contract terms. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (LMVSFA) provides the exclusive remedies for disputes arising from motor vehicle credit transactions and precludes the common-law claim. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the claims against HSBC Holdings because no facts alleged it was a party to the contract or liable for its subsidiary's actions, but allowing the claims against HSBC Auto Finance to proceed. The core reasoning was that LMVSFA section 6:969.33(G) limits remedies only for violations of the Act itself and does not bar additional state-law claims such as breach of contract, while factual disputes over the validity of the contract assignment could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Khaled Qader's lawsuit against FEMA after it denied his request for additional payments on two Standard Flood Insurance Policies covering New Orleans properties damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Qader had received an initial payment in 2006 but disputed the amount; FEMA's June 2006 letter rejected his supplemental claim unless he provided specific documentation, which he later attempted to supply via sworn proofs of loss before filing suit in September 2007. FEMA moved for summary judgment, contending the action was time-barred under the one-year limitation in 42 U.S.C. § 4072 and that extra-contractual damages were unavailable. The court denied the motion in part, holding that a genuine factual issue existed as to whether the June letter qualified as a statutory notice of disallowance triggering the filing deadline, but granted it in part by dismissing claims for attorneys' fees, costs, interest, and other extra-contractual relief because the NFIA's limited waiver of sovereign immunity does not authorize such remedies.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved Prime Insurance Syndicate suing former surplus lines insurance brokers Bennie Jefferson and Maximal Insurance, Inc., for unpaid premiums and taxes totaling over $113,000 under two broker agreements, after which the district court entered judgment for Prime in the amount of $87,087.81 plus attorney fees to be determined later. Prime then moved to fix attorney fees at $69,523.82 under Utah law, which the defendants opposed on amount. Applying Utah standards for reasonableness—including the work actually performed, necessity of that work, customary local rates, and other factors like case complexity and results obtained—the magistrate judge recommended and the district court approved a reduced award of $52,010.62 after reviewing billing records and making appropriate deductions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a pre-trial detainee who filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against St. Tammany Parish jail officials, alleging unconstitutionally unsanitary conditions of confinement for ten days, denial of adequate psychiatric medical treatment for ADHD and anxiety, invasion of privacy from a guard using a cell phone camera, and excessive force when pulled to the ground while shackled. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The core reasoning was that the holding cell conditions and minor injuries did not meet constitutional thresholds, the medical treatment was not deliberately indifferent, the camera use was not shown to violate privacy, and the force applied was reasonable and de minimis in response to a security risk.

civil rightscriminal law